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THE PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF
CAPITAL CASES BY STATE HIGH
COURTS AFTER GREGG: ONLY "THE
APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE"?*
LEIGH B. BIENEN**

Much of the discussion is designed to explain the process of record-gathering
and the methods of analyses, both of science and law, that can be used to conduct
proportionalityreview and to assess the relevance of the data to system-wide claims
of unconstitutionalinfliction of the death penalty ....
Although we recognize that proportionalityis not a scientific determination,
we have attempted to make our determinationas precisein terms of their bases and
reasoning and as objective as possible. We have used scientific and statistical
measures, when helpful, although we recognize that a valuejudgment is built into
practically every measurement. A life is at stake, and although some degree of
subjective value judgment may be required, we have attempted to make thosejudgments explicit so that they can be analyzed and tested against whatever objective
measurements are applicable.'
I.

INTRODUCrION

In the twenty years after the United States Supreme Court approved the parameters for the reimposition of capital punishment in
Gregg v. Georgia2 and its accompanying cases, 3 state and federal courts

have been presented with constitutional challenges to capital punishment based upon statistical evidence of racial and geographic dispari* This article is dedicated to the memory of Robert N. Wilentz, the late ChiefJustice of
the New Jersey Supreme Court.
** Senior Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law; BA., 1960, Cornell University; MA, 1963, University of Iowa Writers' Workshop;J.D., 1975, Rutgers (Newark) School
of Law. The author wishes to thank many people for their contributions to this article,
including those who read and commented on the manuscript, the participants in the Proportionality Review Project, and especially Douglas L. Mills, David C. Baldus, Nina Rossi,
Dale Jones, Claudia van Wyk, Deborah W. Denno, Neil A. Weiner, Ronald J. Tabak, and
James R. Acker.
1 State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1064 (N.J. 1992).
2 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
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ties in state capital case processing systems.4 These challenges are
supported by the Supreme Court decisions in Furman v. Georgia5 and

Coker v. Georgia,6 which both implied, without explicitly holding, that
racially- and geographically-based disparities in the implementation of
capital punishment were fundamental constitutional infirmities.
The majority of state legislatures and supreme courts took the
United States Supreme Court at its word and belieyed that Gregg
meant what it said: newly revised state capital punishment systems
were going to be different from the old systems, and one important
difference would be the requirement of proportionality review. Gregg
in the context of Furmanstrongly implied that a state capital punishment scheme would be declared unconstitutional if it exhibited the
patterns of disparity declared unconstitutional in Furman.
The post-Gregg statutes enacted by various states addressed the
structure and substance ofjury decision-making at trial. 7 As an additional safeguard, Gregg endorsed Georgia's statutory requirement of
proportionality review,8 a new appellate procedure designed to assure
that the imposition of the death sentence under the revised statutes
would not be characterized by the fundamental flaw of arbitrariness
which made the former system unjust.9 Proportionality review is the
comparison of a death sentence with sentences imposed in similar
4 The term "capital case processing system" will be used in this article to refer to the
set of laws, rules and procedures governing the prosecution of capital cases within a single
state. Within each state, local prosecutors are subject to jurisdictional boundaries, usually-but not always-termed counties. The legal authority of prosecutors may, but does
not always, correspond to sharp demographic differences. See infra Appendix B.
Those challenging the reinstituted capital statutes presented empirical evidence of
racially- and geographically-based discrepancies in capital case processing, whether the result of intentional discrimination or passive systemic discrimination, in order to establish
the factual foundation for a constitutional challenge to the restructured state capital punishment systems.
5 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
6 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
7 These statutes are discussed infra in Appendix A.
8 This statute required the state supreme court to review each death sentence to determine, "ifthe sentence imposed is excessive compared with the sentence imposed in similar
,cases." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c)(3) (1983). Justice White rephrased the provision as
"[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed
in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 212 (1976) (White, J., concurring). Justice White's formulation was typically incorporated into state statutes at the time of reenactment.
9 The Georgia statute, which controlled discretion by introducing a structure of aggravating and mitigating factors, was upheld in Gregg while the statutes which attempted to
eliminate arbitrariness by introducing a mandatory system for imposing capital punishment were struck down. Compare Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (upholding
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 et seq.) with Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976)
(striking down statute which totally removed jury discretion) and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (same).
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cases, to determine whether the sentence is fair or proportionate.
The principle is that the death sentence is disproportionate if other
defendants in similar cases are not sentenced to death. This statutory
mandate can implicate broad principles of federal and state constitutional law and trigger the implementation of an empirical examination of the state's entire capital case processing system, raising issues
of racial and economic disparity and questioning the charging practices and autonomy of local prosecutors. Or, it can result in no more
than a conclusory sentence tacked on to the end of a state high
court's affirmance of a death sentence.
The increasing use of proportionality review by state high courts
in the period 1976-1991 mirrored tremendous changes in the jurisprudence and politics of capital punishment nationally: the withdrawal of federal courts, especially the United States Supreme Court,
from the death penalty arena; increased political pressure upon state
judicial institutions from both state legislatures and the electorate; 10
and polarized debate within the courts themselves. How state high
courts approach proportionality review expresses a great deal about
how these courts see themselves and their role within their own states
and in the national criminal justice system.1 '
But despite the mandate given them by the absence of the United
States Supreme Court on these issues, many state high courts ignored
or dismissed statistical evidence of systemic disparities in capital case
processing. Some courts held that such evidence could not even be
presented to a state appellate court, neither within the context of proportionality review, nor as part of the direct appeal of an individual
death sentence. Some members of these state high courts expressed
10 A controlled empirical study of death penalty decision making in four state high
courts (California, Louisiana, NewJersey, and Ohio) from 1980-1988 found judicial voting
behavior to be significantly related to several variables: age and seniority of the justice,
party affiliation, institutional effects, state environmental characteristics and other variables. These states were chosen to maximize variation in institutional features and to provide regional representation. Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Toward an IntegratedModel
ofJudicial Voting Behavior,20 Am. POL. Q. 147 (1992).
11 See The Appearance ofJustice: Juries,Judges, and the Media Transcript,86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1096 (1996) [hereinafter Justice Transcript]. Recent empirical research supports the proposition that in capital cases, judges in state supreme courts are influenced by
the prospect of not being elected or retained:
[U]nder restricted conditions, elected justices in state supreme courts adopt a representational posture. District-based elections, close margins of victory, approaching the
end of a term, conditioning from previous representational service, and experience in
seeking reelection influence liberal justices to join conservative majorities in death
penalty cases in Texas, North Carolina, Louisiana, and Kentucky... Instead of public
policy goals drivingjudicial decisions, basic self-interest may also be an important consideration to the state supreme court justice when rendering decisions.
Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL.
427, 442-43 (1992).
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the view that the issue of racial and geographic disparities in capital
case processing was not justiciable if these disparities were caused by
prosecutorial discretion, since prosecutorial decision-making is not
subject to judicial review. In several jurisdictions the question provoked dissension among the justices and conflict between the state
high court and the state legislature. Other state high court justices
believed these considerations went to the heart of proportionality
review.
Were state supreme courts only interested in maintaining the "appearance ofjustice"' 2 on the issue of racial and geographic disparities
in capital sentencing? 1 3 After the United States Supreme Court held
in Pulley v. Harris'4 that proportionality review was not mandated by
federal constitutional principles, the majority of state high courts reduced proportionality review to a perfunctory exercise.' 5 Perhaps
state high courts were simply responding to more generalized political
pressures to uphold death sentences. 16 When the United States
Supreme Court declared in McCleskey v. Kemp17 that evidence of statistically significant racial disparities based on the race of the victim was
not a sufficient ground for declaring the Georgia capital punishment
system unconstitutional, many state high courts used the federal case
as an excuse not to consider constitutional challenges to capital punishment based on statistical evidence of racial or geographical disparities in any context, undermining the entire foundation of
proportionality review as defined in Gregg.
Is the "appearance ofjustice" the same as the doing of justice?' 8
12 See generally Peter David Blanck, The Appearance of Justice Revisited, 86 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 887 (1996).

13 Courts are especially sensitive to charges of racial bias when the decision makers in
the criminal justice system are overwhelmingly white, and those receiving the "justice" are
blacks or other racial minorities. See Justice Transcript, supra note 11, at 1113.
14 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
15 There are now 39 reenactingjurisdictions. Twenty incorporate some form of a proportionality review provision in their statute, and in three other states the state supreme
court has imposed proportionality review. See Appendix A.
16

Nationally, there is a close correlation between the method of selection ofjustices of a

state supreme court and that court's affirmance rate in death penalty appeals. For the
period 1977-87, death penalty affirmance rates varied among state supreme courts
according to manner of judicial selection as follows: executive appointment, 26.3%;

uncontested retention

elections, 55.3%; nonpartisan contested elections, 62.9%; parti-

san contested elections, 62.5%; legislative appointments, 63.7%.
Gerald F. Uelmen, ElectedJudiciary,in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERiCAN CONSTIrUTION 170,
171 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., Supp. I 1992).
'7 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Is Sometimes the credibility of the court can be damaged when a judge attempts to
maintain the appearance ofjustice. Recently a furor was created at a NewJersey sentencing proceeding held after the penalty phase trial had resulted in a hung jury when a'vic-
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The just result in these cases may not be the reversal of death
sentences, but rather the establishment and maintenance of systematic and meaningful proportionality review. The opinions show many
state high courts to be troubled about their responsibilities, suspicious
of statistical evidence, and uneasy about the reliability of the factual
record documenting disparities. In such states, the opinions illustrate
the tension created when a law-and-order appellate court, whose
judges are often mindful of their own retention, is both presented
with a clearly guilty defendant and evidence of system wide disparities
with a possibly significant relationship to the race of the victim or
defendant.19

The Supreme Court of NewJersey is the exception. 20 It has taken
considerable initiative to implement proportionality review: the court
appointed a Special Master, ordered the preparation of a data base to
compile statistics for proportionality review, and allocated the time
and resources necessary to develop the factual predicate, methodolog21
ical tools and constitutional principles for proportionality review.
Nonetheless, to date no death sentence in New Jersey has been held
to be disproportionate, even after subjection to this scrutiny.
Are state courts only going through the motions on proportionality review? The buck should have stopped at the state supreme court;
in most states it did not. Is proportionality review now continued only
to maintain the "appearance of justice"? This examination of how
state high courts have actually implemented proportionality review
will, hopefully, offer a perspective on these questions.
tim's outraged family confronted an unrepentant defendant.
Before sentencing Johnson lthe defendant], Judge Hoffman chastised him as "the
man who made car jacking a household word" and blasted him for committing crimes
that caused suffering for the victim, her family and residents throughout the state.
"The devastating impact that this crime had, not only on the people of this community, but also on the citizenry of this state, must be considered in imposing sentence,"
Hoffman said .... Hoffman loaded up maximum prison terms against Johnson by
imposing separate, consecutive terms... Under the sentence, the defendant faces life
plus 100 years in prison and cannot become eligible for parole until he has served 80
years behind bars.
Jim O'Neil, Emotions Seethe as Shollar Killer Gets Life Plus, Curses Her Family, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark), May 9, 1995, at 1. See also comments ofJudge Hoffman, Justice Transcript; supra
note 11, at 1126-27.
19 See comments ofJudges Yaskin and Cordell, Justice Transcrip4 supra note 11, at 113335.
20 See infra Part JV.C.
21 See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1063 (N.J. 1992). The opinions in Marshall
describe the history and development of the Proportionality Review Project in NewJersey.
The Order appointing the Special Master delegated to the court's own expert the authority
and responsibility to collect and analyze data on all homicide cases in the state since the
reimposition of capital punishment. See Order, reprinted in Leigh B. Bienen et al., The
Reimposition of CapitalPunishment: The Role of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REv, 27,
371 (1988).
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This Article analyses how state courts have addressed issues of racial and geographical disparities in capital case processing in the context of proportionality review. Part H of the Article sets out the
doctrinal foundation for proportionality review established by the
United States Supreme Court in 1976. After Gregg, however, the
United States Supreme Court shifted away from an analysis of state
capital punishment systems, as systems. In a series of landmark ruling
the United States Supreme Court indicated it would not overturn state
capital punishment systems on the basis of aggregate challenges. Part
II of this Article sets out the difference between an analysis of a capital
case processing system and a challenge to an individual death
sentence.
Part III examines how state high courts and legislatures redefined
and interpreted the principles of proportionality when sharp doctrinal changes in the capitaljurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court became apparent. Immediately after Gregg all capital punishment jurisdictions faced the same situation. The United States
Supreme Court in 1976 had strongly endorsed the procedures and
principle of proportionality review set out in Georgia, but no state
actually done it. Neither state high courts nor state legislatures wanted
to risk the prospect of having their capital case processing system or
newly reenacted statute declared unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court. Most reenacting states included a provision for
proportionality review in their capital statute. The state high court typically took charge of implementing proportionality review after the
legislature enacted the skeletal language of proportionality from
Gregg.
Each state developed its own capital punishment jurisprudence
over the course of the next two decades, against the backdrop of
changing attitudes towards crime and race in the country as whole.
This jurisprudence frequently included the state high court's response to empirical evidence of racial and geographical disparities in
capital case processing within the state. State high courts responded
with a great deal of variety to the presentation of these data and to
being presented with quantitative evidence of disparities and disproportionality in capital case processing. Yet some state high courts did
take the responsibility for preparing and maintaining a reliable factual
record of capital case processing in the jurisdiction.
Table 1 provides the details of dates of reenactment, of the state's
first affirmance of the statute and the date of first execution, and the
time differences between these events, for each capital punishment
state. In several states it was ten years between reenactment and the
state high courts first affirmance of a death sentence. And there were
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waves in the patterns of reenactment and executions.
Table 2 sets out the specifics on death row populations and executions, and some ratios between theses levels as of 1984, 1987 and
1996, again for each capital punishment state. Some surprising relationships are seen when states are compared with regard to these data.
Some states reenacted early but have relatively small death row populations. Other states have large death row populations, but relatively
few executions. Still other states reenacted early and are at a high level
on all measures and have been so since reenactment. The ratio between a state's death row population and the number of executions in
the state is interesting and surprising.
Part III continues the analysis of patterns observed in the jurisprudence of proportionality review in the individual states by setting
out the principal ways in which states responded to the disappearing
mandate of the United States Supreme Court: 1) by repealing their
statutory requirement; or 2) by severely limiting the pool of cases or
scope of review. In addition some states simply let the process atrophy
through disuse.
Part IV describes proportionality review in practice in three very
different states, illustrating the conflicts that arose between state legislatures and state high courts over proportionality review and the presentation of empirical evidence of racial and geographical disparities
in capital case processing. Section A details the scenario to date in
Connecticut, where issues of proportionality are still pending
although the legislature repealed the statutory requirement. Section B
sets out the unusual dialogue between the state legislature and the
state high court in Nebraska.
Section C outlines in greater detail the considerable capital jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and the conflict between the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the state legislature and the
Attorney General of New Jersey. During the decade between reenactment and the court's first affirmance and proportionality review a
body of state constitutional case law was developed under the leadership of the late Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz.
Part V places the 1995 reenactment in New York within the context of the experience of other states, and especially New Jersey. The
unique legislative history in New York and the timing of the New York
reenactment resulted in proportionality review provisions unlike
those in any other jurisdiction. These are the most specific provisions
for proportionality review enacted by any state legislature. They include two provisions requiring the state high court to consider aggregate data on racial and geographic disparities. Even though no death
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sentence has yet been imposed in New York, the expectation is that
racial and jurisdictional disparities will be a principal issue. The New
York Court of Appeals has anticipated this development by calling for
expert advice on issues of data collection and analysis for the purpose
of proportionality review.
Part VI concludes by noting that state high courts have been the
principal, if somewhat reluctant, interpreters of constitutional doctrine regarding proportionality review since Gregg, for better or for
worse. Strong differences have emerged across states and within a single state's jurisprudence during the twenty year period since Gregg, as
the numbers on death row increased. Each state legislature and court
has been its own conscience. As this decade comes to a close it is clear
that issues of proportionality in the application of capital statutes will
remain salient into the next century.
Appendix A sets out the details of reenactment and proportionality review for each capital state and describes how each state's institutions addressed constitutional challenges to racial and geographical
disparities in capital case processing.
Appendix B describes the development of the initial factual foundation for proportionality review in New Jersey, beginning with an accurate and complete identification of all homicides in thejurisdiction.
Appendix B includes basic tables describing the patterns and distribution of homicides in the state and the stages of capital case processing.
The preparation of a comprehensive and reliable factual basis is a necessary predicate to addressing the constitutional dimensions of proportionality in any jurisdiction. The identification of discrete decision
making stages in the state's capital case processing system is the second step in the preparation of a database for proportionality review.
Appendix B describes the beginning of this process in New Jersey.
Without a solid factual foundation constitutional interpretation is an
abstraction.
Appendix C is comprised of a memo by the Supreme Court of
New Jersey's quantitative expert to the Administrative Office of the
Courts in New Jersey detailing the finding of statistically significant
race effects, including the models, in capital case processing in New
Jersey and a subsequent Order in response to these data, dated October 22, 1996, of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Donald
Loftin, regarding proportionality review.
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THE FOUNDATION FOR PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN

CAPITAL CASES
A.

TAKING THE SUPREME COURT AT ITS WORD

When the United States Supreme Court upheld the new capital
punishment statutes in Gregg v. Georgia,22 it did so on the premise that
the procedural safeguards introduced in capital statutes after 1972 addressed the fundamental inequities which led the Court to declare all
state capital punishment schemes unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia.2 3 While there was no majority opinion in Furman, there was a
consensus that the imposition of capital punishment under then-existing statutory schemes violated fundamental rights guaranteed by
the United States Constitution. 24 The perceived infirmity of the then
existing capital statutes was that they provided capital sentencers with
unbridled discretion, producing death sentencing patterns that could
25
only be described as "wanton" or "freakish."
A cornerstone of the Furmanholding was that the death penalty is
inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available. 2 6 There was, therefore, no meaningful basis for distinguishing
the cases of those few who were executed from the many who were
not.2 7 This recognition became the bedrock of proportionality re22 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23 408 U.S. 238 (1972). These opinions have generated a very large literature. See
MICHAEL L. RADELET & MARGARET VANDIVER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1988) (listing 971 books and articles as ofJune 1, 1988). E.g., Robert
Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305 (1984). Commentary has not been
confined to professional legal publications. Economists, criminologists, systems analysts,
and other social scientists have also studied the relationships between patterns of homicide, demographic variables, and the imposition of capital punishment. See e.g., Isaac Ehrlich, The DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment:A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REv.
397 (1975); Lawrence R. Klein et al., The DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment:An Assessment

of the Estimates, in NATIONAL

RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: EsTIMAT-

(Alfred Blumstein et al.
eds., 1978); and James A. Fox and Michael L. Radelet, PersistentFlaws in Econometric Studies
of the DeterrentEffect on the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. LA L. REv. 29 (1989).
24 This article will not address the reimposition of capital punishment on the federal
level. However, the possibility of a relatively large number of federal capital prosecutions
allows for arguments of disproportionality in the application of the federal death penalty,
especially if the disparities are based upon regional differences in prosecutorial charging
practices and result in racial differences.
25 Furman, 408 U.S. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring).
26 The relative infrequency with which the death penalty is imposed is such that "there
is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not." Furman,408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
27 NewJersey, for example, has approximately 500 homicides a year. In the immediate
post reenactment period there were never more than 50 capital trials in a year, and never
more than 10 death sentences imposed. See infraAppendix B tbls. B1, B17. Even Texas,
the state with the largest number of executions, executes a small proportion of those senING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 336-60
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view, a new principle arising from the principles expressed in Furman.
It was the number of cases which could have resulted in a death sentence but did not, in proportion to the number of death sentences
actually imposed, which forced the Court to conclude that execution

28
was arbitrary and fundamentally unjust.
So that death sentences would no longer be "cruel and unusual
in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual," 29
the revised capital punishment statutes which followed Gregg introduced a structure of aggravating and mitigating factors intended to
guide the discretion of the sentencer. In Gregg the Court held that the
infirmities of the former capital punishment schemes had been addressed by Georgia's revised statute.30 The Georgia statute restructured the decision to impose the death sentence by requiring the jury
to make specific factual findings as to the presence or absence of statutorily defined aggravating and mitigating factors.3 '
The caprice and arbitrariness of the former system would also be
prevented by multi-layered, expanded appellate review, including proportionality review. Proportionality review created the framework for a
comprehensive analysis of the state capital punishment system. The
Georgia statute required the state's highest court to conduct proportionality review by examining the operation of the capital punishment
system as a whole, adding to the refashioned death penalty decisionmaking a new system for comparing the death sentence on appeal
with similar cases throughout the state. Heightened judicial scrutiny at
the appellate level, with the inclusion of proportionality review, has
since been viewed by some justices as fundamental to the constitution-

tenced to death and a smaller proportion of those convicted of capital murder. See tbl. 1.
28 The holding in Furmanwas grounded in the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, so Furmandid not frame the
constitutional principle in terms of proportionality. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
29 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
30 Justice White's expectation was that the statutory enumeration of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances for the jurors would sufficiently guide their discretion so that it
could "no longer be said that the penalty [of death] is being imposed wantonly and freakishly..." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring). The decision making of post-Gregg capital jurors is the subject of an interdisciplinary study involving
personal interviews with penalty phase jurors in fourteen states. See William S. Geimer &
Jonathan Amsterdam, Whyjurors Vote Life orDeath: OperativeFactorsin Ten FloridaDeath Penalty Cases, 15 AM.J. CGlM. L. 1 (1987-88); WilliamJ. Bowers, CapitalJury Project, Models of
Decision Making Among Sentencing Jurors, NSF SES-9013252 (National Science Foundation Law and Social Science Program 1993). The research findings of this Project have
been reported in Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion:Jurorlnstructions
in CapitalCases, 79 CoR.Nsi L. Ray. 1 (1993); William Bowers, CapitalPunishment and Con-

temporary Values: People'sMisgivings and the Court's Misperceptions, 27 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 157,
169-70 (1993).
31 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1973).
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ality of the death penalty itself 3 2
Gregg and its companion cases upholding the revised capital statutes sent a clear signal to the state legislatures: enact a capital punishment statute resembling the Georgia statute, including a provision for
proportionality review, and that statue will be upheld by the Court.
Eager to reenact death penalty provisions, state legislatures took the
Supreme Court at what seemed to be -their word, and read Gregg as a
how-to manual for constructing a constitutional capital punishment
statute.3 3 Over thirty states almost immediately enacted proportionality review procedures similar to those upheld in Gregg. 3 4 Although the
United States Supreme Court declared in 1984 that proportionality
review was not mandated under the constitution, twenty-two states
continue to require some form of proportionality review as part of
their appellate review of capital cases. 35
Under the post-Gregg scheme, only some of the circumstances of
the offense and a very limited set of defendant characteristics may be
identified as statutory aggravating factors justifying a capital sentence.
Non-statutory or extra-legal factors are, in principle, irrelevant. Disparities based upon the race of the defendant or victim, or county
boundaries of prosecutorial jurisdiction are prime examples of extralegal factors which are theoretically impermissible under Gregg.3 6 If a
statute is proven to place significant reliance upon an extra-legal fac37
tor, then the constitutionality of the entire system is questionable.
32 "[S] ome form of a meaningful appellate review is an essential safeguard against the
arbitrary and capricious imposition of death sentences by individual juries and judges...
meaningful appellate review is an indispensable component of the Court's determination
that the State's capital sentencing procedure is valid." Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 59
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
33 The majority of the 12 states whose mandatory capital punishment schemes were
declared unconstitutional in 1976 responded by enacting statutes similar to the Georgia
statute upheld in Gregg. For example, the post-Gregg South Carolina statute includes a
proportionality review provision virtually identical to the Georgia provision. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-25 (Law. Co-op. 1985); State v. Shaw, 255 S.E.2d 799, 803-04 (1979) ("The
statutory death penalty complex adopted by the General Assembly in 1977 [S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-25] is constitutionally indistinguishable from the statutory complex approved by the
United States Supreme Court in Gregg.").
34 See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 71 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, despite the Court's insistence that such review is not compelled by the Federal Constitution,
over 30 States now require, either by statute orjudicial decision, some form of comparative
proportionality review." (citation omitted)).
35 Pulley, 465 U.S. at 37, held that proportionality review by the state high court was not
required by the federal constitution. Arguments regarding proportionality are important
in clemency proceedings. See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital

Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANrE 255 (1990-91).
36
37

See infra Appendix B.

[B] oth "legal" and "extra-legal" factors can influence sentencing decisions concerning
the death penalty. Legal factors reflect legally relevant influences or "official-norma-

1996]
B.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

DIFFERENT APPROACHES: THE ANALYSIS OF A CAPITAL CASE SYSTEM
VS. THE REVIEW OF A SINGLE DEATH SENTENCE

It is now almost twenty five years since Furman and over twenty

years since Gregg. In addition to ideological changes at the United
States Supreme Court, much has changed in the state and federal
courts and in the state legislatures. Since Furman, two methods of analyzing capital case processing systems have become clear: one views
the imposition of a death sentence as the outcome of a decision-making
system, the other regards the imposition of the death sentence as a
single isolated sentencing event.3 8 The distinction between these two
approaches is not merely whether or not one agrees with the proposition that 'death is different,' and consequently capital cases require
more rigorous or heightened appellate review.
A systems approach begins with the collection of information on
all potential capital cases to analyze aggregate data on intake and exit
from the capital case processing system as a whole, regardless of
whether that system is viewed as fair. Systems analysis identifies discrete, decision-making stages within capital case processing, and analyzes the characteristics of cases and defendants and how they move
through the system at each identified stage.3 9
The case specific approach, on the other hand, sees the imposition of the death penalty upon a particular defendant simply as a sentence imposed for a specific crime; the decision of a particular jury at
a unique time and place. Under this approach, each death sentence
is an independent event, an idiosyncratic and essentially unpredictable individual result. This isolated decision-making event is seen as
unrelated to any other decision-making event in that case or any
other. According to this approach, no systems analysis can ever active descriptions of the criminal justice system," such as the offender's prior criminal
record, statutory aggravating or mitigating characteristics, and official charges. Extra-

legal factors "refer to perceived characteristics of the offender that are legally irrelevant to the imposition of sentence," such as race, gender, and socio-economic status
Bienen et al., supra note 21, at 101 (citingJohn Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal
Sentencing An Assessment of a Sociological Vwpoint, 8 LAW & Soc'v REv. 357, 358 (1974)).
The relevance and relationship of the race of the victim and the race of the defendant has
been a particularly controversial. See David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the 'Inevitability' of
RacialDiscriminationin CapitalSentencing and the Impossibility' of Its Prevention, Detection, and
Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359 (1994).
38 The U.S. General Accounting Office emphasizes this distinction in their evaluation
of empirical studies of state capital punishment systems. U.S. GENEAm ACCouNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 3-5
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 GAO REPORT]. Studies which examine a system under controlled
conditions are empirically sound. Id.
39 See Bienen et al., supra note 21, at 332 (diagramming stages in capital case processing). See infra Appendix B for a typical systems approach to capital case processing.
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count for the individual characteristics of any case, and attempts to
impose aggregate analysis or quantitative uniformity are irrelevant,
distorting, futile, and, worse, dehumanizing. 40
In Furman and Coker, the United States Supreme Court assessed
an entire system for imposing capital punishment within a single state,
although the opinions in Furman did not use the terminology of systems analysis. In Furmanthe court declared the Georgia death penalty
unconstitutional because of the way the Georgia capital case processing system, and by analogy the systems in all states, operated as a
whole. The remedy to the constitutional infirmity identified in
Furman was therefore the abandonment of the previous system for im41
posing capital punishment in all of the states.
The Gregg Court, by contrast, focused upon specific statutory remedies addressed to jury decision-making during the penalty phase of a
capital trial. 42 Gregg's emphasis on jurors was a shift from Furman's
focus on the capital case processing system as an institution.4 3 How40 This view ignores the fact that the law routinely quantifies human suffering, degradation and grief in the civil context with similar results. Tort judgments that put a dollar
value on a victim's loss, suffering, and grief are acceptable in our culture. The tort law
framework accounts for intentionality and malice, increasing the amount of money damages awarded when the intention to cause suffering or injury has been proved. Standard
risk analysis is routinely applied in the prediction of accidents and projection of liability in
situations involving loss of life such as airplane accidents and equipment failures, and in
analyzing other social advancements such as advancement in education. See Feinberg &
Mason, Identification and Estimation of Age-Period-CohortModels in the Analysis of DiscreteArchi-

val Data, SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY, 1979 (K Schuessler ed., 1978).
41 In 1996 state high courts are typically the administrative center for the entire state's

court system, with the responsibility for coordinating and reviewing case loads, dispositions
and the allocation ofjudges and other staff, following the leadership of the federal courts.
See, e.g., SCOTT GILBERT & PATRICIA LOMBARD, FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, A REPORT TO THE
CONFERENCE OF CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGES AND CIRCUIT EXECUTIVES: AN ANALYSIS OF DisposiTION TIMES FOR CAPITAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS (1995) (on file at State Documents
Section, Northwestern University School of Law Library); DAVID RAUMA & DONNA STEINsTRA, FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, THE CIVILJUSTICE REFoRM Aar EXPENSE AND DAILY PRODUCTION PLANS: A SOURCEBOOK 1995 (1995). Ironically the United States Supreme Court, the
same court which rejected systems analysis in the context of capital case processing accepted the reliability of regression analysis as an adequate method of statistical proof in
employment cases in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385 (1986). See David C. Baldus et al.,
Law and Statistics in Conflict: Reflections on McCleskey v. Kemp, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY
AND LAw 251-71 (Dorothy K. Kagehiro & William S. Laufer eds., 1992).
42 "The Court has said that 'one of the most important functions any jury can perform
in making.., a selection (between life imprisonment and death for a defendant convicted
in a capital case) is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the
penal system." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (citing
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
43 Compare Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153, with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The
history of the Supreme Court of New Jersey's initial ruling on the state's death penalty
statute offers an example of how state high courts resented and resisted rulings from the
United States Supreme Court on the constitutionality of state capital punishment schemes.
Prior to the decision in Furman there were intimations of what was to come. In State v.
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ever, the court's emphasis in Greggupon restructuring the decisions of
jurors at the penalty phase of a capital trial44 implied not only that
jury decisions were autonomous and separable, but also that jurors
might be the only actors whose decisions could be directly addressed
by federal judicial fiat without violating separation of powers doctrines. 45 For example, separating the guilt and penalty phases of the
capital trial and insisting on the specification of statutory aggravating
and mitigating factors were legislative reforms addressed to jury deciForcella,245 A. 2d 181 (N.J. 1968) the Supreme Court of NewJersey held that the system of
allowing defendants to plead non vult and avoid the death sentence did not violate the
United States Supreme Court opinion in United States v.Jakson,390 U.S. 570 (1968). After
keeping the appeal for three years, the United States Supreme Court reversed the holding
in a memorandum opinion ordering the NewJersey Supreme Court to set aside the capital
punishment system in NewJersey at the time. Funicello v. NewJersey, 403 U.S. 948 (1971).
In the case overturning the death penalty sentencing scheme in NewJersey the then Chief
Justice wrote an eloquent concurring opinion outlining the tensions between federal and
state judicial authorities on matters of constitutional law.
The case before us dramatizes the failure to provide direction and suggests the Federal and State Judiciaries cannot meet their responsibilities unless some rules are
changed .... My point is the doctrines of the Federal Supreme Court have led to an
impossible situation .... I believe the case method should be replaced by a rulemaking process in which the Federal Supreme Court can meet regularly with representatives of State Supreme Courts, to become aware of their problems, to benefit
from their experience, and to adopt rules of prospective application ....
State v. Funicello, 286 A.2d 55, 60, 62, 67-68 (N.J. 1972) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring).
44 Gregg; 428 U.S at 196-98.
45 Ironically, however, the jury only decides questions of fact. The other decision makers in a capital case processing system-prosecutors and judges-have the responsibility
for interpreting law, which makes them a more logical focus of appellate review since they
would be responsible for interpreting the new rules imposed upon juror decision-making.
The strictures imposed upon jury decision-making discussed in Gregg needed first to be
implemented by legislatures and then interpreted by prosecutors and appellate courts. For
a graphic representation of the interactive relationship between trial judges and jurors, see
Peter David Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us: StudyingJudges' andJuries'Behavior,40
AM. U. L. REv. 775, 783 fig.1 (1991).
Moreover, the Supreme Court generally addresses errors in legal interpretation. Factual decisions by jurors are usually thought to be beyond the scope of appellate review.
The legislature's decision to structure the decision-making ofjurors by defining statutory
aggravating and mitigating factors could be characterized as no more than offering guidance to jurors on how to sort the facts. On the other hand, the decisions of prosecutors
and the decisions ofjudges are based on professional judgment and interpretations of law,
an appellate court's traditional province.
In many state jurisdictions the issue of separation of powers, and whether the state
high court could regulate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion was controversial. For
example, the Attorney General of NewJersey argued that it would violate the doctrine of
separation of powers for the New Jersey Supreme Court to review prosecutorial decision
making. The NewJersey Supreme Court rejected this argument, first in State v. Koedatich,
548 A-2d. 989, 955 (1988), and then in State v. Marshal, 613 A.2d. 1059, 1070-73 (1992)
(Marshall 12). In response to Koedatich the New Jersey County Prosecutors Association
adopted The Prosecutor's Guidelines for Designation of Homicide Cases for Capital Prosecutions, reprinted in Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of CapitalPunishment in New
Jersey: Felony Murder Cases, 54 ALB. L. REv. 709, 791-93 (1990).
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sion making, although these changes also required prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges to alter the way they structured a case for
the jury. Because the focus was on jurors, however, these reforms
could never be challenged on the basis of separation of powers
doctrine.
Although one purpose of proportionality review was to correct
aberrant decisions of jurors, proportionality review was not aimed at
restructuring jury decision-making. The repeated references to jurors
made in Gregg may have been rhetorical. 46 The court's focus upon
jury decision-making at the penalty stage, however, implied that the
jury or judge's life/death vote at sentencing was the principal locus of
arbitrariness. 47 Proportionality review was rather designed to institute
a different kind of constitutional protection.
The systemic discrimination which proportionality review is
designed to address occurs independent of the decision making of
possibly biased individual jurors. The racial imbalances occurring
within and across capital punishment systems are strongly related to
prosecutorial discretion, the political factors influencing the selection
and retention of prosecutors and judges, and racial stereotyping.
These system wide effects have been found to be especially pronounced in the middle range of capital cases. 48 These are the cases
which might be capital in one county or state and not capital in another county or state. These differences partly explain the large discrepancies in death row populations between states. 49 The theoretical
or doctrinal foundations for protection from racial discrimination in
the application of capital case processing systems are the same principles which find a constitutional infirmity in system wide discrimination in employment, jury selection, or the entitlement to government
benefits.5 0 The protection from being punished by a racially discriminatory sentencing structure is grounded in the eighth amendment
and in the requirements of due process. 5 1
46 The emphasis upon jury decision making in Greggmay be partly explained by the fact
that systems analysis at that time was not routinely applied to decisions within the legal
sector.
47 Greggs emphasis upon juror decision making strongly influenced the direction of
social science research. See, e.g., WilliamJ. Bowers, The CapitaljuyProject: Rationale,Design,
and Preview ofEarlyFindings, 70 IND. LJ. 1043 (1995); Symposium, The CapitalJuyProjec4 70
IND. LJ. 1033 (1995).
48 For a graphic illustration, see Baldus et al., supra note 41, at 261, fig. 13.3.
49 See infra Table 1.
50 See, e.g., Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
51 This is how the majority opinion in Marshal ifexplained the principle:
The best way to understand the concept of proportionality review is to understand its
origin
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Although the jury's decision to impose the death sentence is a
discrete, dichotomous event at the conclusion of the capital trial, the
jury's decision to impose the death sentence is not isolated. Nor is the
decision-making ofjurors the end of a linear progression. After Gregg,
the jury's decision to impose the death penalty is preceded by specific
factual findings of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors which
the jury must weigh or balance. A juror's decision to impose the
death sentence is therefore the end result of a dynamic, interactive
process imbedded in strata of procedural and substantive law. Long
before ajuror addresses the evidence at penalty phase, what the juror
confronts has been structured by the rules, procedures, and discretionary decisions made by police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, administrators and judges at every step of the way.
The process begins well before the jury is convened, long before
the judge's instructions atjury selection. It encompasses the legal criteria for jury selection and the admissibility of evidence, and is inextricably bound up with the legal system's restraints and sequencing
imposed upon the parade of testimony and evidence. Why then, did
the Gregg court choose to focus on this end result?
Perhaps the jurors' decision to impose the death sentence was
the segment of the decision-making process which was perceived to be
.... Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Gregg cited two features of Georgia's
scheme that would guide and channel the exercise of sentencing discretion. Georgia's statute had a bifurcated procedure for deciding a defendant's guilt first and sentencing later, and also provided for the further safeguarding of meaningful appellate
review of every death sentence
....
Simply stated, the substantive or offense oriented proportionality review
looks to whether the punishment of death is excessive for a particular offense, while
procedural or offender-oriented review examines whether, when compared to factually similar cases involving the same offense, a defendant's death sentence is excessive.
The kind of proportionality review that asks whether the death penalty is "generally"
imposed is an Eighth Amendment inquiry into substantive proportionality-does the
punishment fit the crime?
...
That type of substantive review is best perceived in the context of cases such as
Coker v. Georgia and Enmund v. Florida

. . Another approach to proportionality review is to 'inquire instead whether the
penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to
the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime .... proportionality
review, "[a]lthough clearly no'panacea ... often serves to identify the most extreme
examples of proportionality among similarly situated defendants." That, we believe, is
an acceptable understanding of the intention of the framers of our Act-that statutory
proportionality review should seek to insure that the death penalty is being administered in a rational, non-arbitrary, and even.handed manner, fairly and with reasonable
consistency. That review serves as a means through which to monitor the imposition
of death sentences and thereby prevent any impermissible discrimination in imposing
the death penalty.
State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1068-1070 (N.J. 1992) (citations omitted).

LEIGH B. BIENEN[

[Vol. 87

the most amenable to reform from above.5 2 Or, the United States
Supreme Court may have concluded that it was politically more acceptable to frame its decision in terms ofjury decision-making, rather
than to attempt to regulate the behavior of prosecutors or judges. 53
There could be no objection from the other institutionalized decision
makers to rules aimed at restructuring the decision-making ofjurors.
On the other hand, an opinion which attempted to influence the discretionary decision-making of thousands of local prosecutors or
judges in over thirty autonomous and very different legal jurisdictions
of states could be controversial, unacceptable, or simply ignored.
C.

PULLEYAND MCCLSKEI.

THE SUPREME COURT STOPS MONITORING

CAPITAL CASE PROCESSING SYSTEMS

After Gregg the Court continued its retreat from Furman'sempha5 4 in
sis on examining state capital punishment systems. Pulley v. Harris
1984 and McCleskey v. Kemjp5 in 1987 both rejected challenges to
death sentences based upon a systems approach to capital case
processing.
Pulley challenged the capital case processing system in California
because it did not have a statutory requirement of proportionality review. The question was whether proportionality review of the state's
entire system for imposing capital punishment was required at all. 56
52 For some jurors' own descriptions of their decision making processes and responses
in capital cases, see Leigh B. Bienen, HelpingJurors Out: Post-Verdict Debriefingfor Jurors in
Emotionally Disturbing Trials, 68 IND. L.J. 1333, 134648 (1993). See also WilliamJ. Bowers,
Capital Jury Project, Models of Decision Making among Sentencing Jurors, NSF SES9013252 (National Science Foundation and Social Science Program 1993); WilliamJ. Bowers et al., In Their Own Words: How CapitalJurors Explain Their Life or Death Sentencing
Decisions (Nov. 7, 1992) (Capital Jury Project Working Paper No. 7); WilliamJ. Bowers et
al., In Their Own Words: How Capital Jurors Explain Their Life or Death Sentencing Decisions (May 26, 1992) (Capital Jury Project Working Paper No. 6); Maria Sandys, The Life
or Death Decisions of Capital Jurors: Preliminary Findings from Kentucky (Nov. 27, 1991)
(paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, San
Francisco, Cal.). Ajury's decision to sentence a defendant to death is not only a determination of fact, although it may have a factual predicate in the finding of guilt and the
finding of the existence of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors.
53 See Linda A. Foley & Richard S. Powell, The Discretionof Prosecutors,Judges andJuries in
CapitalCases, CRiM.JusT. REv., Fall 1982, at 16, 19-22 (finding, post-Furman, that extra-legal
factors continued to influence prosecutors and judges in Florida capital cases).
54 465 U.S. 37 (1984). See DAVID C. BALDus ETr AL., EQUALJUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTr A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYsis 22-24 (1990) (outlining state legislative responses to
Furman). Note that several state legislatures reenacted capital statutes almost immediately
after Furmanand before Gregg. See, e.g., the date of reenactment in Florida, Arkansas, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, infra tbl.1.
55 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
56
The issue in this case, therefore, is whether the Eighth Amendment ...
requires a
state appellate court, before it affirms a death sentence, to compare the sentence in

1996]

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

Thus, Pulley did not address the sufficiency or adequacy of an estab57
lished proportionality review process or a statistical methodology.
The litigation had the potential of forcing states which did not conduct proportionality review to adopt it. Presumably the Court would
have set out minimal proportionality review standards for the states if
it had required such review. Instead, the Court held that proportionality review was not constitutionally required. 58
Pulley was decided at a time when some state supreme courts were
expanding their recognition of rights under state constitutional provisions. 59 When Pulley declared that the federal constitution did not
require proportionality review, the state supreme courts had the alternative of shifting the requirement for proportionality review to analogous provisions of the state constitution. To date only the NewJersey
Supreme Court has taken an unequivocal position that proportionality review and the systematic analysis of capital case processing is man60
dated by the state constitution.
the case before it with the penalties imposed in similar cases if requested to do so by
the prisoner .... In some States, such as Florida, the appellate court performs proportionality review despite the absence of a statutory requirement; in others, such as California and Texas, it does not.
Puley, 465 U.S. at 43-44.
57 If the defendant had not been sentenced to death in California an appellate court
would have been required to undertake proportionality review, but there was no such requirement for a death sentence.
Ironically, although the California death penalty statute reviewed in this case does not
require comparative proportionality review, most other felony sentences in the State
are subject to a mandatory, and highly complex, system of comparative review. California therefore accords greater protection to felons who are imprisoned than to felons
who may be executed.
Id. at 73 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
58 Id. at 44-54. The length of time to final decision in Pulley may have contributed to its
boomerang effect. The defendant was initially arrested on July 5, 1978. By the time the
final decision was handed down on July 23, 1984, 6 years had passed and the mood of the
Court had changed.
The dissent noted that the states could continue to require proportionality review
under their statutory provisions or as a matter of state constitutional law.
Indeed, despite the Court's insistence that such review is not compelled by the Federal
Constitution, over 30 states now require, either by statute or judicial decision, some
form of comparative proportionality review before any death sentence may be carried
out. By itself, this should weigh heavily on the side of requiring such appellate review.
Id. at 71 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
59 State constitutions became an important independent source of constitutional guarantees in the 1980's and will continue to be so in the 1990's. See, e.g., Stewart G. Pollock,
State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RurGE.Rs L. REuv. 707 (1983).
State constitutional provisions have been particularly important in the capital jurisprudence of NewJersey. See, e.g., State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 314 (NJ. 1987) (HandlerJ,
dissenting).
60 "Whether in the exercise of statutory proportionality review or our constitutional
duty to assure the equal protection and due process of law, we cannot escape the responsibility to review any effects of race in capital sentencing." State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d. 1059,
1112 (1992) (Marshall I1) (citing N.J. CoNsT. art. VI, § 5(c)). In Marshall I, the court
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Like Pulley, McCleskey v. Kemp61 was a challenge to Georgia's entire
system of imposing capital punishment, and by implication a challenge not only to the Georgia scheme but to every analogous state
system developed after Gregg. The claim in McCleskey was that a pattern of racial discrimination based upon the race of the victim had
been demonstrated in a statistical study of the state's capital punishment system. 62 If McCleskey had declared the Georgia capital punishment system unconstitutional on the basis of the statistical evidence
presented, every state system would have been subject to question because of inherent discrepancies in capital case processing. Even in
states with few minorities, group differences exist between rural and
63
urban jurisdictions.
But McCleskey did not involve an explicit challenge based upon
Georgia's proportionality review procedures or to Georgia's method
for conducting proportionality review.64 Rather, the challenge to
Warren McCleskey's death sentence, was based upon principles
closely related to the doctrinal foundations of proportionality. 6 5 The
argument was that Warren McCleskey's death sentence was unconstitutional because similarly situated defendants did not receive the
death sentence and that there was statistical evidence that the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia was influenced by the extralegal factor of race, in this case the race of the victim.
The challenge to the defendant's death sentence in McCleskey was
based upon a comprehensive, system wide study of the imposition of
the death penalty in Georgia over a period of years. 66 In McCleskey the
explicitly said that it was not following McCleskey. Id. at 1109-13.
61 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
62 See Baldus et al., supra note 37, at 364-76. The decision has generated considerable
comment. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Disorderin the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1741 (1987); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital
Punishment, and the Supreme Court; 101 HIv. L. REv. 1388 (1988); DavidJ. Macher, Note,
McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Statistics and the Death Penalty, 15 W. ST. U. L. RFv. 179 (1987).
63 See Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the
DeathPenaly in Florida,43 FLk. L. REv. 1 (1991); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race
and ProsecutorialDiscretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAw & Soc'y REv. 587 (1985).
64 Warren McCleskey's death sentence had been subjected to the mandatory provisions
of the Georgia proportionality review statute and been upheld as proportionate by the
Georgia Supreme Court.
65

The second type of error in capital punishment occurs when we execute someone
whose crime does not seem so aggravated when compared to those of many who escaped the death penalty. It is in this kind of case-which is extremely common-that
we must worry whether, first, we have designed procedures which are appropriate to
the decision between life and death and, second, whether we have followed those
procedures.
John Kaplan, The Problem of CapitalPunishment, 1983 ILL. L. REv. 555, 576 (1983).
66 The research conducted by Baldus and his colleagues on the Georgia capital case
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defense presented statistical evidence that certain defendants who
killed whites were significantly more likely to be sentenced to death
than similar defendants whose victims were not white, and that these
racial differences remained statistically significant when other possibly
explanatory variables were controlled. 67 Even when confronted with
this evidence, the Court did not reverse McCleskey's death sentence.
The immediately apparent implication of McCleskey was that the
United States Supreme Court would not set aside a death sentence or
overturn a state capital punishment system on the basis of an empirical analysis of a state system presented in the context of proportionality review. McCleskey held that such statistical evidence was irrelevant
to the validity of the individual death sentence on appeal, unless it
could be demonstrated that there had been a specific intent to discriminate against this particular defendant on the part of some identified individual decision maker. 68 Consequently, McCleskey was
processing system is set out in DAVID C. BALDus ET AL, EQUAL JuSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY. A LEGAL AND EMPnUcAL ANALYsis (1990) and discussed in Bienen et al., supra note
21, at 147-56.
The most recent study of the Georgia system by Baldus and his colleagues represents
an extremely thorough and sophisticated perspective on the death sentencing process
that both supports and builds upon previous research conducted elsewhere by the
authors. Moreover, the authors have addressed, and in many cases denounced, in
detail the methodological criticisms of their study that were raised in McCleskey v.
Zant [580 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (McCleskey I)] and McCleskey v. Kemp [753
F.2d. 877 (11th Cir. 1985) (McCleskey II)] .... Indeed, the Baldus study simply replicates with a more sophisticated methodology the result found in the numerous prior
studies summarized here. Race is not a neutral variable. It may be as significant as the
presence of an additional statutory aggravating factor.
Id. at 157 (footnotes omitted).
67 The 1990 book by Professor Baldus and his colleagues sets out in detail the lower
court history of McCleskey and the research methodology employed in the study which provided the factual basis for the defendant's legal arguments. See BALDUS ET A., supra note
54, at Ch. 4, 6, and 10.
68 However, Professor Baldus points out "Social science research is relevant to death
penalty decision-making because these institutions purport to be rational, principled, and
guided by facts. And when the facts are in dispute, the basic idea is that the side with the
better evidence should carry the day." David C. Baldus, Keynote Address: The Death Penalty
DialogueBetween Law and Social SdencA 70 ImN. L.J. 1033 (1995). Under the McCleskey standard, what would be necessary to demonstrate such an intent has been the subject of much
speculation by persons representing capital defendants. Would first person statements by
prosecutors or legislators be necessary? Would the prosecutor, judge, or juror, an alleged
racist, have to make statements in a public forum, such as a newspaper? Some of the most
avowedly racist legislation in the history of the country would not meet the criteria set out
in McClskey, e.g., laws establishing literacy requirements for voting and a poll tax, which
were race neutral on their face, but whose purpose was to disenfranchise blacks and maintain the political power of white minorities. Nor would explicitly racist provisions such as
the exclusion of blacks from jury service meet the McCkskey criteria.
The United States Supreme Court's growing impatience with arguments based upon
racial discrimination in capital sentencing was observable prior to 1987 and unmistakable
after McCleskey, although many respected academic studies consistently document the socalled "race of victim" effects in capital case processing across jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
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interpreted by most state high courts as negating the federal constitu69
tional underpinnings for state proportionality review.
Read together, McCleskey7° and Pulley7 1 sent a message to the
states which was crystal clear: the Supreme Court was no longer willing
to reverse individual death sentences or declare capital punishment
statutes unconstitutional in response to evidence of arbitrariness or
caprice, bias or systematic racial discrimination within a particular
capital case processing system. McCleskey foreclosed further arguments to the Supreme Court based upon a statistical showing of a race
of victim effect in the overall functioning of a capital case processing
system, whether or not in the context of proportionality review. The
execution of Warren McCleskey himself in 1991 as well as subsequent
executions after the Supreme Court summarily denied relief, underscored the court's new intransigence.
BALDUS ET AL., supranote 54 (Georgia); BARRY F. NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1987) (North Carolina); Steven D. Arkin, Note, Discrimi-

nation and Arbitrariness in Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Post-Furman Murder Cases in
Dade County, Florida, 1973-1976, 33 STAN. L. REv. 75 (1980); Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patternsfor the Georgia Death Sentenc, 18 U.C. DAVIS L REv. 1327 (1985); WilliamJ.
Bowers, The Pervasiveness and Arbitrariness of Post-Furman CapitalStatutes, 74J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1067 (1983) (Florida and Georgia); William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce,
Arbitrarinessand DiscriminationUnder Post-Furman CapitalStatutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563
(1980) (Florida, Georgia, Texas and Ohio); Eckland-Olsen, StructuralDiscretion, Racial Bias
and the Death Penalty: The First Decade after Furman in Texas, 60 Soc. Sci. Q. 853 (1988);
Linda A. Foley, FloridaAfter the Furman Decision: The Effect of ExtralegalFactors on the Processing of CapitalOffense Cases, 5 BEHAV. SCL & L. 457 (1987); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro,
Patternsof Death: An Analysis of RacialDisparities in CapitalSentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27 (1984) (Florida, Georgia, and Illinois); Elizabeth Lynch Murphy,
Application of the Death Penalty in Cook County, 73 ILL. B.J. 90 (1984) (Illinois); Raymond
Paternoseter, ProsecutorialDiscretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Biased
Racial Discrimination, 18 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 437 (1984) (South Carolina); Michael L.
Radelet, Racial Characteristicsand the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 918
(1981) (Florida); M. Dwayne Smith, Patternsof Discriminationin Assessments of the Death Penalty: The Case of Louisiana, 15J. CRIM.JuST. 279 (1987); Gennaro F. Vito & ThomasJ. Keil,
CapitalSentencing in Kentucky: An Analysis of the FactorsInfluencingDecision Making in the PostGregg Period,79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 483 (1988); Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The FloridaExperience, 95 HARV. L. Rav. 456 (1981); Margaret
Fae Klemm, The Determinants of Capital Sentencing in Louisiana: 1979-84(1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Orleans) (on file with the University of
New Orleans library). A recent review of the research literature concludes that pervasive
race discrimination effects are amply documented in reliable empirical studies. See 1990
GAO REPORT, supra note 38, at 5.
69 Throughout the 1980's, and especially before McCleskey, numerous state supreme
courts considered proportionality review to be the appropriate mechanism for reviewing
the fundamental fairness of a state capital case processing system, including the assessment
of racial and geographical disparities introduced by plea bargaining practices and
prosecutorial discretion in the selection of cases for capital prosecution. See, e.g., Tichnell
v. State, 468 A.2d 1 (Md. 1983), discussed in Appendix A, infra.
70 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
7' 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
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Given the green light to do so by the United States Supreme
Court, many state high courts after McCleskey refused to use the independent authority of their state constitutions to consider evidence
of system wide racial disparities in their capital case processing
schemes.7 2 System wide arbitrariness in state capital punishment systems presented state supreme courts with the opportunity to use state
constitutional guaranties to replace federal due process protections
for capital defendants which were no longer recognized by the United
States Supreme Court, but it was a challenge and an opportunity
which the state high courts overwhelmingly chose to decline.7 3
The combined effect of Pulley and McCleskey is that state high
courts no longer need to demonstrate to the United States Supreme
Court that their capital punishment systems are free from systemic
racial orjurisdictional bias. As far as the Supreme Court is concerned,
the presumption is that these systems operate free from racial bias, or,
if they don't, the court will accept the way they do operate.7 4 The
Supreme Court is no longer in the business of overturning state-imposed death sentences for any reason at all and especially not on the
basis of seemingly abstract arguments based upon statistics describing
capital case processing systems.7 5
72 Only the NewJersey Supreme Court has taken upon itself the responsibility for collecting and maintaining a comprehensive data base on capital case processing. The New
Jersey Supreme Court has initiated the development of a scientific methodology capable of
producing a reliable factual basis documenting the presence of race effects and other system wide biases similar to those presented to the United States Supreme Court in McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). See David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discriminationin
the Administrationof the Death Penalty:A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV.

133 (1986).
73 See Baldus et al., supra note 37, at 375 ("State courts, by contrast, are not bound by
McCeskey and are free to entertain claims of racial discrimination under their state constitutions. Even so state courts routinely invoke McC/eskey as ajustification for dismissing such
claims with or without a hearing.") (footnote citing to cases omitted).
74 Given that there is little disagreement about the demonstrated effects themselves,
the sharp disagreements in the legal community, and within the state high courts themselves, occur over the responsibility of the judiciary to address the issue. See, e.g., infraPart
IV.B.
75 See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (holding that a third party does
not have standing to challenge the validity of a death sentence imposed on a capital defendant who elected to forgo his right to appeal); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738
(1990) (holding that it is constitutionally permissible for an appellate court to reweigh
aggravating and mitigating evidence to uphold ajury-imposed death sentence that is based
in part on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating factor); Butler v. McKellar, 494
U.S. 407 (1990) (holding that a recently decided rule concerning police-initiated interrogation following suspect's request for counsel not retroactively available to support federal
habeas corpus petition under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)); Boyde v. California, 494
U.S. 370 (1990) (holding that California capital sentencing instructions tojuries on mitigation do not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as to defendant who
presented mitigating evidence of background and character); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494
U.S. 299 (1990) (holding that Pennsylvania death penalty statute mandating a death sen-
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The majority of states also took the United States Supreme Court
at its word when Pulley v. Harrisdeclared that probably proportionality
review was not required by the federal constitution. After McCleskey v.
Kemp state legislatures and state supreme courts understood that the
United States Supreme Court was no longer interested in reviewing
allegations of arbitrariness based upon racial disparities in state capital punishment systems. 76 State courts took the United States
Supreme Court at it's word as it became clear that the United States
Supreme Court was unlikely to overturn a state imposed death sentence on any grounds. 7 7 The way for state high courts to insulate
themselves from changes at the United States Supreme Court was well
mapped: avoid federal constitutional issues altogether or rely upon
state constitutional doctrine.
Nonetheless, twenty-two states continue to require some form of
proportionality review as part of the appellate review of death
sentences. 78 For example, the 1995 statute reenacting capital punishment in New York includes a proportionality review provision directing the state high court to consider empirical evidence of system
wide bias, with a specific reference to race. However, empirical evidence in a number of jurisdictions indicates that the risk of arbitrariness and systematic bias in the application of capital punishment
continues to exist and that this risk is greatest in the so-called middle
range, or low visibility cases. 79 While one purpose of proportionality
tence if the jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances does not violate the Eighth Amendment). But see McKoy v. North Carolina, 494
U.S. 433 (1990) (holding that instructions which prevent the sentencing jury from considering any mitigating factor that the jury does not unanimously find violates the Eighth
Amendment under Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 279 (1987)).
76 McCleskey held that demonstrated racial disparities in the imposition of the death
sentence were not sufficient grounds to overturn an individual death sentence or declare a
state system unconstitutional. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99, 319 (1987). The
majority opinion in McCleskey did not deny or dispute the accuracy of the finding of racial
disparities.
77 After McCleskey, it became increasingly apparent that a majority of the Court was
more interested in speeding up executions than in overturning state imposed death
sentences. William H. Rehnquist, Text of ChiefJusticeRehnquist's Remarks to ABA, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Feb. 14, 1989, at 2. Recently, constitutional challenges to capital punishment
have been addressed to methods of execution. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Getting to
Death: Are Executions Constitutional?,87 IowA L. REv. (1997) (forthcoming).
78 See infra Appendix A; James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Statutory Measuresfor More
Effective Appellate Review of CapitalCases, 31 ClM. L. BULL. 211, 237 n.102 (1995). The states
which require proportionality review by statute include: Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Washington.
79 See Baldus et al., supra note 37, at 386 n.115, 410. See also 1990 GAO REPORT, supra
note 38, at 5. Empirical studies of the application of the death penalty since Furman have
repeatedly found evidence of discrimination by prosecutorial jurisdiction and by race of
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review is to minimize or eliminate systematic and systemic bias in the
application of capital punishment statutes, especially with regard to
racial and geographic disparities, almost without exception state institutions have refused to address that issue.
D.

EXPLAINING THE VARIANCE IN THE OPINIONS OF STATE HIGH
COURTS

Every state with proportionality review has adopted its own methodology. However, the procedure necessarily involves the comparison
of the death sentence under review with other cases which the appellate court considers to be equivalent or similar in terms of the culpability or blameworthiness of the defendant and the relative
aggravation of the circumstances of the offense.
Once the Supreme Court sent the message that a multiplicity of
state capital punishment systems is acceptable, state high courts
shared no common constitutional doctrine. 80 For example, Texas,
and California are sui generis. Texas has a unique statutory structure,
upheld by the Supreme Court at the time of Gregg. California had one
jurisprudence when Rose Bird was ChiefJustice and another when she
and two other justices were replaced in a recall election in which the
California Supreme Court's reversal of death sentences was critical. 8 1
the victim and defendant. Bienen et al., supra note 45, at 737 n.112 (1990) (listing and
annotating studies).
80

The [Furman] opinions presented a staggering array of arguments for and against the
constitutionality of the death penalty and offered little means, aside from shrewd political prediction, of determining which arguments would dominate in the decision of
any future cases.
. The Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek opinions did not attempt to list in any definitive
fbshion the prerequisites for a valid capital punishment regime; rather, they simply
upheld each particular scheme presented on the basis of its own peculiar mix of procedural protections. Hence, the 1976 opinions established the essentially "provisional" nature of the Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence and thus
marked the clear commencement of the Court's ongoing regulatory role.
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
ConstitutionalRegulation of CapitalPunishment, 109 HAzv. L REv. 357, 362-63 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
81

California has the largest death row of any state in the nation. In 1986, Governor
George Deukmejian publicly warned two justices of the state's supreme court that he
would oppose them in their retention elections unless they voted to uphold more
death sentences. He had already announced his opposition to ChiefJustice Rose Bird
because of her votes in capital cases. Apparently unsatisfied with the subsequent votes
of the other two justices, the governor carried out his threat. He opposed the retention of all threejustice and all lost their seats after a campaign dominated by the death
penalty. Deukmejian appointed their replacements in 1987. The removal and replacement of the three justices has affected every capital case the court has subsequently reviewed, resulting in a dramatic change. In the last five years, the Court has
affirmed neatly 97% of the capital cases it has reviewed, one of the highest rates in the
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With little risk of reversal by the Supreme Court, high courts in states
with large death row populations tend to conduct minimal proportionality review, and some of these courts have become factories for
affirmances. In states where reenactment was relatively late, or where
there have been few capital cases-such as New Jersey and Connecticut-whether for reasons of local culture, or simply a small number of
homicide cases, capital jurisprudence and its microcosm, proportionality review, are an entirely different enterprise. These state high
courts have continued a careful and individualized appellate review of
death sentences, including proportionality review, in the face of administrative and political pressures to abandon it.
The general sense one gets from these formidable state high
court opinions, which during the period of 1976-91, were overwhelmingly pointed in a single direction, is that absent the threat of reversal
by the Supreme Court, there is no motivation to address the issue of
racial and geographic disparities in capital case processing. State legislatures enacted proportionality review procedures because they believed, on the basis of language in Gregg, that state capital punishment
statutes lacking proportionality review provisions would be declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.82 After Pulley and McCleskey,
many state supreme courts found themselves in an awkward position:
statutory proportionality review provisions remained intact,8 3 and a
nation.
Stephen Bright & Patrick Keenan, Judges and the Politis of Death: DecidingBetween the Bill of
Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. RPv. 759, 760-61 (1995) (footnotes
omitted).
Even before Chief Justice Bird's removal, justices in other states were influenced by
perceived public reaction. A rare in-depth study of the voting behavior of Louisiana
Supreme Court justices examined how 'liberal' justices were inclined not to dissent from
affirmances in capital cases:
Justice 'A' stated that he does not dissent in death penalty cases against the opinion of
the court to affirm a defendant's conviction and sentence, expressly because of a perceived voter sanction, in spite of his deeply felt personal preferences to the contrary
The other liberal justices, Justice 'B' andJustice 'C,' when asked about voters, argued
that they were relatively unconcerned with winning or losing their next elections.
Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case
Study, 49J. POL. 1116, 1120-21 (1987).
82 The timing of reenactment often played a role in whether the state enacted proportionality review. See infra Table 1. State legislatures and high courts eager to reinstate
capital punishment after Gregg were very likely to include proportionality review provisions
and/or institute procedures. The amount of time between reenactment, the court's first
affirmance under the new statute, and the state's first execution may give some indication
of a state's willingness to entertain constitutional challenges to the death penalty. Compare,
e.g., New Jersey, Alabama, and Colorado timing data in Table 1.
83 Six states have repealed their proportionality review statutes. They are Connecticut,
Idaho, Maryland, Nevada, Oklahoma and Wyoming. See infra Appendix A.
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number of state high courts had institutionalized proportionality review, either as part of their ordinary appellate review of individual
death sentences, or by creating a special internal administrative procedure.8 4 Now they were stuck with it.
However, many state high courts did revise existing procedures
for proportionality review and reduce proportionality review to a formality after Pulley and McCleskey. Some courts did this in a technical
manner by changing the definition of cases which would be considered similar. Other state high courts changed the character of the
review conducted by simply refusing to consider any systemwide challenges to their capital punishment system, thereby restricting proportionality review to a narrow comparison. Finally, some other state
courts limited proportionality review to a very narrow comparison between the sentences of codefendants in the same case.85
III.

STATE HIGH COURT DECISIONS AND CHANGING ATTITuDEs
TowARDs CRIME AND RACE

However complicated its implementation history, the principle
behind proportionality review is simple and the same everywhere: it is
unjust to impose a death sentence upon one defendant when a similarly situated defendant whose murder was equally aggravated is not
sentenced to death or executed. Generalizing across jurisdictions and
courts over a time period of fifteen years is hazardous, nonetheless
certain patterns in state supreme court opinions are observable during the period between Gregg in 1976 and the second and final rejection of the federal appeal of Warren McCleskey's death sentence and
his execution in 1991.86 Racial and jurisdictional disparities were not

the sole component of Warren McCleskey's appellate arguments. Racial and geographic disparities, however, were the only basis for challenging a state's entire capital case processing system before a federal
court, and by implication in all of the states. Racial and geographic
disparities are therefore at the heart of the concept of proportionality
84 For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set out the principles for proportionality review and authorized the administrative office of the courts to collect data on all
homicides, but it has not been clear from subsequent opinions exactly how the court uses
the information for proportionality review, or if it does use the database created for the
purpose. See infra Appendix A.
85 Intracase proportionality is a comparison between the death sentence under review
and the sentences received by codefendants in the same case. California and Illinois are
two states that perform only intracase proportionality review. See infraAppendix A.
86 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). Warren McCleskey was executed shortly
after the Supreme Court rejected his second habeas corpus petition. The hope that the
United States Supreme Court would again declare a state system unconstitutional died with
Warren McCleskey.
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itself, both in capital sentencing and in other areas, as the factors
which show the most disparate results.
Commentary on state high court opinions, even on issues of national dimensions, is typically sporadic or relegated to footnotes. Yet
these institutions are now the principal interpreters of constitutional
principles in capital jurisprudence and other areas of constitutional
law formerly the province of federal courts. Even if, as many say, state
high court opinions are less erudite or well-reasoned than the constitutional discourse of the higher federal courts or academic journals,
these opinions nonetheless began to define constitutional doctrine on
this question in the period 1976-91.87
Both state judicial institutions and legislatures faced similar circumstances in this period. Legislatures were apprehensive that the
Supreme Court would declare their state capital case processing systems and statutes unconstitutional. At the same time, the political climate grew increasingly favorable to the implementation of the death
penalty. People became impatient with reversals of capital sentences
on what were perceived as "legal technicalities," 88 as well as the disparity between the large number of people sentenced to death and the
89
few who were executed.
Furthermore, the issue of proportionality always had race lurking
in the background. On the other hand, consensus on issues of race
generally did not exist during this period. The trend in decision-making by the federal courts during the 1980's was in the direction of
denying relief to claims based upon allegations of racial discrimination generally. Certainly, arguments alleging that capital sentencing
systems had disparate impact upon different racial groups were not
heard by state high courts in a jurisprudential or political vacuum. 90
Arguments based upon differential racial impact in the capital punishment context were being considered by state high court justices who
had witnessed the checkered history of court-imposed orders regarding school and housing desegregation and redistricting-orders
which were neither straightforward nor uncontroversial. The ineffec87 See, e.g., State v. Ross, 646 A.2d. 1318, 1373-75 (Conn.) (Berdon, J., dissenting in
part) (reviewing constitutional analysis in Connecticut state court decisions), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1133 (1995).
88 Justice Transcript, supranote 11, at 1101-02. See alsoBright& Keenan, supranote 81, at
785; Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardeningof the Attitudes: Americans' Vews of
the Death Penalty, 50 J. Soc. IssuEs 19, 40-42.
89 See infra tbl.1, tbl.2.

90 "If the purpose of McCleskey was to provide closure, it certainly was successful in the
federal courts. The decision has eliminated the federal courts as a forum for the consideration of statistically based claims of racial discrimination in capital sentencing." Baldus et
al., supra note 37, at 374.
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tive role of courts in many of these proceedings, and the political pressures placed upon them, may have made state high courts even more
reluctant to intervene where these issues arose in the criminal justice
arena.91
Where responsibility rested for defining the parameters of proportionality review was ambiguous. In some states neither the legislature nor the state high court firmly took charge of the process. In
other states the legislature clearly ceded authority for defining proportionality review to the state high court. In other states institutional
conflicts emerged between the state high court and the legislature.
For example, if the legislature wanted to limit the scope of review by
the court, the legislature limited the pool of comparison cases by statute. Most state legislatures had little conception of what proportionality review entailed at the time of enactment. State legislatures typically
passed simply-worded proportionality review states in response to
Gregg,92 and a few state high courts almost immediately reversed one
or two death sentences on grounds of disproportionality.
In the early 1980s, then, implementation of proportionality review seemed relatively straightforward, but this seeming simplicity was
short lived. Ordinary delays met by the early capital cases as they
made their way through state appellate systems were often further extended for proportionality review. Some state supreme courts did not
conduct proportionality review until all other issues on appeal had
already been decided. Some states waited until more than one death
sentence had been affirmed so that there would be a pool of cases for
93
comparison.
91 The capital punishment decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the 1980's
were preceded by controversial decisions on zoning and school financing.
ChiefJustice Wilentz's landmark zoning opinion in 1988, which came to be known as
Mt. Laurel II [South Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 456 A. 2d 390
(NJ. 1983)) because it was the second involving that mostly white Burlington County
suburb, set off a firestorm .... The other major decision that is still roiling NewJersey
is Abbott v. Burke (1990) .... again written by ChiefJustice Wilentz, in which the court
ruled that the state's poorest school districts must be given enough state aid to bring
their level of spending spend (sic) per pupil to that of the richest ones.
.
In the summer of 1986, Robert N. Wilentz was very nearly fired. By then he
had been Chief Justice for seven years, the point at which the Senate considers
whether to give a judge a lifetime appointment. Some of his rulings, especially the
Mount Laurel decision, made him enemies ....
Jan Hoffman, His Court, His Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (New Jersey Section), June 30, 1996, at
13NJ6-7.
92 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
93 In somejurisdictions it took several years for post-Greggstatutes and procedures to be
affirmed, even if the state reenacted immediately. Then it took some time for capital convictions to come to the state supreme court for proportionality review on appeal. The first
proportionality review in the jurisdiction usually was incorporated in the first direct appeal
of a death sentence. This was usually, but not always, the case holding the reenacted capi-
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Proportionality review was also thrust into legal limbo during the
pendency of the appeal in Pulley.94 State legislatures and high courts
were both reluctant to take a stand on proportionality which might
subject them to reversal. Then, as the Supreme Court reduced the
grounds for the reversal of death sentences in the late 1980s, state
high courts reconsidered the status of proportionality review. If it
wasn't a federal constitutional remedy, what was it? It had been enacted in response to an endorsement from a very different Supreme
Court, that of the 1970s. 9 5 Now it was wholly a matter of state law,
based upon either state statute, state court rule, or state common law.
Proportionality review could be transformed into a state constitutional
requirement, or it could be institutionalized as a statutory interpretation. The overwhelming response to the withdrawal of the federal
constitutional requirement of proportionality review established in
Greggwas the concomitant withdrawal of the state requirement, either
through legislative action, irrespective of its procedural under-pinnings, or through the action or inaction of the state supreme court.96
In fact, the jurisprudence of proportionality review by state
supreme courts between 1976 and 1991 became in large part the story
of how state high courts responded to constitutional arguments based
upon statistical evidence of racial and geographic disparities. State
high courts are typically presented with variations upon several related
arguments about proportionality. Some argue that the data show
county by county disparities within the state, and that such disparities
passively create racial and/or geographical differences with constitutional dimensions in capital sentencing. Others say that there are rural/urban differences in capital case processing, attributable to
bureaucratic pressures, differing policies of individual prosecutors, or
both. Finally, some argue that differences in capital case processing
are introduced via the overfly different charging policies of autonomous local prosecutors within the same state. 9 7 The factual evidence
for these arguments was strong, even if its presentation was sometimes
unsystematic. Nonetheless, state high courts have been extremely reluctant to grant credence to statistical evidence of any of these disparities, or to regulate the effects of prosecutorial discretion on such
tal statute constitutional. See infra tbl.1 for the different time periods between reenactment, affirmance of the first death sentence, and the first execution, by individual state.
94 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
95 See supra Part IIA
96 The state high court could say, after Puley, "The United States Supreme Court does
not require this, so we are not doing it." Or, the court could just no longer conduct proportionality review or just be very perfunctory. See infra Appendix A.
97 State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 946 (N.J. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017 (1989).
The factual parameters of such arguments are set out infra, Appendix B.

19961

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

grounds. 98

In capital cases, where a life is in the balance, state high courts
might be expected to be more likely to give the benefit of the doubt to
statistical evidence of racial disparities, which may be at least partially
attributable to prosecutorial charging practices. In fact, the opposite
appears to be true.9 9 As state high courts have become increasingly
confident that the Supreme Court would not declare state capital systems unconstitutional, they have become increasingly unwilling to entertain arguments alleging racial and jurisdictional disparities in
capital case processing. In some states which reenacted the death
penalty early there was a period in the mid-eighties during which proportionality review was a viable appellate issue since it was established
in those states, and its federal fate was unclear. As the tide of popular
opinion, however, continued to turn in the direction of increased support for executions, state high courts were content to let proportionality review wither on the vine. In many states not-so-benign neglect was
as effective as the repeal of a statute or an explicit ruling overturning
the requirement.
A.

THE RESPONSE OF STATE HIGH COURTS TO QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Perhaps state high courts are justifiably suspicious of empirical
data and social science evidence, especially of statistical analyses of
racial disparities in the criminal justice system.' 00 Appellate courts are
particularly distrustful of statistics developed by the defense in criminal cases, 10 1 and the prosecution has no motivation to develop such
evidence. A state high court is then left with two alternatives: (1) producing its own accurate data on the capital case processing system
(not a trivial research task) and overseeing its analysis; or (2) accepting the analysis and data put forward by defense counsel. Very
98 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 301 S.E.2d. 335, 353 (N.C. 1983) (rejecting a statistical
analysis of capital case processing).
99 State high courts have been unwilling to rule on behalf of capital defendants on the
basis of statistical evidence of racial disparities in capital case processing, irrespective of the
alleged cause. A weaker scientific showing in the context of employment discrimination,
or racial discrimination in jury selection has resulted in findings of racial discrimination.
See Baldus et al., supra note 37, at 375-76.
100 Justice Powell's comment that "racial... discrimination still remain[s] a fact of life"
in the criminal justice system may have accurately expressed the view of many state
supreme court justices, many of whom had trial court experience. Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 558 (1979).
101 The Supreme Court of NewJersey confronted this issue when the Public Defender
presented a series of reports titled The Reimposition of CapitalPunishment in NewJersey, which
included the quantitative analysis of data on homicides and capital case processing in the
jurisdiction as a whole. See Order, reprinted in Bienen et al., supranote 21, at 371-72 (1988)
(requesting the Special Master to assess this data as one of his first tasks).
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few courts have been willing to undertake research and data collection themselves, although many state high courts already maintain
ongoing records of all capital appeals in their role as administrator of
the court system. Transforming such records into a reliable data base
for systematic analysis of capital sentencing would be feasible, especially since state high courts administer their court systems by using
102
computerized case tracking systems.
When presented with quantitative evidence of racial disparity,
some courts did not understand how to interpret it or how to use it.
Courts justifiably feared they would not be able to evaluate the objectivity of such evidence, especially when the findings were not unambiguous. Perhaps because many justices were unfamiliar with social
science research and its norms they expected more definitive results
than an increased likelihood or statements regarding probability.
The impact of racial and geographical disparities on capital case
processing is counter-intuitive and inferential, in addition to being
controversial and politically unpopular. This evidence supports arguments that the demonstrated racial differentials are caused by explicit
or implicit racial discrimination, or by passive discrimination related
to geographical differences among counties. Contributing to misunderstanding is the fact that the statistical results based upon county or
jurisdictional disparities may demonstrate an unanticipated effect,
namely that cases involving black or minority defendants and victims
are treated less harshly because they are less likely to be declared capital. Jurisdictional disparities may then be articulated as the devaluing
of minority or low status victims, while murders involving white or
10 3
higher status victims are aggressively prosecuted as capital cases.
Furthermore, the data involving geographical disparities may be articulated as a rural/urban distinction, such that homicides are down102 Increasingly, state supreme court ChiefJustices have the administrative responsibility
of overseeing the operation of the enitre court system:
Chief Justice Wilentz spent perhaps two-thirds of his time overseeing the state court
system, which now includes 10,000 employees. More than a million cases were filed
last year in trial level Superior Courts

credible

the Chief Justice strove to make the courts more efficient, accessible and
Toward the end of his tenure, he managed to centralize control of the
budgets of the disparate judicial districts in an effort to erase distinctions in the services offered in poorer and wealthier counties-and, by extension, the quality ofjustice
Jan Hoffman, His Court, His Legacy, N.Y. Tims (NewJersey section),June 30, 1996, 13NJ7.
103 Minorities are in some cases "benefitting" from the discrimination, and this may additionally disturb political alliances on these issues. See Leigh B. Bienen, A Good Murder,20
FORDHAM

UaB. L.J. 585 (1993).
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graded in urban jurisdictions with overburdened dockets and strained
bureaucratic resources, while similar crimes in relatively affluent rural
or suburban districts are prosecuted capitally.10 4 In every jurisdiction
the potential exists for discussions of proportionality to be mired in
technicalities. The more ambitious and sophisticated the scope and
analysis of data, the greater the likelihood of frustration, confusion
and misunderstanding. 10 5 A systematic, reliable study takes time and
causes further appellate delay to executions, creating an additional
source of unpopularity.
In the face of a judiciary unfamiliar with statistical arguments,
persons convicted of capital murder and their court appointed lawyers
are not in the best position to persuade a state high court to set aside
death sentences on the basis of subtle quantitative analyses of capital
case processing. 10 6 But these problems are surmountable. For instance, the response of the Supreme Court of New Jersey was to appoint an expert to advise the court on technical issues of data
interpretation. 10 7 How unusual it was for the supreme court of New
Jersey to create a Proportionality Review Project under the direction
of this Special Master can be appreciated against the backdrop of what
08
other state high courts chose to do, or not to do.
During this period the NewJersey Supreme Court was considered
to be the leading state high court for the development of state constitutional doctrine. 10 9 In particular, the ChiefJustice of the NewJersey
104 The Guidelines for Prosecutorial Discretion adopted by the County Prosecutors Association in response to the Supreme Court of New Jersey's opinion in State v. Koedatidh
548 A.2d 939 (N.J. 1988), declare that factors such as race, socio-economic status, and the
resources of the county prosecutor will not be a factor in the decision to declare a case
capital. See Bienen et al., supra note 45, at 791-93. Nonetheless, patterns of urban/rural
disparity persist. See infra Appendix B, tbl. B8.
105 The district court and circuit court opinions in McCleskey v. Kemp were mired in detail and demonstrated that both courts did not understand the analytical finding. See
BALDUs ET AT., supra note 66, at 340-45.
106 The situation in New Jersey was unusual. The NJ. Office of the Public Defender
supported the collection and analysis of data during the entire proportionality review project, including the hiring of statistical experts from the University of Pennsylvania and
Princeton University. See Appendix B, text accompanying notes 549-552. In most states
public defenders have few financial resources and are unable to support any systematic,
empirical research. The typical pattern is for the research to be conducted by academics
whose research agenda is not designed for the litigation strategy of the defense. The completed academic research is then translated into legal arguments. See, e.g., NTAKELL &
HARDY, supra note 68, at 93 (1987). The New Jersey Public Defender never set a limit on
expenditures for capital appeals, and the New Jersey Legislature consistently appropriated
funds for capital defense during this period.
107 The New York Court of Appeals has implemented procedures to institutionalize systematic data collection and analysis by issuing a form for capital case data reports and by
drawing upon the experience of other states. See infra Part V.B.
108 See infra Part IV; Appendix A.
109 State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (NJ. 1992), shows a court struggling to maintain
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Supreme Court was critical throughout the development of proportionality review in the state."10 The commitment demonstrated by this
court to proportionality review was in part due to several other factors:
the independent character of the New Jersey Supreme Court itself,
the experience and expertise of the Special Master hired by the court
to compile and analyze the relevant data,"' and institutional factors
which made it possible for first the Office of the Public Defender and
then the Administrative Office of the Courts to conduct a comprehensive research and analysis project. 1 2 The research conducted by the
Proportionality Review Project, as it came to be called, refined and
developed a broadly conceived methodology for measuring defendant
culpability and the aggravation level of homicide. These measures are
now available and applicable to studies of homicide and other analyses of criminal behavior and responsibility. The development of systematic, analytic categories for gradations of criminal culpability and
aggravation levels in homicide is a path-breaking intellectual achievement. That such conceptual development should occur in a court
sponsored research project is all the more extraordinary.
consensus while coming to terms with an expert analysis of comprehensive data concerning racial disparities in capital case processing. Proportionality review in NewJersey was an
ongoing study of the development of social science data and methodology by a court. The
court was criticized, often inaccurately, for attempting to be as precise as possible in its
reference to facts and quantitative relationships. The court's commitment is especially
noteworthy because it was exceptional.
'It might be the best Supreme Court in the Country-state or federal,' said Harvard
law Prof. Laurence H. Tribe.
[A] fair amount of the credit for the Court's achievements belongs to ChiefJustice Wilentz,' said Professor Tribe, 'but it's certainly not a one-man accolade.' Professor Kamisar's [Professor Yale Kamisar, University of Michigan School of Law]
personal applause is reserved for Stewart G. Pollock, 51, a liberal Republican who has,
in speeches and articles, picked up a recurring theme of the court: the importance of
the state constitution in protecting fundamental rights ....
Bruce S. Rosen, A Bold CourtForges Ahead, NAT'L LJ., November 5, 1984, at 1.
110 ChiefJustice Wilentz not only authored several important opinions building the jurisprudence concerning proportionality in capital cases, but he also had a commitment to
the principled application of social science methods which the court needed to maintain
its commitment. During this period the Chief Justice was personally attacked when the
court reversed death sentences. The ChiefJustice died shortly after he announced his early
retirement for reasons of ill health. See Jan Hoffman, His Court, His Legacy, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1996, at 13NJ1; David Stout, Robert Wrdentz, 69, Dies; Court Aided Women and Poor,
N.Y. TiMES, July 24, 1996, at D20.
111 See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
112 The New York Court of Appeals may now be in a favorable position to demonstrate
similarjudicial leadership. See infra Part V. Recently, the state high courts of Pennsylvania
and Connecticut have expressed a willingness to take the responsibility of maintaining an
adequate factual record in order to conduct systematic proportionality review. See State v.
Cobb, 663 A.2d 948, 961-62 (Conn. 1995); Commonwealth v. Banks, 656 A.2d 467, 474
(Pa.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 113 (1995).
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THE STATE HIGH COURT'S DUTY AS COURT ADMINISTRATOR TO
PREPARE AND MAINTAIN A RELIABLE FACTUAL RECORD ON
CAPITAL CASE PROCESSING

In addition to New Jersey, a small number of state high courts
have initiated comprehensive data collection and assumed responsibility for creating and maintaining a factual record on homicide cases
within their jurisdiction. Without a reliable factual record documenting the movement of potentially capital cases through the system, however, there can be no meaningful proportionality review.
For example, an extensive data collection effort has been in place
in Pennsylvania since that state reenacted the death penalty. Data
have been collected and made available to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court since at least 1983, with some information on cases going back
to 1978.11 The data are now being updated and corrected by the
1 14
Philadelphia office of the Public Defender.
The Pennsylvania data set has the potential of providing a comprehensive factual basis for the systemwide analysis of a capital punishment system which seems to have wide disparities." 5 At the present
113 See Commonwealth v. Frey, 475 A-2d 700, 712-13 (Pa. 1984) (proportionality review
data collection instrument "Review Form: Murder of the First Degree"). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court database is described in John F Kairns & Lee S. Weinberg, The Death Sentence in Pennsylvania-1978-1990:A PreliminaryAnalysis of the Effects of Statutory and Nonstatutory factors, 95 DIc,. L. Rrv. 691 (1991).
114 See Commonwealth v. DeHart, 516 A.2d 656, 671 (Pa. 1986). Researchers have encountered problems in attempting to analyze the Pennsylvania database. Data are provided on a form by the trial court judge. Data are collected on the race, sex and age of
defendant and victim; the dates and disposition of the offense; and whether or not the
death penalty was sought. The form also asks whether there was a factual basis for any
statutory aggravating factor submitted or found, whether there were aggravating circumstances which were not pursued by the State, and the court's opinion as to why the Commonwealth did not seek the death penalty or failed to pursue aggravating circumstances if
there was a factual basis for seeking the death penalty. Information is sought on the statutory mitigating circumstances submitted and found, the statutory mitigating circumstances
which were not pursued, and the court's assessment of why defense counsel may have
failed to pursue any mitigating circumstances. Finally, both the prosecutor and the defense attorney, in theory, certify the accuracy of the data and provide additional information. See Frey, 475 A.2d at 712-13. The open ended database is intended to be maintained
on a standardized statistical file. The absence of a narrative summary for each case is a
serious methodological problem. Without case narratives it is impossible to verify facts or
procedural decisions to ensure a reliable analysis.
115

In most jurisdictions, prosecutors file such notice [to seek the death penalty] in a
small percentage of eligible homicides: in Pittsburgh, for example, W. Christopher
Conrad, Allegheny County's deputy district attorney for homicide, estimates that his
office files a Rule 352 [a notice of intention to seek the death penalty] in about a
quarter of the cases in which aggravators are present. Philadelphia files one in virtually every case ....
.... In 1991, the last year for which figures are available for comparison, Houston's
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time, however, defendants challenging the application of the statute
are verifying basic case processing data and collecting information on
additional variables. 1 16 In sum, the Pennsylvania experience proves
that collecting data without controls on accuracy and comprehensiveness cannot provide a reliable factual basis for proportionality analysis
by a court or anyone else.
Indeed, state courts are disingenuous when they refuse to consider issues of racial and geographic disparity because of an absence
of reliable data. The statutory mandate to conduct proportionality review necessarily implies creating and maintaining an adequate factual
record. A critical distinction between the states is whether or not the
state high court itself takes the initiative in institutionalizing data collection and certifies its accuracy; the data analysis which follows is rela117
tively straightforward.
C.

PATTERNS OBSERVED IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PROPORTIONALITY
REVIEW IN THE INDIVIDUAL STATES

While each state has a unique statute and body of capital punishmentjurisprudence, certain patterns are discernible. There are stark
differences between states with large death row populations and states
prosecutors sought death in seven cases at trial and won it in six. That year, Philadelphia sought it at trial in at least 59 cases, and probably many more ... and won it 12
times.
Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMEs MAG., July 16, 1995, at 42, 46.
116 The Philadelphia Public Defender's Office is updating and verifying a segment of
this data base as part of its challenge to racial and geographic disparities in the application
of the death penalty in Philadelphia. The Defender Association of Philadelphia is in the
process of creating a data base for a state wide study of proportionality in the imposition of
the death sentences in Pennsylvania. The sample includes all death sentences, a sample of
penalty phase life cases and death possible non penalty phase cases, including trials and
pleas. The Administrative Offices of Pennsylvania Courts have provided this Project with
its own data and research going back to 1978. Professor David C. Baldus is a consultant to
the Defender Association. The Project is modeled after the Proportionality Review Project
of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Telephone interview with David Zuckerman, Assistant Defender, Appellate Division, Defender Association of Philadelphia, November 19,
1996.
117 When the court engages in independent data verification and maintains a factual
record of potentially capital homicides, that record is usually a public record, available to
any interested party, including those challenging the imposition of the death sentence.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, routinely gives its data files to capital defense attorneys. But see Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 672, 681-82 (Ky. 1985) (holding that the public advocate is not entitled to data compiled for the Supreme Court
pursuant to the court's authority to review death sentences). Some state high courts have
created permanent data files on all capital appeals. The court typically appoints a special
clerk or administrative agency to collect the data and ensure its reliability. In other states,
the court will cooperate with independent researchers to prepare a data base on capital
cases. See the description of the data collection methods in NAKELL & HARDY, supra note
68, at 98.
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with a small number of capital cases."

8

Table 1 summarizes the experience of the states since Gregg. In
Table 1 the date of death penalty reenactment (Column 1), the date
of the first affirmance of a death sentence (Column 2), and the date
of the first execution (Column 3), are tracked for each reenacting
state." 9 The next three columns show the period of time elapsing
between reenactment and the first death sentence affirmed (Column
4), the period of time from reenactment to the first execution in the
state (Column 5); and the number of years from the first death sentence affirmed to the first execution (Column 6). The final two columns show the death row population as of 1996 (Column 7) and the
number of executions between 1976 and 1996 (Column 8).
When the states are ranked by these different measures several
patterns emerge. 120 Texas, with over 100 executions since 1976 is
grossly out of proportion in comparison to other states, even considering only other southern states. For example, Florida has executed
thirty-four, Virginia, twenty-seven, Louisiana, twenty-two, and Georgia,
twenty. Eight states have had six, five, or four executions; four states
have executed three or two; and five states have executed one person.
Twelve reenacting states have had no executions, including Connecticut, which reenacted in 1973, Tennessee, which reenacted in 1974,
and Colorado and New Mexico which both reenacted in 1975. While
the rhetoric of the capital punishment jurisprudence in these states
may be favorable to capital punishment, the state high court is not
expediting executions.
Ranking by date of reenactment, Florida was the first state to reenact, which it did on December 8, 1972, before Gregg was handed
down. A total of eleven states then reenacted in 1973, and an additional ten reenacted in 1974. Another six reenacted in 1975. Before
Gregg was handed down, then, twenty-eight states had already reen118 See infta tbl. 1.

119 The date of the first death sentence affirmed should not be confused with the date
the statute is held constitutional. In New Jersey, for example, the statute as a whole was
held to be constitutional in State v. Ranseur,524 A.2d 188 (NJ. 1987). However, the first
capital conviction was not affirmed until MarshallIin 1991. State v. Marshall, 586 A.2d 85
(N.J. 1991). The death sentence of Robert Marshall was affirmed in 1992 after proportionality review in MarshallI. State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992). Although federal
and state habeas actions are pending in Marshall's case, the NewJersey Supreme Court has
issued a ruling on the direct appeal and upheld the death sentence after proportionality
review-the final appellate action in a capital appeal. Similarly, in Connecticut, the state
high court has upheld the statute's constitutionality as a whole, but the court has not yet
upheld an individual death sentence after proportionality review.
120 The subtractions and the rankings within each column were done using Microsoft
Excel.
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TABLE 1
DATE OF REENACTMENT, DATE OF FIRST CAPITAL AFFIRMANCE, DATE OF
FIRST EXECUTION, AND

TIME

PERIODS BETWEEN,

By

STATE

Col. I

Col. 2

Col. 3

Years from
Re-enactment
to First
Death
Sentence
Affirmed
(col. 2-col. 1)
Col. 4

Alabama

3/ 5/76

9/ 9/77

4/22/83

1.5

7.2

5.7

144

Arizona

8/ 8/73

12/20/76

4/ 6/92

3.4

18.9

15.5

121

4

Arkansas

3/23/73

12/22/75

6/18/90

2.8

17.5

14.7

37

11

California

1/ 1/74

10/12/80

4/21/92

6.9

18.6

11.7

444

3

Colorado

1/ 1/75
10/ 1/73

5/14/90

3/29/74

9/20/84

3/14/92

10.6

18.2

7.6

11

8

8/72

11/27/74

5/25/79

2.0

6.6

4.6

351

36

Georgia

3/28/73

4/ 4/74

12/15/83

1.0

10.9

9.8

108

20

Idaho

7/ 1/73

5/23/83

1/ 6/94

10.0

20.8

10.8

19

1

Illinois

7/ 1/74

11/13/81

9/12/90

7.5

16.4

9.0

164

7

Indiana

5/ 1/73

1/30/81

3/ 9/81

7.9

8.0

0.1

50

3

Kansas

4/22/94

Kentucky

1/ 1/75

11/ 2/80

Louisiana

7/ 2/73

10/11/74

12/14/83

1.3

10.6

9.3

53

Maryland

7/ 1/75

11/ 3/83

5/16/94

8.5

19.2

10.7

17

1

Mississippi

4/23/74

5/24/78

9/ 2/83

4.1

9.5

5.4

54

4

Missouri

9/28/75

5/11/81

1/ 6/89

5.7

13.5

7.8

92

19

Montana

3/11/74

11/12/76

5/10/95

2.7

21.5

18.8

6

1

Nebraska

4/20/73

2/ 2/77

9/ 2/94

3.8

21.7

17.8

10

1

Nevada

7/ 1/73

5/17/78

10/22/79

4.9

6A

1.5

85

6

New
Hampshire

1/ 1/91

NewJersey

8/ 6/82

7/28/92

10.1

12

New Mexico

7/ 1/79

1/20/83

3.6

3

New York

9/ 1/95

North
Carolina

6/ 1/77

11/

Ohio

1/ 1/74

11/24/76

State

Connecticut
Delaware
Florida

Oklahoma

Date
Death
Penalty
Reenacted

12/

Date
First
Death
Sentence
Affirmed

Date of
First
Execution

Years from
Re-enactment
to First
Execution
(col. 3-col. 1)
Col. 5

Years from
First Death
Sentence
Affirmed to
First
Execution
(col. 3-col. 2)
Col. 6

15.6

Death
Row
Executions
Population Since 1976
as of 1996 as of 1996
Col. 7

Col. 8
13

4
5

3/81

5.9

3/16/84

4.5

28

6.9

2A

2.9

8

150

5/17/73

3/21/80

12/ 7/78

2/26/88

Pennsylvania

3/26/74

12/30/82

5/ 2/95

8.9

21.4

12.5

200

2

South
Carolina

7/ 2/74

2/11/76

1/11/85

1.6

10.7

9.0

71

5

South Dakota

1/ 1/79

Tennessee

2/27/74

1/ 7/80

Texas

1/ 1/74

4/16/75

12/ 7/82

1.3

9.1

7.8

394

Utah+

7/ 1/73

11/25/77

1/17/77

4.5

3.6

-0.9

10

5

Virginia

10/ 1/75

9/ 5/75

8/10/82

-0.1

7.0

7.0

54

31

Washington

11/

13

2

Oregon

Wyoming

9/10/90

154

23

6.9

17.6

10.6

9A

119

7

22

2
5.9

102

4/75

11/ 6/84

1/ 5/93

9.1

17.4

8.3

2/28/77

5/27/83

1/22/92

6.3

15.1

8.8

106

1

Source: For date of reenactment, individual state statutes and session laws. Date of reenactment is the effective date of the
statute. For date of affirmance, individual state high court opinions. Date of affirmance is the date the state high court upheld
the first post-Furman death sentance on appeal, including proportionality review. Source for death row population and
executions (as of April 30,1996): NAACP LrAL DEFENS
rAN EnucA'noN FUND,DsATH Row, USA. Spring 1996. Source for New
Jersey death row population, Administrative Office of the Courts, NewJersey, as of August 1, 1996.
+ Utah executed Gary Gilmore when he withdrew his appeals, before his conviction and death sentence were affirmed.
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acted?12 ' After Gregg, two states reenacted in 1977 and 1979, and in all
other years only one state reenacted, with no states at all reenacting in
twelve of the years between 1980 and 1995.122 Generalizations about
the rush to capital punishment in the 1980's do not hold. Reenactments occured primarily in the 1970's.
When the dates for the first death sentence affirmed are ranked,
a more even distribution is seen, with four states each having affirmances in the years 1976, 1980, and 1981 and 1983. Georgia was the
first state to affirm, with Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Virginia, and Arkansas all affirming the constitutionality of their statutes before 1976,
and before Gregg. After Gregg it might have been expected that there
would be a cluster of affirmances in 1977, but there were only three.
Similarly, by 1984, when Pulley was decided, most states had already
affirmed their first death sentence, although a surprising number,
123
five, had not.
The distribution of dates of first execution in Column 3 shows
Utah to have been first, in 1977. Following Utah were Florida, Nevada, Indiana, Virginia and Texas, all before 1983. Then four states
had their first execution in 1984. No additional states began executions until 1990, then seven states executed their first person between
1990 and 1992. Three other states initiated executions in 1994.
Eleven death penalty states had not yet executed anyone in 1996.
Column 4 shows the time lapse between reenactment and the
first death sentence affirmed was less than two years in six states, and
less than five years in seventeen states. Four states took ten years or
more to affirm their first death sentence after reenactment, and five
states had not yet affirmed their first death sentence in 1996.
The distribution of years from reenactment to the first execution
for those twenty-seven (including Ohio) states which have had executions, shows Utah to be the outlier, with only 3.6 years elapsing between reenactment and execution. Eight other states executed their
first capital defendant before ten years; thirteen took between ten and
twenty years, and four took more than twenty years.
The ranking of years between the first affirmance and the first
execution shows that twelve states are between five and ten years, and
nine states are between ten and twenty years. Utah has a negative
value, since Gary Gilmore was executed before his direct appeal was
121 If Gregg had declared the Georgia statute unconstitutional, it would have sent all of
those states back to square one. The political cost might have been very high indeed.
122 No states reenacted in 1980, 1981, 1983-1990, 1992 or 1993.
123 The states which have not affirmed their first death sentence as of 1996 include:
Connecticut (reenacted in 1973), Kansas (1994), New Hampshire (1991), New York
(1995), and South Dakota (1979).

LEIGH B. BIENEN[

[Vol. 87

decided. This is followed by Indiana, which executed its first person
less than a year after affirmance. At the other extreme, Montana and
Nebraska had 18.8 years and 17.8 years elapse, respectively, between
the first affirmance and the first execution. Other relationships in Table 1 are noteworthy: Florida was the first state to reenact, one of the
first states to affirm its statute, the second state to execute a defendant, and the state with the third largest death row population, yet the
state has executed less than ten percent of that population. 124 By contrast, Texas, which reenacted early and affirmed early, did not execute
its first defendant until 1982; but as of 1995 it had executed almost
twenty-five percent of that population. Similarly, Virginia had executed almost one-third of its death row population as of 1996,
although the state did not have an execution until 1982.
Table 2 lists death row population by state. In 1984, the year Pulley was decided, California already had 153 people on death row, placing it third. Only Florida, with 203, and Texas, with 172, had more
people on death row. 125 Eleven states had between 20 and 40 prisoners on death row in 1984, while seven states had none. By 1987, when
McCleskey was decided, Florida, with 267, still had more people on
death row than any other state, followed by Texas with 245, and California with 196.126 In 1987 only six states had no defendants on death
row.
In 1996, the top three death row populations were in California,
Texas, and Florida, with populations of 444, 394, and 351, respectively. The biggest change since 1987, however, is that twelve states
have over 100. Seven other states had 50 or more people on death
row and nine states had less than 5 defendants on death row. Percentage changes in death row populations from 1984 to 1987 and from
1987 to 1995 show large and varied percentage changes, as well as
negative percentages, but these large variations in percentages often
See Baldus et al., supra note 37, at 413-17 (discussing Florida's capital jurisprudence).
And, of course, a state will have a death row population as soon as the first defendant
is sentenced to death at the trial level. The state need not have affirmed its first death
sentence for a death row population to exist.
126 Changes in the number of people on death row reflect not only executions, but also
defendants removed from death row because their death sentences were overturned by
courts-either on direct appeal, or by a state or federal court on post conviction relief. To
date no one has compiled an accurate account of the affirmance rate for each individual
state supreme court, and defining such a rate has many methodological difficulties. For
example, are reversals on direct appeal the only reversals counted? What about the reversal rate for federal district courts and federal circuit courts? Additionally, some circuits are
much more likely to reverse death sentences than other circuits. Defining categories, as
well as counting and tabulating, present difficult questions which must be resolved consistently if comparative figures are to have any meaning. For this reason, Tables 1 and 2 only
contain numbers as of a specific date which could in theory be established with certainty.
124
125
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TABLE

2

DEATH Row POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE INCREASES, NUMBER OF
EXECUTIONS, BY STATE, AND

YEARS 1984, 1987,
Death Row
Population
1996
Col. 4

1996

AND

Executions
as a % of
Death Row
Population
1996
Cl. 7

Death Row
Population
as of 1984
Col. 1

Death Row
Population
as of 1987
Col. 2

Alabama

71

86

2

144

103%

13

Arizona

50

64

0

121

142%

4

3%

Arkansas

23

33

0

37

61%

11

23%

California

153

196

0

444

190%

3

Colorado

2

2

0

4

100%

0

Connecticut

0

0

0

5

Delaware

6

6

0

11

Florida

203

267

16

351

73%"

36

9%

Georgia

114

107

7

108

-5%

20

16%

State

Executions
as of 1987
Col. 3

% Increase
1984-1996
Cl. 5

Executions
as of 1996
Col. 6

8%

0
83%

8

42%

Idaho

9

14

0

19

111%

1

5%

Illinois

59

105

0

164

178%

7

4%

Indiana.

25

42

2

50

100%

3

6%

0

0

0

Kentucky

19

31

0

28

47%

0

Louisiana

36

52

7

53

47%

23

30%

Maryland

13

19

0

17

31%

1

6%

Mississippi

38

48

1

54

42%

4

7%

Missouri

23

50

0

92

300%

19

17%

Kansas

0

Montana

4

6

0

6

50%

1

14%

Nebraska

11

14

0

10

-9%

1

9%

Nevada

20

39

2

85

325%

6

7%

New Hampshire

0

0

0

NewJersey

5

24

0

12-

New Mexico

0

0

0

3

New York

0

0

0

North Carolina

34

65

3

154

353%

8

Ohio

21

76

0

150

614%

0

Oklahoma

40

69

0

119

198%

7

0

3

0

22

Pennsylvania

56

86

0

200

257%

2

1%

South Carolina

88

50

2

71

115%

5

7%

Oregon

0
140%

0
0
0
5%

6%

0

0

0

0

0

2.

38

59

0

102

168%

0

172

245

22

394

129%

106

4

7

1

10

150%

5

33%

21

36

5

54

157%

31

36%

Washington

4

7

0

13

225%

2

13%

Wyoming

3

3

0

0

-100%

1

100%

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia

21%

sEesE
Ao EucAmoN FuND, DrATH Row, U.S.A., Spring 1996; March 1, 1984 and May 1, 1987 (the
Source: NAACP I2.AL D
v. Kemp, respectively). The NewJersey figure for 1996 from Administrative
dates immediately after Pu/lq v. HasisandMcfks
Office of the Courts, as of Sept. 1, 1996.
Percentage increases are calculated as follows: Col. 5 = (Col. 4 - Col. 1)/Col. 1; Cl. 7 = (Col. 6/Cl. 6 + Col. 4).
Note: As of March 1. 1984, there were a total of thirteen post-1976 executions: one each in Alabama, Georgia, Indiana,
Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, Utah and Virginia; two in Louisiana; and three in Florida.
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occur when working with a small base.
The three states with the largest death row population in 1984,
Florida, Texas, and California, showed percentage increases of thirtytwo percent, forty-two percent and twenty-eight percent, respectively,
between 1984 and 1987. By comparison, those same states show even
greater percentage increases in their death row population from 1984
to 1996: Florida, 73%; Texas, 129%; and California, 190%. Overall,
however, Texas has had the most persons sentenced to death. The
current death row population in Texas only ranks below California
because Texas has executed over 100 defendants, and California less
than half a dozen.
Finally, the percentage of the death row population executed
shows both expected and surprising comparisons. Texas has the highest number of executions, but Delaware, Virginia, Utah and Louisiana
have executed the largest percentage of their death row populations,
each with more than 30% on varying bases. In several indicators, Virginia emerges as a state almost as aggressive as Texas in its death penalty policies.1 27 Florida again emerges as the surprising figure, having
executed nine percent of its death row population. This results in a
large number of actual executions for Florida, but a small proportion
of the total death row population. The same effect occurs in the numbers for some other Southern states.
The high courts of Texas, Florida, and California spend a substantial amount of time on capital appeals, and have a highly developed capital jurisprudence. 128 However, goaded by political
pressures, and staffed by judges who know they may be voted out of
office if they reverse death sentences, these courts have almost become factories for affirmances.' 29 The next tier of state high courts,
those with death row populations above 100, are now being pushed in
that direction.1 30 Those state high courts with a small number of capi127 In the entire history of capital punishment in America, Virginia has executed more
women than any other state, and more than twice as many as the next state (112 executions
of women in Virginia, as opposed to 49 in Maryland). Victor L. Streb, Death Penalty for
Battered Women, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 163, 172 (1992).
128 These states have had a great deal of interplay between the state high court and
federal courts on capital punishment issues. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, TestingPenry and
its Progeny, 22 AM. J. ClM. L. 1 (1994) (chronicling the interplay between the federal
courts, the state appellate courts, and the Texas Legislature on the question of statutory
mental mitigating factors).
129 See Bright & Kennan, supra note 81, at 766. Bright & Keenan discuss the replacement of ChiefJustice Rose Bird and three other justices on the California Supreme Court,
after a campaign in which the Chief Justice's prior reversal of death sentences played a
prominent part. The affirmance rate for capital cases went up dramatically after that
election.
130 See supra tbl.1.
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tal appeals engage in an entirely different enterprise when they review
death sentences.
After McCleskey the majority of states no longer took proportionality review seriously. If the state high court remained under a statutory
mandate to conduct proportionality review, the manner and method
for conducting such review changed. However, it is not always easy to
tell when a state high court is setting aside a death sentence as disproportionate, since courts may give multiple reasons for setting aside a
capital conviction.' 3 ' Sometimes this fact was explicitly acknowledged
by the state high courts, sometimes it was not. McCleskey shocked the
defense bar, but it was welcomed by members of the legal community
who thought that defendants had been too successful in postponing
32
executions.,
Systematic, statistical analysis of a capital punishment system
which found significant racial disparities would not result in the federal courts reversing a death sentence, so why then should a state high
court conduct proportionality review using a systemwide approach?
In the majority of states proportionality review was turned into a limited review of individual death sentences, a comparison to one or two
or three other sentences which resulted in the predictable affirmance
of the death sentence under review. It was especially easy to ignore
the constitutional issues if there was no reliable, systematic analysis of
the capital case processing system, since there could be no constitutional violation without a factual predicate indicating disparities with a
constitutional dimension.
But state high courts were not required to abandon the constitutional principles of proportionality review, so why were so many state
high courts eager to eviscerate the process? There is no definitive answer, but by the late 1980's, state high courts considered themselves
ill-equipped and unprepared to undertake an empirical review of
their state capital punishment systems. These courts did not have
spare resources to devote to the task, and judges often did not wish to
make the educational investment required to understand the issues.
No institutional actor except the Public Defender was pushing the
state high court to undertake systematic proportionality review; the
political and institutional pressures were all in the opposite direction.
131 Frequently a court will reverse on proportionality and on other grounds. But see
Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. 1995) (death sentence was not proportionate);
see also State v. Pratt, 873 P.2d 800, 824 (Idaho 1993) ("We hold that the death penalty in

this case is disproportionate.").
132 See, e.g., Conference: The DeathPenalty in the Twenty-First Century, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 239,
327-31 (1995) (comments of Paul D. Kamenar). The ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court
went on record endorsing the speeding up of executions-a view that was shared by many
in the judiciary. See Rehnquist, supranote 77, at 2.
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Moreover, in most states the Public Defender had been rendered ineffective by the lack of a centralized administration, the absence of
political support and a severe shortage of funds.' 3 3 They were not
strong enough to defend against the attack on proportionality review.
The draconian dollar limits imposed upon capital appeals in many
states means that no one defendant has the resources to collect the
information required for a systematic analysis of the state's capital
punishment system.' 34 And if the defense does not press for proportionality review, certainly the Attorney General and county prosecutors will not. The prosecution has nothing to gain from systematic
proportionality review by the court. Judges, including state high court
judges, are overwhelmingly composed of ex-prosecutors. 13 5 The problem was not that there was no legal theory or principles available to
support proportionality review. The patterns show that most state
high courts intentionally turned away from support of proportionality
review. They did this in two different ways: by repealing or overturning proportionality review entirely or by limiting the universe of cases
for comparison.
1.

Getting Rid of ProportionalityReview

Six state legislatures repealed their statutory provisions for proportionality review after initially following the Gregg mandate. 3 6 One
state, Tennessee, reinstated its proportionality review provision after a
repeal in 1992.137 In two additional states the state high court, on its
133 If the administrative unit for the public defender is the county, then the typical pattern is that the office of the public defender will be effective in the large cities, where there
is a large volume of serious criminal cases and a professionalized staff. Even those attor-

neys, however, cannot undertake systematic data collection on homicides throughout the
state. The New York statute enacted in 1995, N.Y. JUD. LAw § 35-b(3) (McKinney Supp.
1996), creates a central Capital Defenders Office for this purpose. In many states public
defenders are appointed by local authorities, and there are vast differences in the quality of
defense counsel in different parts of the same state.
134 In many jurisdictions, limits on defense spending limit the capability of the defense:
In [capital] cases, Philadelphia pays a $1,700 flat fee for preparation and $400 for
each day in court. This averages $3,519 a case, according to Geoff Gallas, the executive administrator of Philadelphia's courts .... Since the public defenders began

taking murder cases in April 1993 [in Philadelphia], their clients have not been given
a single death sentence, while 33 of those privately represented-most, if not all, court
appointed-have been given one.
Rosenberg, supra note 115, at 50 (citations omitted). In Alabama, a court appointed lawyer
in a death penalty case is awarded $20 an hour and limited to $2,000 for out-of-court time.
In Mississippi, the limit is $1,000. See The O.J.Simpson Case and CapitalPunishmen 38 How.
L.J. 247, 265 (1995) (panel discussion) (comments of Stephen Bright).
135 See Bright & Keenan, supra note 81, at 781.
136 Those states were Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Nevada, Oklahoma and Wyoming.
See infra Appendix A.
137 See infraAppendix A.
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own initiative, explicitly abandoned the effort to conduct a systematic
review of the state's capital case processing system.1 38
States that abandoned proportionality review were not necessarily
the states where the procedure was a meaningless exercise. For example, in Wyoming, proportionality review was not a perfunctory exercise prior to repeal. The Wyoming high court systematically
examined a large number of cases and carefully considered the issues.' 39 Nevada overturned five death sentences as disproportionate
prior to repeal, a relatively large number of death sentences to be
140
overturned for such a small jurisdiction.
2.
a.

Limiting the Pool of Cases or Scope of Review

Death Only

Some states limited proportionality review by cutting their pool of
comparison cases to those in which the sentence of death had actually
been imposed. 14 ' The articulated rationale for this is that a death sentence is unlike any other sentence, therefore a death sentence can
only be compared with other death sentences.' 42 Courts adopting this
approach have thereby concluded that cases which did not result in a
death sentence are by definition qualitatively different from the death
sentence case under review.143 Thus, the method fails to account for
situations in which the death penalty was not applied.
Cases in which the death sentence was not imposed are irrelevant
because the only purpose of proportionality review is to make sure
that the death sentence under review belongs with the class of other
death sentences. Similarity between cases can also mean nothing
more than similarity to only one other death sentence which has been
upheld. The proportionality decision in this context then is whether
138 California was engaged in a systematic data analysis project prior to McCleskey. It was
abandoned after McClaskey was decided.
139 See infra Appendix A.
140 See infra Appendix A.
141 Courts and legislatures define the relevant terms differently. The important analytic
point is that a "pool" or "universe" of cases is the group of cases to which the death case
under review is being compared, however that group is defined. Courts also use terms
such as "death eligible" and "capital" to mean different things.

142 This is the "precedent-seeking" approach in the typology of the National Center for
State Courts. See BA.nus ET A.. , supranote 66, at 281. The death sentence under review is
not disproportionate if the court can find at least one other similar case in which the death
sentence has been upheld.
143 See infra Appendix A. The states which limit the pool of comparison cases to other
death sentences imposed, either by statutory provision or by an explicit holding in the case
law, are Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, NewJersey, Ohio, South Carolina, and Virginia. Even in these states, however, the court will occasionally depart from
its own procedures and consider other non-death cases.
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this death sentence is internally consistent with the class of other
death sentences,'" or, if there is any other case in which the death
sentence has been upheld which is similar to the death sentence
under review. This process ususally results in a statistically meaningless comparison. In California and Texas, states with large death row
populations, where the pool of comparison cases using only death
sentences could be large, with the possibility of statistically significant
results, there is no mandated proportionality review.
Except in states where the death row populations are very large,
this limitation essentially reduces proportionality review to a perfunctory exercise. Only one death sentence has been overturned on
grounds of disproportionality in all of the jurisdictions which have
limited the pool of cases to other death sentences, and that death
145
sentence was overturned relatively soon after Gregg.
Courts which adopt this rationale tend to ask whether the case
under review is as "heinous," "aggravated" or "serious" as other cases
in which the same court has already upheld a death sentence.146 No
similar cases in which defendants escaped the death penalty are considered. This proportionality review exercise, then, groups all the
144 This type of proportionality review, however, makes no sense. Assume for the moment that it was demonstrated that the jurisdiction in question was found to only impose
death in cases involving black defendants and white victims. Under the logic of this approach, it would be irrelevant that there were five, ten or one hundred allegedly similar
cases involving white defendants and white victims in which the defendant was not sentenced to death. As long as the class of people sentenced to death was internally consistent, the standard is satisfied. The Attorney General of the State of New Jersey conceded
this point in the oral argument in Marshall
145 See Steven M. Sprenger, Note, A CriticalEvaluation of State Supreme CourtProportionality
Review in Death Sentence Cases, 73 IowA L. REv. 719, 738 n.154 (1988) ("A reasonably diligent review of proportionality review opinions of state supreme courts that limit their universe to death sentence cases reveals that within all those states, courts have identified a
death sentence as comparatively excessive in only one case") (citing Coleman v. State, 378
So. 2d 640 (Miss. 1979)).
In Coleman v. State, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for committing a murder while engaged in the commission of a burglary. In conducting its proportionality review, the Mississippi Supreme Court refised to include similar life
sentence cases in its universe even though it failed to identify any similar death sentence cases. Lacking such cases, the court vacated the death sentence as excessive.
Id. at 738 (footnotes omitted). A search of post-1987 proportionality review cases did not
reveal another such case.
146 See, e.g., Turner v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 483, 490 (Va. 1988).
[The defendant] cites prior cases where the "vileness" involved was admittedly greater
than the "vileness" present here. But no concept of proportionality requires that each
new capital murder case equal in horror the worst possible scenario yet encountered,
else the death penalty may not be imposed .... "While the atrociousness involved in
Turner's murder does not rise to the level evidenced in Stamper,James DyralBriley, or
Coppola, Turner's murder is just as brutal as the murders in Linwood Earl Briley and
Clark...."
Id. (citation and footnotes omitted) (second ellipsis in original).
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death sentences together and asks if all of the cases in which death
was imposed are similar to one another. The principle of proportionality will be upheld if all of these case resemble one another. The
death sentence will be overturned only if the court can identify the
case under review as an aberrant judgment, a case in which the circumstances of a murder or the characteristics of the defendant are
strikingly dissimilar to those in other death sentences. The circumstances most likely to occasion a substantive legal argument on this
basis are those where the death sentence has been imposed upon one
codefendant, while an "equally or more culpable" codefendant received life. 14 7 Typically, however, state court opinions upholding
death sentences consist of inflammatory rhetoric, a recitation of horrors designed to appeal to emotions of vengeance and disgust before
the court upholds the death sentence. Moderation is rare.
Interestingly, those state supreme courts that only consider the
pool of other death sentences typically say little or nothing about their
proportionality review procedures. The court may not even cite another case in affirming a death sentence. Courts adopting this approach usually have a small and manageable number of cases
immediately after reenactment of the death penalty. Ironically, perfunctory review procedures are usually institutionalized when the
number of comparison cases grows, as more people in the jurisdiction
are sentenced to death.
b.

Capital Convictions

Other state courts have defined the pool of comparison cases as
all cases which resulted in a conviction for capital murder but not
necessarily a death sentence. The rationale for this approach is that a
death sentence should be compared with all cases where there has
been an actual legal judgment which could have supported the imposition of the death sentence, i.e. all convictions which reached the penalty phase of a capital trial.' 48 Cases which have a factual or
circumstantial similarity to the case under review are excluded if there
was no conviction for capital murder. The justification for this exclusion is that prosecutorial and juror decision making, and hence trial
outcomes, are essentially unpredictable. This pool thus leaves out
147 Even in this circumstance, however, state high courts will not always set aside the
death sentence as disproportionate. See, e.g., Coppola v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 797,
807 (Va. 1979).
148 See infraAppendix A. The states which define their pool of comparison cases as all
other penalty phase cases, either by statute or by an explicit holding to that effect by the
state high court are: Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Washington.
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cases whose facts or circumstances could have supported a capitalprosecu149
tion, but prosecutors choose not to pursue it.

This initial choice does not result in the same universe in every
jurisdiction. Nor does this decision rule mean that all death sentences
or capital convictions which have ever been imposed in that jurisdiction will necessarily be included. 150 The pool may also not be comprised solely of jury verdicts at penalty phase. It may include some
pleas to capital murder.15 1 It may include some death sentences and
life sentences imposed by ajudge either without ajury or when overruling a jury. 15 2 It may or may not include death sentences reversed
53
on appeal or the result of penalty phase retrials.'
A conviction for death eligible murder under this rationale appropriately limits the class of similar cases because these are the only
cases in which there is both a legal and factual foundation for the
death sentence. Or, to put the matter in terms of similar defendants,
members of this class are similar because they are the only defendants
actually at risk of receiving the death penalty. Proportionality review in
the state high court, then, exists for the sole purpose of correcting
aberrant death sentences imposed by ajury or judge, after the factual
and legal prerequisite for such ajudgment has been found to exist. A
death sentence may be found disproportionate if other cases with similar facts and circumstances resulted in a life sentence after a conviction
54
for capital murder.1
149 See Marshall II, 613 A.2d 1059, 1070-72 (N.J. 1992).
150 This is due to the fact that some states do not include death sentences which have
been reversed at guilt phase or penalty phase. Some states do not include death sentences
which have not yet been upheld on appeal. This pool, therefore, is not in every instance all
penalty phase cases, nor does it result in the same universe in every state. As the New
Jersey Supreme Court explained:
We realize that other courts throughout the country have used different measures of

comparison... the Georgia Supreme Court uses all capital felony cases which have
been appealed for comparison... Delaware's universe consists of a comparison between the subject case and 'the penalties in all first degree murder cases which have
gone to trial and a penalty hearing.'
State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1073 (N.J. 1992) (citations omitted).
151 There may also be convictions for capital murder imposed by ajudge. In some rare
cases the conviction may be imposed pursuant to a plea bargain. See Bienen, et al., supra
note 21, at 94 n.337 (discussing the conditional plea to capital murder in NewJersey); see
also State v. Wright, 483 A.2d 436 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (involving a plea to
capital murder in exchange for a sentence recommendation of four life sentences, where a
mother killed her four children under circumstances similar to those in the highly publicized Susan Smith case).
152 For example, in Florida and Indiana the judge can override ajury's verdict at penalty
phase. See infra Appendix A.
153 The inclusion of reversed death sentences is especially problematic. See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1129 (NJ. 1992) (HandlerJ. dissenting).
154 In the terminology of stage analysis, these jurisdictions look at one stage prior to the
decision-making stage examined by courts that limit their universe solely to other death

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

1996]
IV.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN PRACTICE: THREE STATES, THREE
APPROACHES

A.

CONNECTICUT: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE ABUSE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AS A MATTER OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION

Recently, the Supreme Court of Connecticut addressed its state's
constitutional issues with respect to capital punishment iii depth, carefully examining the standards in other jurisdictions before holding
that the statute met state constitutional standards in the case State v.
Ross.' 55 The challenge to the death sentence was not, however, based
upon proportionality. 156 The legislature revised the death penalty
statute, effective October 1, 1995, prospectively eliminating proportionality review.' 5 7 The legislature presumably took this action to presentences. See infra Appendix B, fig.1 (outlining the stages of capital case processing).
They stop short, however, of analyzing the two previous stages: all cases where there was a
factual basis for capital murder, although the case never resulted in a prosecution for capital murder or a capital conviction. Not suprisingly, jurisdictions following this method
have accounted for almost all of the reversals of death sentences on grounds of
disproportionality.
155 646 A.2d 1318 (Conn. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1138 (1995). The principal constitutional issues involved the structure ofjury decision making and the standards and procedures for evaluating mitigating factors, as well as Eighth Amendment questions and
other issues. See id. at 1358-58 (citing State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (NJ. 1987)). For a
detailed history of Connecticut constitutional history, see id. at 1378-1395 (Berdon, J., dissenting). See also infraAppendix B.
156 DissentingJustice Berdon, however, noted that the defendant in Ross, who was convicted of six murders, was allowed to plead guilty and avoid the death penalty by a prosecuting attorney who had full knowledge of the convictions. In contrast, a prosector in
anotherjudicial district did seek the death penalty- "This life-and-death difference between
the sentences received by the defendant for identical crimes proves that an unacceptable
level of arbitrariness exists due to prosecutorial discretion, even if the jury is adequately
guided by the statute." Id. at 1382 (Berdon, J., dissenting). Justice Berdon went on to say
that in his opinion the death penalty was discriminatory on the basis of the race of the
victim. He cited studies from other jurisdictions and noted that all of the five defendants
on death row in Connecticut had killed white victims, and that two of the defendants were
African American. Id. at 1384-85 (Berdon,J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the court
was divided: "[T]wo justices of this court believe the death penalty is constitutional, one
does not, and four are silent." Id. at 1387 (Berdon,J., dissenting). In a subsequent case,
State v. Breton, 663 A.2d 1026, 1054 n.2 (Conn. 1995) (Berdon, J., dissenting), Justice
Berdon noted that only three Supreme CourtJustices were qualified to sit in Ross, and in
Breton three justices still had not yet addressed the state constitutionality of the death penalty. Justice Berdon continued to express his view that the death penalty was applied in a
discriminatory manner due to different prosecutorial charging practices. Id. at 1055, nn.5-

6 (Berdon, J., dissenting). The court's opinion in Breton did not address proportionality
since the death sentence was reversed for other reasons.
157 "The legislature recently eliminated proportionality review altogether on a prospective basis." State v. Cobb, 663 A.2d 948, 950 n.2 (Conn. 1995) (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-46(b) (West Supp. 1996)). Connecticut previously had a standard proportionality review provision, using a slight variant of the language in Gregg. CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-46(b) (3) (West 1994) (repealed) ("[T]he sentence is excessive or dispropor-
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empt the possibility of the court declaring the statute unconstitutional
on grounds of proportionality. The court will, however, continue to
conduct proportionality review for those cases in which the homicide
occurred before the effective date of the amendment, avoiding issues
of ex postfacto.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut again addressed proportionality in State v. Cobb.158 The proportionality arguments in Cobb were
not based upon federal or state constitutional challenges. No empirical evidence or projections concerning the operation of the capital
case processing system in the state were presented. The claim was that
independent of the state and federal constitutions, the state proportionality review provision required expanding the universe of cases for
proportionality review because the death penalty has been applied in
a discriminatory manner. 59 Although the court did not consider the
matter one of interpretation of state or federal constitutional issues,
raising the issue of racial bias suggests that the court was mindful of
the fact that this constitutional claim could be brought under proportionality review in the future.' 60 The majority commented that evidence similar to that presented under McCleskey would be
appropriately brought under the general provision for appellate review and such a claim would not necessarily be rejected if the factual
basis was analogous to that in McCleskey.16 1 The implication is that the
Supreme Court of Connecticut could and would consider such evidence of bias and rule on the constitutional issue, irrespective of
whether the legislature had eliminated proportionality review.
The question of what was and has been the universe of cases in
Connecticut is confusing because the court made rulings regarding
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the
crime and the character and record of the defendant.").
158 663 A.2d 948 (Conn. 1995).
159 One issue in Cobb was whether the proportionality question had been addressed and
decided in Ross. See id. at 952. In Cobb, the court declined to rely upon its decision in Ross.
Id.
160 The dissent discussed the issue of racial bias in terms of the state constitution. Cobb,
663 A.2d at 965 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
161

We emphasize that we do not decide whether a statistical study comparable to that
offered in McCleskey v. Zant would establish a violation of [the appellate review provision] in any particular case. Nor do we suggest that only such a broad scale attack
could establish such a violation. Obviously, if the record in any given case indicated
that, irrespective of any statistics, the death sentence was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor incident to that particular trial, there would be a
violation of [the appellate review provision]. We conclude only that, subject to the
requirement that the defendant make his statistical challenge at trial, [the appellate
review provision] provides an appropriate statutory vehicle for his statistical claim on
appeal.
Id. at 961 n.20 (citation omitted).
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the universe of cases which were not published and because the universe of potentially similar cases includes crimes committed as far
162
back as 1973, when the capital statute in Connecticut was passed.
The universe of cases in Cobb includes all capital felony cases which
have reached the penalty phase since 1973.163 In Ross the court refused the defendant's request that the universe be expanded to include those cases in which the State clearly could have, but did not,
charge the accused with a capital felony and which then resulted in a
64
conviction of not less than first degree manslaughter.1
The court rested its interpretation on the legislative history of the
proportionality review provision and held that the legislature did not
"contemplate the kind of universe advocated by the defendant, which
would necessarily be accompanied by a detailed, complex fact-finding." 165 The court also declined to follow the New Jersey model set
out in MarshallJ,166 however the court allowed the defendant to present a post-appeal state habeas corpus petition, including empirical evidence of systematic racial bias in the Connecticut capital punishment
system as applied, after creating a reliable factual record at the trial
level.' 67 In other words, the court will allow the defense to present a
factual record based upon a system-wide study of the state capital punThe universe of cases for proportionality review was governed by Practice Book
§ 4066A(b), authorized by the court under its rule making authority. This rule provides
that the universe of cases shall be "only those capital felony cases that have been prosecuted in this state after October 1, 1973, and in which hearings on the imposition of the
death penalty have taken place... unless the court... shall modify this limitation in a
particular case." Id. at 952 n.6 (emphasis omitted).
162

163 Id.
164 Id. at 952 n.7. The court denied Ross' application, but granted a more limited request. Id. Prior to Ross, the court had granted two other enlargements to the proportionality universe. Id.
165 See id. at 955. The State argued that an expanded proportionality review would require the court to inquire into "the nature and circumstances of every case since 1973 that
ended in a homicide conviction in order to determine whether that case could have been
charged as a capital felony." Id. at 956. The court inaccurately noted that only Pennsylvania now conducts such fact-finding. Id. at 957. New Jersey, Tennessee, Washington,
and Georgia review homicide cases to determine which coUd have resulted in a capital
prosecution. See infraAppendix A.
166 613 A.2d 1059 (NJ. 1992).
167 Cobb, 663 A.2d at 962 ("[T]he nature of the defendant's claim of systematic racial
bias, and the seriousness and finality of the death penalty, counsel against raising any undue procedural barriers to review of such a claim."). The dissent, which now included
three justices of the court, believed that the statistical showing put forward by the defense
in Cobb was sufficient to show that the death penalty was more likely to be imposed if the
victim was white or otherwise not African-American. The data presented were preliminary.
The dissenters believed that proportionality review was the appropriate rubric for these
arguments and that the Supreme Court of Connecticut, not the trial court, was the appropriate forum in which to conduct a factual inquiry. Id. at 965 (Berdon,J. dissentingjoined
by Norcott, J. and Katz, J.).

LEIGH B. BIENE[

[Vol. 87

ishment system. The habeas corpus petition in state court on these
issues is pending, and as of this writing no death sentence has been
affirmed in Connecticut.
B.

NEBRASKA: CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT AND
LEGISLATURE OVER THE UNIVERSE OF CASES FOR
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

The 1978 Nebraska statute specifies that proportionality review
encompasses challenges to systemwide disparities and challenges to
possibly discriminatory patterns introduced by the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, including a consideration of prosecutorial
charging practices. 168 Since 1979, however, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has consistently narrowed the scope of proportionality review.
The Nebraska Supreme Court initially interpreted the proportionality
review statute as requiring the court to review only cases in which the
defendant was found guilty of first degree murder. 169 The court subsequently narrowed the pool of comparison cases even further to require a review only of death sentences imposed. 170 In other words,
the court narrowed the universe of cases on two separate occasions.
The most recent decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court all limit
comparison to other death sentences only, directly contradicting the
1978 statutory mandate to consider all potentially capital cases when
conducting proportionality review.' 71
168 The Nebraska legislature enacted a statute requiring proportionality review which
read as follows:
(3) State law should be applied uniformly throughout the state and since the death
penalty is a statewide law an offense which would not result in a death sentence in one
portion of the state should not result in death in a different portion; ....
The Supreme Court shall within a reasonable time after July 22, 1978, review and
analyze all cases involving criminalhomicide committed on or afterApril 20, 1973. [The date

of reenactment.] Such review and analysis shall examine (1) the facts including mitigating and aggravating circumstances, (2) the charges filed, (3) the crime for which
defendant was convicted, and (4) the sentence imposed. Such review shall be updated
as new criminal homicide cases occur.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2521.01(3), 29-2521.02 (Reissue 1995) (emphasis added). This statute is also referred to as L.B. 711, Laws 1978.
169 State v. Williams, 287 N.W.2d 18, 28 (Neb. 1979). This ruling contradicted the specific statutory mandate to "review and analyze all cases involving criminal homicide." NEB.
REv. STAT. § 29-2521.02.

170 State v. Welsh, 275 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Neb. 1979). This holding was reaffirmed in State
v. Reeves, 453 N.W.2d 359, 386 (Neb. 1990).

171 The statute reads:
In order to compensate for the lack of uniformity in charges which are filed as a result of
similar circumstances it is necessary for the Supreme Court to review and analyze all
criminal homicides committed under the existing law in order to insure that each case
produces a result similar to that arrived at in other cases with the same or similar
circumstances.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.01(4) (Reissue 1995) (emphasis added). The court trumped
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The majority opinion in Williams noted in dicta that the statutory
mandate would violate constitutional principles of separation of powers if interpreted literally because it explicitly required the court to
review prosecutorial decision making in the selection of cases for capital prosecution. 172 And that was the statute's explicit intention. Williams did not, however, hold the proportionality review provision
unconstitutional on those grounds.' 7 3 Instead the court ignored the
legislative mandate and decided to conduct proportionality review by
comparing the death sentence under review only with all other convic174
tions for first degree murder after the effective date of the statute.
175
This compromise did not satisfy all members of the court.
this legislative directive. "In a series of cases this court determined that if read literally,
L.B. 711 would unconstitutionally encroach upon the judicial function .... we held that
the proportionality review under L.B. 711 should include only those cases in which the
death penalty was imposed." State v. Reeves, 453 N.W.2d 359, 386 (Neb. 1990) (citations
omitted).
172

There is language in at least two sections of L.B. 711, Laws of 1978, directing the
Supreme Court to review and analyze 'all criminal homicides.' If the language be
interpreted to extend beyond first degree murder convictions, problems relatingto the
exercise of prosecutorialdiscretion in homicide cases and the exercise by juries of the deci-

sional power of determining guilt or innocence or fixing degrees of culpability in
homicide cases are all involved. To interpret that language of L.B. 711 literally would
create insurmountable constitutional problems. In view of the disposition made here,
it is unnecessary to discuss constitutional issues.
Williams, 287 N.W.2d at 29 (emphasis added).
173 Id.

174 In Wiliams, the court first considered cases which did not result in a death sentence.
It reviewed 32 cases which resulted in a conviction for first degree murder, including eight
cases which were not appealed and seven death sentences which were on appeal. The
remaining 25 cases it considered were life sentences. Id. The court began with a consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
In all of the death penalty cases previously affirmed or now pending in this court, each
has involved at least three separate and distinct statutory aggravating factors and only
one or no statutory mitigating factors .... Any objective weighing and balancing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and comparison to the other death penalty
cases now pending establishes that the death sentence in the case now before us is not
excessive or disproportionate to the death penalties imposed in the other death penalty cases.
Id. at 29-30.
175 The ChiefJustice of the Nebraska Supreme Court, in dissent, described his concerns
as follows:
I am more concerned, as I believe L.B. 711, Laws 1978, requires me to be concerned,
as to how this case squares with the remaining 25 cases where the death penalty was
not imposed. [The ChiefJustice then reviewed the statute and its relationship to an
earlier provision.] All of that makes it seem clear to me that not only is this court
required to examine aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but in addition to that
we are supposed to in some manner place each first degree murder case one on top of
the other to see whether or not they all conform. While I may be the first to concede
that imposing such a duty upon the court is at best difficult and perhaps impossible,
nevertheless, I cannot find how I can ignore that requirement. [The ChiefJustice's
opinion then goes on to enumerate a number of cases "similar" to the case under
review in which the defendant was not sentenced to death, either because the defend-
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The Nebraska Supreme Court further narrowed the scope of proportionality review in the 1986 case of State v. Palmer.176 The majority
in Palmerconcluded that the appropriate universe of cases for proportionality review was other death sentences. 177 The ChiefJustice of the
Nebraska Supreme Court objected not only that the court's decision
ignored the legislature's explicit mandate to review all homicide cases
which were potentially death eligible, 178 but also that the court's decision to limit the universe of cases to other death sentences abrogated
the primary function of proportionality review.
The purpose of L.B. 711 was to ensure that persons were not being arbitrarily sentenced to death. To therefore suggest that we look only at
those individuals who may have been discriminated against to determine
whether or not they have been discriminated against is an exercise in
futility. If one wants to determine whether individuals are being discriminated against in public transportation, one does not merely look at
those who are required to sit in the back of the bus and conclude that
since everyone in the back of the bus looks alike, there is no discriminadon. One, of necessity, must look at who is riding in the front of the bus
as well in order to determine whether the persons in the back are being
discriminated against. So, too, there is no way that we can determine
ant pled guilty or the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment .... The Chief
Justice then concludes that the legislative intent of L.B. 711 must have been to further
restrict the imposition of the death penalty] by directing us not to impose the death
penalty if on previous occasions of cruel and senseless killings we have not imposed
the death penalty.
Id. at 32-35 (Krivosha, Cj., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176 399 N.W.2d 706 (Neb. 1986).
177 The majority opinion commented:
It would be possible to construe the statute so that cases in which the death penalty
was not imposed, although upon reflection it could be said that the death penalty
might have been imposed, would be the standard against which all future death penalty cases would be compared. By a process of 'attrition' this would result in a substantial narrowing of the group of cases in which the death penalty would be a possible
sentence and, eventually, for all practical purposes, could amount to a repeal of the
death penalty. We do not understand that the Legislature intended the statute to
effect a repeal of the death penalty.
State v. Palmer, 399 N.W.2d 706, 735-36 (Neb. 1986) (citing State v. Copeland, 300 S.E.2d
63, 71-72 (S.C. 1982).
178

The plain language of the act seems to make it clear that all criminal homicide cases
are to be reported to the Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court, in conducting
its review, is to look at al of these cases and to then compare the case on appeal with
those other cases having same or similar circumstances, not penalties, to determine
whether the imposition of the death penalty in the case on appeal is more severe than
that imposed in other cases having same or similar circumstances ....

limiting the

review to be conducted by this court to those cases in which the death penalty has
been imposed is to rewrite the statute ....

The language of the act simply will not,

absent painful distortion, permit a finding that the review is to be limited to only cases
in which the death penalty had been imposed.
Id. at 747-48 (Krivosha, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
ChiefJustice Krivosha cited voluminous legislative history supporting this interpretation of
the act. See id. at 751-52.
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whether those who are sentenced to death are being discriminated
against if we do not examine those cases having the same or similar circumstances which, for
whatever reason, did not result in the imposition
179
of a death sentence.
The ChiefJustice then proceeded to present a data base and conduct his own proportionality review.' 8 0 The Chief Justice attached to
his opinion a list of 185 homicides in which individuals were involved
in the killing of another and convicted, or pled guilty to either first
degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter or less. 18 1
Of that number he noted that only thirteen, or seven percent, of these
cases resulted in the death penalty being considered. 82 Out of these
185 cases, Chief Justice Krivosha identified 57 homicides involving
robberies, of which six, or 10.5%, including the case under review,
resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. 83 A closer examination of the facts of some of the non-death cases demonstrated to the
satisfaction of Chief Justice Krivosha that many of the cases where a
life sentence was imposed had not only similar, but nearly identical,
fact patterns to the death case on appeal.' 8 4 Therefore the death sentence under review was, in his opinion, disproportionate. 8 5
C.

STATISTICS AND LAW: THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY'S

IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

The development of the law in NewJersey illustrates the possibilities of what a state high court can do under the rubric of proportionality review. The doctrinal foundation for proportionality review in
NewJersey was developed in the five year period between State v. Ramseur'86 in 1987, the case upholding the constitutionality of the New
179 Id. at 752 (Erivosha, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Handler, in Marshall , used the same analogy. See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1130 (N.J.
1992) (Handler, J., dissenting).
180 This discussion, including the annotations to allegedly similar cases in the concurring and dissenting opinion of ChiefJustice Krivosha, comprises fifty pages. SeePalmer,399
N.W.2d at 738-83.
181 Id. at 753 (Krivosha, Cj., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182 Id. (Krivosha, Cj., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183 1& at 753 (Krivosha, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184 Id. at 758 (Krivosha, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Chief
Justice concluded that analysis of similar cases supported the conclusion that the death
penalty for a killing during a robbery, absent other circumstances, was by definition disproportionate: "[T]he death penalty for murdering an individual while attempting to or in
fact robbing the individual was imposed in only 12.8 percent of the cases, while life imprisonment or less was imposed in 87.2 percent of the cases." Id. at 754 (Krivosha, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185 Id. at 754-55 (Krivosha, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987).

184
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Jersey statute, and State v. Marshall'8 7 in 1992, when the court conducted its first proportionality review using the data and analysis
presented to it in the Proportionality Review Project's Final Report.1 88
While the factual and legal issues in NewJersey were not unusual, they
were simply not addressed with such careful reasoning elsewhere.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has not yet reversed
any death sentences on grounds of proportionality. 189
State v. Marshall II is the leading case on proportionality review.
Issues which were referred to tangentially in other jurisdictions were
fully litigated before the New Jersey court. These issues polarized
opinion on the court, although the majority held for the principle of
systemwide review and for the commitment to proportionality review
based upon comprehensive empirical analysis. The political pressure
to abandon or severely restrict proportionality review was present in
New Jersey just as it was in other jurisdictions. Even though it was
politically costly to do so, the court maintained its initial commitment
to the establishment of a process dedicated to protecting the constitutional due process rights of capital defendants. This sustained support for a reliable and comprehensive data-gathering and analysis
project has not yet been matched by any other state high court.
Many other state high courts were presented with the identical
statutory mandate as New Jersey following Gregg.19 Similarly, New
Jersey legal institutions and New Jersey homicide cases incorporate
most of the features observed in other jurisdictions.1 9 1 The New
Jersey high court addressed the questions which arise again and again
in other jurisdictions: what should be the universe of cases; should
proportionality review include the review of prosecutorial discretion
in charging; how should racial and geographic disparities be ex187 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992) (Marshall II).
188 MarshallIlwas the first case to implement proportionality review in NewJersey. The

entire opinion, exceeding 100 pages, is devoted to proportionality review. The opinion
summarizes the history of proportionality review litigation in New Jersey and applies the
analysis and data of the Proportionality Review Project's Final Report to the facts and circumstances of the imposition of Robert Marshall's death sentence, which was upheld on
direct appeal a year earlier in State v. Marshal4 586 A.2d 85 (NJ. 1991) (Marshall I).
189 The Supreme Court of NewJersey continues to analyze racial and geographic disparities in capital processing as new capital cases come before the court. Unfortunately, the
race effects persist See infra Appendix C. For example, the data in the court's most recent
proportionality review, State v. Harris, 660 A.2d 539 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), involved a black defendant and a white victim and showed evidence that the victim's race had
a significant effect. However, the NewJersey Supreme Court did not address the proportionality data in that case because Harris died prior to the proportionality hearing.
190 See infra Appendix A.
191 Appendix B sets out some of the basic parameters from the MarshallH data set and
presents a summary analysis of the proportionality review issues, such as racial and geographic disparities in capital case processing, that arise in death penalty jurisdictions.
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amined; what should be the relationship between the authority of the
state high court and the legislature; how should the political pressure
placed on the court be reduced; and what is the foundation and purpose of proportionality review itself. What other state high courts did,
or did not do, as they set about to conduct proportionality review is
brought into focus by examining the approach taken by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey.
The Proportionality Reiew Project of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey put flesh on the bones of the statutory mandate to conduct proportionality review. Under the direction of the court's Special Master,
David C. Baldus, the Proportionality Review Project established a reliable data base and a methodology and procedure for conducting proportionality review. Building on the assembled facts and the technical
analysis of the Proportionality Review Project, the court then defined
the constitutional foundation for proportionality review. From the beginning of the development of these principles to the conclusion of
the first phase of proportionality review marked by Marshall 1, the
court moved against the direction taken by other high courts and contrary to the evolving capital jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court.
The Proportionality Review Project identified the relevant variables affecting capital case processing and analyzed them using the
most sophisticated social science methodologies available, while the
project itself made substantial contributions to those methodologies. 192 The court educated itself concerning these methods and used
the analyses in its proportionality review of Robert Marshall's death
sentence. 193 The court chose among alternative formulations of comparison categories, rejecting some, elaborating upon others. At no
time was the court the passive recipient of an expert's opinion. The
court never shirked its responsibility to define the constitutional
dimensions of proportionality for itself in the context of capital
94
punishment.
192 The work of the Proportionality Review Project has been described and compared
with the analogous data collection and analyses that were presented to the United States
Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Baldus et al., supra note 37, at

405-13.
193 See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992) (Marshall II). The court stated,
"[w]e have but little knowledge of the science of statistical probabilities." Id. at 1111. This
somewhat wistful comment in the court's opinion followed an extensive discussion of technical methodological issues. "If a court concludes that the statistical evidence is so deviant
as to compel a conclusion of substantial significance, the court must then look to the circumstances surrounding that statistical showing to determine its full constitutional import." Id. at 1111.
194 The implementation of concepts based upon equity and principles of proportionality has been difficult in other areas of the law as well. For example, the principle of pro-

LEIGH B. BENE[

[Vol. 87

The methodological contributions of the Proportionality Review
Project represent a considerable advance over previously existing
methods for tracking case dispositions, and for measuring defendant
culpability and the relative aggravation level of murder cases, especially for those cases which did not go to trial as capital cases.' 9 5 The
development of the constitutional principles underlying proportionality traces a part of the history of the court itself under the leadership
of former Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz. The center held on to proportionality, but it become increasingly embattled, both from within
and without, with Justice Garibaldi and Justice Handler increasingly
defining independent positions. 196 The death of ChiefJustice Wilentz
in July of 1996 may change these alignments and signal a change in
the court's continued commitment to systematic proportionality
review.
1.

The Early History of ProportionalityReview in New Jersey

In 1982 the New Jersey legislature reinstated capital punishment.
Reenactment was a decade after its former capital punishment statute
had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court followed
by the reluctant concurrence of the state supreme court. It was almost
two decades after the last execution in New Jersey.19 7 The New Jersey
portionality has been the doctrinal foundation of recent cases involving challenges to
inequalities and disparities in a university's allocation of resources for men's and women's
athletic teams. See Cohen v. Brown University, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D. R.I. 1995); Judge Says
Brown Plan Won't Work, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 18, 1995, at 3D.
195 These methodological refinements are transferrable to research on other forms of
criminal conduct. The Proportionality Review Project sets out a graduated standard for
evaluating the strength of evidence of guilt which is applicable to cases other than murder
cases. The model carefully distinguished between circumstantial aspects of a case, aspects
of the defendant's conduct, and facts relevant to criminal intent and is generalizable to
other jurisdictions and crimes.
196 Justice Garibaldi, in her concurring and dissenting opinion, disagreed with several
key points made by the Marshall lmajority. See Marshall I, 613 A.2d at 1115 (Garibaldi,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra notes 222-24, 230-31 and accompanying text. Justice Handler took a position similar to that of former Justices Brennan and
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court. Justice Handler believed that "[o]ur experience over the last ten years with capital punishment, capped by the lessons wrought from
our gargantuan effort to attain proportionate sentencing, confirms the constitutional impossibility of capital punishment." Id. at 1144 (Handier, J., dissenting).
197 Reenactment was delayed in NewJersey because the then Governor, Brendan Byrne,
refused to sign legislation reenacting capital punishment during his two terms in office.
However, in 1982, the NewJersey legislature passed a capital punishment statute that was
drafted to comport with the federal constitutional requirements specified in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See 1982 N.J. Laws 555. For a discussion of the legislative history
of reenactment in New Jersey, see Bienen et al., supra note 21, at 66-70; Connie Chen, A
Review and Analysis of the 1982 Legislative Decision Making Process Reenacting Capital
Punishment in NewJersey (1992) (unpublished), in 1992 Woodrow Wilson School Policy
Conference Final Report: A Decade of Capital Punishment in New Jersey (1992) (unpub-
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capital punishment scheme, like the majority of those now in effect in
the 39 other capital jurisdictions, is built upon a structure of statutory
aggravating and mitigating factors which are found as facts and then
weighed by a specially selected jury during the second stage of a capital trial.
Not all murders are eligible for capital prosecution in NewJersey.
As in other states the county prosecutor in each of the twenty-one
separate county jurisdictions has the sole discretionary authority to select which of the potentially death-eligible cases will be subject to capital prosecution through a procedure called the serving of a notice of
factors. Throughout the period considered here, the law required
both a factual basis for one of the eight enumerated statutory aggravating factors and that the defendant either committed the homicidal
act by his own conduct with the requisite intent to kill, or paid another to commit the homicidal act. 198
The language of the proportionality review provision in New
Jersey was taken directly from Gregg- The New Jersey Supreme Court
shall determine whether the death sentence is "disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and
the defendant." 199 Proportionality review was created by statute; however, it was always the responsibility of the state high court to deter0
mine how proportionality review would be conducted.20
lished) (presented to the New Jersey Assembly Judiciary Committee and the New Jersey
Senate Judiciary Committee in 1992 and included in the legislative history of A.C.R. 20, a
pending amendment to the New Jersey Constitution) (on file with State Documents Section, Northwestern University School of Law Library) [hereinafter 1992 WWS Final Report], and Tanya Minhas, Newspapers, Crime and the Public: The Role of the Media in the
Reinstatement of the Death Penalty in New Jersey (1992) (unpublished), in 1992 WWS
Final Report.
For a description and statistical analysis of the structure of the NewJersey statute, see
Bienen et al., supra note 21, at 242-62; Bienen et al., supra note 45, at 715-85.
198 A constitutional amendment ratified in 1992, N.J. CONST. art. I, par. 12 (West Supp.
1996), reduced the intent requirement for a conviction of capital murder, reversing the
Supreme Court of New Jersey's opinion in State v. Gerald, 549 A.2d 792, 819 (N.J. 1988)
(holding that a conviction for capital murder must include a finding of specific intent to
commit capital murder). None of the cases prior to MarshallH or included infra in Appendix B are affected by the 1992 amendment.
199 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3e (West 1995). Cf.Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 212
(1976) (White, J., concurring).
200 Most states institutionalized proportionality review in this manner. In New Jersey,
the Proportionality Review Project was located within the Administrative Office of the
Courts (AOC). In Gregg the Court cited with approval the fact that "in order that information regarding 'similar cases' may be before the court, the post of Assistant to theSupreme
Court [of Georgia] was created. The Assistant must 'accumulate the records of all capital
felony cases in which the sentence was imposed afterJanuary 1, 1970, or such earlier date
as the court may deem appropriate.'" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 212 (1976) (White,
J., concurring) (citation omitted). The language of Gregg was both very simple and very
general: "similar cases considering both the crime and the defendant." Id. The Georgia
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The Office of the Public Defender raised proportionality in all
capital appeals beginning in 1982. The earliest direct appeals included data from the Public Defender Homicide Study in support of
appellate arguments that the operation of the capital case processing
system in New Jersey violated constitutional principles of proportionality.2 0 1 The Public Defender consistently argued that proportionality
review must encompass an examination of the entire capital case
processing system in the jurisdiction and incorporate an analysis of
capital case processing by stages. It was an unusual and fortuitous circumstance that the NJ. Office of the Public Defender had the resources and commitment to begin a systematic study of capital case
processing throughout the state prior to the court appointing the Spe20 2
cial Master.
2.

The Identification of Issues

State v. Ramseur,20 3 and State v. Marshall11,204 frame the constitu20 5
tional jurisprudence on proportionality review in New Jersey.
Although proportionality review had not been mandated by the fedSupreme Court had not implemented any procedures or conducted a proportionality review at the time the United States Supreme Court endorsed the Georgia statute and rules.
201 Arguments concerning disproportionality based on preliminary results from the Public Defender Homicide Study have been raised by defendants since State v. Ramseur, 524
A.2d 188 (NJ. 1987) and State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939 (N.J. 1988). The arguments have
taken different forms. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant at 28-56, State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d
939 (N.J. 1988) (arguing abuse of prosecutorial discretion in the decision to charge capital
murder); id. at 178-80 (system-wide disproportionality and race and county-based disparities documented in the then available findings of the Public Defender Homicide Study).
Earlier briefs relied upon data from the Preliminary Report (1986) of the Public Defender
Homicide Study. Later briefs relied upon the Interim Report (1987) of the Public Defender Homicide Study or the statistical findings published in Bienen et al., supra note 21.
202 The work of the Public Defender Homicide Study was included in an annotation of
major studies in the 1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 38. The GAO report stated:
It is important to evaluate research quality... By quality we mean the strength of the
design and the rigor of the analytic technique that leads to a level of confidence we
have in the study findings. Wejudged a study to be of high quality if it [1 ] was characterized by a sound design that analyzed homicide cases throughout the sentencing
process; [2] included legally relevant variables (aggravating and mitigating circumstances); and [3] used statistical analysis techniques to control for variables that correlate with race and/or capital sentencing.
Id. at 3. See Bienen et al., supra note 21, at 330 fig.1 (indicating the stages of capital case
processing in New Jersey).
203 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987). Ramseurhas been influential outside of NewJersey as well.
See State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 189 (Tenn. 1991) ("[W]e adhere to the analysis in Gregg
v. Georgia... particularly as followed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Ramseur
. . and find persuasive the reasoning of both decisions.") (citations omitted).
204 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992).
205 The post reenactment capital cases prior to Ramseur address specialized constitutional issues, such as the access of the press and the public to pretrial proceedings in a
capital trial. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1983); Bienen et al.,
supra note
21, at 70-100 (summarizing the early case law interpreting the statute).
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189

eral constitution since Pulley v. Harris,20 6 or by the New Jersey legislature since 1985,207 in 1987 the court in Ramseur stated its commitment
to performing thorough and complete examinations of the imposition of the death penalty in the jurisdiction under the rubric of proportionality review: "Proportionality review has a function entirely
unique among the review proceedings in a capital proceeding .... 'It
purports to inquire instead whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime.' 208 In Ramseur
the court expressed "some preliminary views concerning this important aspect of the death-penalty review process... "209 Although proportionality review had not yet been institutionalized within the
Administrative Office of the Court in 1987, the court was prescient in
delineating the parameters of the impending legal debate within the
court and in the larger legal community in NewJersey and elsewhere.
Prior to Ramseur, the court identified its concern that
prosecutorial discretion could be a possible source of arbitrary or discriminatory patterns in capital charging and sentencing. 210 Then in
Ramseur the court declared its intention to review prosecutorial decision-making in the selection of cases for capital prosecution. In doing
so, it anticipated that it would consider empirical evidence of discrimination based upon race, sex, and socio-economic status as part of proportionality review. 211 Proportionality review would be statewide. It
would include systematic data collection and a statistical analysis of
the entire capital case processing system. The court called on the expert advice of statisticians, criminologists, sociologists and others to
help prepare the data base. 212

206 465 U.S. 37 (1984).

1985 NJ. Laws 536, 541 (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2G:11-3(e)).
State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 291-92 (N.J. 1987) (citation omitted). Proportionality review, said the court in Ramseur, is required because the death sentence is "profoundly
different from all other penalties" and consequently there is a heightened need for reliability in the imposition of that sentence. Id. at 292 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605
(1978)). Proportionality review acts "as a check against the random and arbitrary imposition of the death penalty." Id.
209 Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 291 ("In doing so, we intend only to guide future parties in
their exploration of some of the issues that appear essential to the development of a proportionality review process that would satisfy the requirements of the statute and any applicable constitutional obligations.").
210 State v. McCrary, 478 A.2d 339, 343-45 (NJ. 1984) (permitting limited judicial review
of the prosecutorial dicision to charge capital murder under the Act).
211 Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 293-94.
207
208

212 Id. at 293.
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The Process of Record Gathering

In Ramseur the court asked all parties who expected to participate
in the appellate review process in future capital cases to "begin gathering data necessary for proportionality review of a death penalty in
comparison to similar crimes and defendants. Moreover, these statistics will be helpful in determining whether there is race and gender
discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty."2 1 3 The court
correctly anticipated that controversy would crystallize around the issue of the universe of cases.2 1 4 This apparently procedural decision in
fact determined the scope of proportionality review itself. The controversy was initially resolved by the court in Marshall 11, with the selection of the universe of cases recommended by the Special Master.
However, the legislature would finally intervene on the side of the
5
Attorney General, and attempt to restrict the universe of cases. 2 1
In 1991, the court created the Proportionality Review Project and
appointed the independent Special Master in an unprecedented and
unexpected order. The July 29, 1988 Order2 16 gave the Special
Master the authority to collect and analyze data, produce a data base
and files on individual homicide cases, invite the participation of interested parties, develop a public data file, including a record of dispositions of all relevant homicide cases, conduct hearings, procure
expert technical advice, call witnesses, and request public records and
any other relevant information. Not only was the Special Master given
broad authority to accomplish a comprehensive, scientifically sound
empirical study, but the court appointed as Special Master a person
213 Id. at 293. The court then cited Joseph H. Rodriguez et al., ProportionalityReview in
New Jersey: An IndispensableSafeguard in the CapitalSentencing Process, 15 RuTGERs LJ. 399,
437 (1984).
214 "First, we must determine what will be the 'universe of cases,' ... against which a
comparison of the imposed death sentence will be made .... " Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 293
(citation omitted). In comparison to the practice in some other states, the court said it
believed that:
statewide uniformity is the more appropriate measure, and therefore [we] anticipate
that comparisons will be made to "similar" cases throughout the state.
But a decision to adopt statewide comparisons does not end the analysis. We
must also decide whether to include in the statewide universe of cases only those in
which a death penalty was actually imposed, or to expand the potential cases for comparison to include all those in which the death penalty could have been requested by
the State.
Id. at 293 (citation omitted).
215 Determining the universe of cases was a source of conflict in other states as well. See,
e.g., supra Part IV.B (discussing Nebraska).
216 The Supreme Court of NewJersey's Order ofJuly 29, 1988 creating the Proportionality Review Project and appointing Professor David Baldus as the Special Master is reprinted
in Bienen et al., supra note 21, at 371. The duration of the first phase of the Proportionality Review Project was approximately 4 years, from July, 1988, the date of the appointment
of Professor Baldus as Special Master, untilJuly, 1992, when the court decided Marshall I.
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capable of achieving such a task: Professor David C. Baldus. 217 The
Special Master was specifically ordered to consider and assess the validity and utility of the data base and analyses presented to the court
in the Reports of the Public Defender Homicide Study. 2 18 To its
credit the Proportionality Review Project accomplished all of the tasks
enumerated in the Order.
The Special Master was ordered to make recommended findings
of fact and recommended conclusions of law regarding proportionality in the administration of cases subject to capital punishment in New
Jersey, but not to make any determination concerning the excessiveness or disproportionality of any death sentence imposed in any particular case. 21 9 The legal determination of proportionality was the
province of the court. The Special Master was to educate the court
217 David C. Baldus is the Joseph B. Tye Professor of Law at the University of Iowa College of Law. With George Woodworth and Charles Pulaski he conducted two empirical
studies of the Georgia capital punishment system after Furman. See David C. Baldus et al.,
Arbitrarinessand Discriminationin the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State
Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L Ruv. 133 (1986); David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of
Death Sentences: An EmpiricalStudy of the GeorgiaExperience,74J. CRiM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 661
(1983). The Georgia studies formed the factual basis for the statistical arguments
presented to the United States Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
The Georgia studies and that litigation is described in detail in DAVID C. BALDus ET AL.,
EQUALJusTIcE AND THE DEATH PENALTT: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990).

See also

Bienen et al., supra note 21, at 147-58 (discussing "the Baldus Studies").
Professor Baldus has also served as a consultant to the supreme courts of South Dakota and Delaware and to the National Center for State Courts' Project on Comparative
Proportionality Review of Death Sentences by State Supreme Courts. See Baldus et al.,
supra note 37.
218 "We authorized the consideration of the data base that formed the basis of the report of the NewJersey Public Defender entitled 'The Re-Imposition of Capital Punishment
in NewJersey'..." Marshall , 613 A.2d at 1062. This reference is to Parts I and II of the
Interim Report of the Public Defender Homicide Study (on file along with the Preliminary
Report of the Public Defender Homicide Study in the State Documents Collection of
Northwestern University School of law). The Interim Report of the Public Defender Study
was submitted to the NJ. Supreme court in State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939 (N.J. 1988)
before its findings were published in Bienen et al., supranote 21, at 27, 36-37. The Interim
Report of the Public Defender Study included data on 703 cases. A Preliminary Report of
the Public Defender Study was submitted to the N.J. Supreme Court in 1987 during the
appeal in Ramseur. It contained data on 568 homicide cases. The majority opinion in
Koedatich cites to data from the Preliminary Report of the Public Defender Study (1988).
Koedatich, 548 A.2d at 955. In contrast, Justice Handler's dissent cites to the Interim Report
of the Public Defender Study (1988). Id. at 1018-19 (HandierJ., dissenting). The research
reports of the Public Defender Homicide Study are detailed in Bienen et al., supra note 21,
at 27 n.3, 36-37; Bienen et al., supra note 45, at 744.
219 The work of the Proportionality Review Project, with particular emphasis upon the
methodological issues, is described in David Baldus and George Woodworth, Proportionality: The View of the Special Master, 6 CHANCE: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STATISTICS & COMPUTING 917 (1993). The Attorney General's position on these issues is described in Herbert I. Weisberg, Proportionality:An Alternative View. 6 CHANCE: NEW DiREcrIoNs FOR STATISTICS & COMPUTING 18-24 (1993).
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and provide the court with the factual basis necessary to make an informed decision. The Report recommended that the court keep
open the data base, and that it continue to include death eligible
cases which did not reach penalty phase. The court accepted that recommendation in Marshall11.220
The Proportionality Review Project conducted research over a
four year period, assembling what is probably the most complete data
base ever compiled by a court on homicide and capital case processing in a single United States jurisdiction. 22 1 The 1991 Final Report is
both an extensive review of all death eligible cases in the jurisdiction
from 1982 to 1990, and an exhaustive proportionality analysis of Robert Marshall's individual death sentence. The Attorney General filed
an Independent Report containing a series of tables and analyses
based upon an expanded data set of 264 death eligible murder
cases.2 22 The 246 cases analyzed in detail in the 1991 Final Report
220

We must take steps to assure that it [the data base] is kept current and accessible to
the parties and the Court .... the data base is relevant to evaluate the system-wide
claims of constitutional dimension ..... We have no way of knowing how long the
Master will continue to assist the Court in the data-gathering process. Any system we
maintain should be able to operate efficiently even after his departure, and, indeed,
after our departure ....

Hence... we shall appoint a Superior Court judge familiar

with the relevant statistical and data-assembly concepts to oversee development of a
recommended plan for future maintenance of the Court's records ....
MarshallII, 613 A.2d at 1113. See Appendix C, infra,for developments subsequent to Marshall f.
221 The Proportionality Review Project under the administrative supervision ofJohn P.
McCarthy, Jr. of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and with the assistance of other
staff, including Nina Rossi, Esq., staff attorney, screened over 3,000 New Jersey homicide
cases arising between 1982 and 1990. In the first proportionality review, the Special Master
presented the Supreme Court of NewJersey with a detailed and accurate quantitative and
qualitative analysis of 246 death eligible cases, including all cases in which the death sentence had been imposed or considered during the period. Staff at the Administrative Office of the Courts tracked cases, collected and verified official records, and contacted
prosecutors and defense attorneys to clarify ambiguities, in addition to performing the
ordinary tasks of any research team, such as data entry, systematic error checking, and the
mechanics of generating computer runs. Important and fundamental factual errors were
identified in official documents and court records at every stage-documents routinely
relied upon by sentencing and parole authorities, courts, prosecutors and other decision
makers. The accuracy of record keeping varied widely among counties.
222 This was the first and only time that the Attorney General complied with the court's
suggestion that all parties collect data on capital case processing. The Proportionality Review data set, augmented by the cases added by the Attorney General, became the Marshall
II data set. This is the data set analyzed in Appendix B. It is a data set unique to the
MarshallII case, which is unlikely to be used again by the court. See Herbert I. Weisberg,
Proportionality Review of Death Sentences in NewJersey: An Independent Analysis of Data
on Capital Charging and Sentencing (November 26, 1991) (on file with the State Documents Collection of the Northwestern University School of Law) [hereinafter 1991 Weisberg Report]. The Attorney General's Report is also part of the record on appeal in
Marshall I and can be requested from the Administrative Office of the Courts or the New
Jersey Supreme Court.
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went to the penalty phase as death eligible cases or were found to have
met the factual criteria for at least one statutory aggravating factor,
and hence to have been potentially death eligible, although the death
sentence was either not imposed, not charged, or not even considered
by the county prosecutor. 22 3 Justice Garibaldi took exception to this
224

selection of cases.

During the four years of the Proportionality Review Project the
Attorney General of New Jersey consistently proposed that proportionality review be limited to death sentences only in its arguments
before the courts, in its briefs and in the proportionality review meetings. The Attorney General also brought an independent action asking the court for a declaration that the universe of cases be limited to
death sentences only.22 5 The court consistently refused to limit proportionality review to such a restricted category.2 2 6 During the pendency of Marshall the Attorney General took these arguments to the
legislature, where he was successful in persuading the legislature to
223 The 1991 Final Report of the NewJersey Proportionality Review Project, including a
summary of its data and analyses in appendices and the technical commentary, is part of
the record on appeal in Statev. Marsal&l 586 A.2d 85 (N.J. 1991) (Marshall I). In MarshalI
the court upheld the death sentence but reserved the issue of proportionality review. See
David C. Baldus, Death Penalty Proportionality Review Project Final Report to the New
Jersey Supreme Court (September 24, 1991) (unpublished) (on file with the State Documents Collection of the Northwestern University School of Law) (hereinafter 1991 Final
Report]. The 1991 Final Report, including its technical appendices, annotations to the
data set and data collection process, a detailed description of the methodology and a discussion of the legal issues raised can be obtained upon written request from John P. McCarthy, Jr., Assistant Director, Administrative Office of the Courts, CN 982, Justice
Complex, Trenton, New Jersey 08625.
224 See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1117 (N.J. 1992) (Marshall II) (Garibaldi, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). She believed the Proportionality Review Project could not accurately determine the facts of cases which did not go to a penalty phase
trial.
The validity of the entire system depends on the correcmess of the subjective evaluations made by personnel of the Administrative Office of the Court concerning the
"deathworthiness of a case" as contrasted with the evidentiary concerns and other
hazards of litigation that a case presents. Such evaluations made on a cold record, are
extremely difficult, even if undertaken by experienced prosecutors and defense counsel. To replace the reasoned determination of prosecutors, trial judges, and, in some
cases, juries, and to rely instead on the subjective evaluations of persons who have
never faced the realistic difficulties of trying a criminal case creates an unreliable data
base and misleading conclusions.
I&d.(Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
225 See In re Proportionality Review Project, 585 A.2d 358 (N.J. 1990).
226 Id. See also Marshall fh
In an earlier proceeding we declined to determine in advance the appropriate "universe" of cases against which to compare challenged death sentences in order to assure proportionality. The Attorney General had contended that the only appropriate
universe is one comprised exclusively of cases in which a death sentence has been
imposed under our Capital Punishment Act.
613 A.2d at 1063 (citation omitted).
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pass a statute adopting the State's position, declaring that the universe
of cases for proportionality review would be limited to death sentences
227
only.
4.

The Relevance of the Data to System-Wide Claims of Unconstitutional
Infliction of the Death Penalty

In Ramseur the New Jersey Supreme Court stated its position on
discrimination at the outset: "Discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
or other suspect characteristics cannot be tolerated .... ",228 Marshall
1I reaffirmed that commitment and stated it more sharply:
[W] ere we to believe that the race of the victim and race of the defendant played a significant part in capital sentencing decisions in New
Jersey, we would seek corrective measures, and if that failed we could
not, consistent with our State's policy, tolerate
discrimination that
22 9
threatened the foundation of our system of law.
The first major issue addressed by the Ramseur court was whether
proportionality review was the appropriate vehicle for examining systemwide defects in the operation of the capital case processing system.
The court believed it was, declaring that "proportionality review therefore is a means through which to monitor the imposition of death
sentences and thereby to prevent any impermissible discrimination in
imposing the death penalty." 230 The Ramseur court's declaration did
not end the controversy over this issue. In 1992, Justice Garibaldi
2 31
broke with the MarshallII majority on this question.
227

Following oral argument, the Legislature amended the Capital Punishment Act to provide that "[p]roportionality review.., shall be limited to a comparison of similar cases
in which a sentence of death has been imposed." L. 1992, c. 5 (eff. May 12, 1992) ....
Because there are several capital appeals pending under the prior law, we address the
issues in sufficient detail to deal with those appeals as well as this, depending on the
ultimate effect of L. 1992, c.5.
Id. at 1063-64.
228 State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 292 (NJ. 1987).
229 See Marshall I, 613 A.2d at 1110. Marshallif also states, "To countenance racial discrimination in capital sentencing would mock that tradition [to eliminate racial discrimination] and our own constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws under New
Jersey Constitution Article I, paragraph 1." Id. at 1109. Recognizing that a white defendant could argue that the capital punishment system in New Jersey was unconstitutional
because it discriminated against non-whites, id., Marshall IT stated that were it presented
with a statistical showing analogous to that before the United States Supreme Court in
McCleskey, "we would not hesitate to invalidate the sentence of death." Id. at 1112.
230 Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 292.
231

Proportionality review is not a second appellate review nor a broad review of dueprocess concerns or other constitutional issues .... It is not a vehicle for determining
whether prosecutors abused their discretion. Nor is proportionality review a means of
addressing individual instances of racial discrimination or other denials of due process. Of course, this Court will not tolerate such impermissible influences, and any
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The Ramseurmajority then set out its views on the second princi23 2
pal issue in proportionality review, the definition of similar cases.
In Ramseur the court anticipated what factors would be relevant in developing categories of similar cases and called for guidance from experts in their development 2 3 The difference between the complexity
of analysis in Marshall / and what was previously anticipated in Ramseur indicates just how far the court was brought along by the empirical analysis of the Special Master's Final Report. In Marshall I the
facts allowed for a number of comparison categories, and the court
went through a separate proportionality analysis for each category.
The analysis relied upon by the court in MarshallI was far more detailed and case specific than what could have been anticipated in
sentence of death that results therefrom will be fatally infected. However, the proper
avenue for addressing those issues is the capital defendant's direct appeal, not on
proportionality review.
Marshall , 613 A.2d at 1116-17 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Meanwhile, Justice Handler again expressed his view that the New Jersey capital punishment scheme violated the state constitution's cruel and unusual punishment clause:
The unequal treatment of capital defendants also implicates Article I, paragraph 5 of
the [New Jersey] Constitution, which bars the denial of civil rights or discrimination
against persons in the exercise of any right because of religion, race, or national origin. When inequality arises from improper considerations such as race, those concerns are most acute. The Special Master's study preliminarily shows the race of the
victim to be a factor in many decisions to impose the death penalty, and seems to
confirm many long-held suspicions .... The doctrine of evenhandedness and the
accordant requirement of comprehensive proportionality review implicates, perhaps
most directly, the protections secured by the cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Id. at 1126 (HandlerJ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
232

Second, we must determine what are "similar crimes" ... , in order to narrow the
scope of the similar crimes to be used in the proportionality review, such categories as
"torture," "sexual mutilation," or "multiple victim" crimes have been suggested. But
beyond these, there is a difficult question whether there are subcategories of "murder"
that can be appropriately identified and considered. "Domestic," "depravity of mind,"
and "execution style" crimes, for example, may be too broad or ambiguous to allow
any real comparison for proportionality. We anticipate and welcome suggestions regarding which criminological, sociological, and statistical models are appropriate for
analyzing the similarity of crimes and sentencing.
Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 293 (citation omitted).
233

Third, after the crimes similar to the case on review are identified, we must compare
those defendants with the one before the court .... The aggravating and mitigating
factors set forth in Section c(4) and Section c(5) are a beginning. But other factors
such as race, sex, and socioeconomic status might also be appropriate considerations
for reviewing proportionality. Moreover, the relationship between the defendant and
victim, whether defendant pleaded guilty or not guilty, and the race and sex of the
victim might also be appropriate factors. This list is only a beginning and still other
factors could be relevant to proportionality review of the defendants. Our task in this
process will be to sift through these factors to determine those that have an effect on
the capital sentencing decision. We must ensure that discriminatory factors are not
shifting the balance between life and death.
Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 293-94 (citations omitted).
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Ramseur.2 34
5. Racial and GeographicalDisparitiesand Their Relation to Differences
in ProsecutorialChargingPractices
In Ramseur the New Jersey high court did not avoid another area
of controversy: whether it would be appropriate within the context of
proportionality for the court to examine the prosecutor's discretionary selection of cases for capital prosecution.2 3 5 This issue sharply divided other state high courts. In State v. Koedatich the court prodded
county prosecutors take action to reduce disparities in capital case
charging.23 6 The Koedatich court strongly suggested that New Jersey
should promulgate uniform statewide guidelines for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in the selection of cases for capital prosecution.2 3 7 In response to this directive, the Attorney General and county
234 The majority opinion in Marshall II compared the death sentence under review according to the following categories: (1) similar cases as defined by the same aggravating
factor, and/or a similar constellation of aggravating and mitigating factors, MarshallII, 613
A.2d at 1085, 1090; (2) contract killers, both principals and hitmen, id. at 1089, 1095-96;
(3) spousal murders involving a high level of blameworthiness and a defenseless victim, id.
at 1090; (4) premeditated robbery/kidnap murder cases involving extensive premeditation, a pecuniary motive, deception/entrapment of the victim, and a defenseless victim, id.
at 1090, 1097-98; (5) first-time murderers of spouses, id. at 1092; and (6) "other cases"
offered as similar by the public defender, id. at 1098. The court also applied frequency
analysis, the precedent seeking approach, Dr. Weisberg's approach, the salient-factors approach, arguments based upon the infrequency with which juries return the death penalty
in NewJersey, id. at 1099, and arguments based upon geographical and racial patterns in
charging and sentencing. Id. at 1102. The court carefully explained each approach prior
to its analysis.
235 "Here we may anticipate considering whether to address concerns about possible
misuse of prosecutorial discretion presented to the courts of this state, including in the
review all cases in which a prosecutor had the discretion to seek the death penalty." Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 293 (citations omitted).
236 The role of prosecutorial discretion as one possible source of racial bias or arbitrariness in capital charging was at issue in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 357 (1987) (Blackmun,J., dissenting). The Fulton County, Georgia District Attorney, who had served in that
office for 18 years, testified that there were no standards for the Assistant District Attorneys
regarding plea bargaining in death eligible cases or to guide them in when to seek the
death penalty. See discussion concerning the identification of prosecutorial discretion as a
source of bias in Baldus et al., supranote 37, at 414-15. See also U.S. ex reL Silagy v. Peters,
713 F. Supp. 1246 (C.D. Il1. 1989) (holding the Illinois capital case processing system in
violation of the Eighth Amendment because of a lack of guidelines for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in the selection of cases for capital prosecution), rev'd, 905 F.2d
986 (7th Cir. 1990).
237 Citing data from the Public Defender Study, the Court noted that:
while prosecutorial decision-making is normally beyond its purview, fundamental fairness required that this Court review the basis for the State's notice of aggravating
factors in a capital case to ensure that prosecutors have cause to designate defendants
as death-eligible. To be sure, we stated that our goal was to "effect on a minimal
intrusion into this area ofprosecutorial discretion." Nevertheless, we believe there is a
need to promote uniformity in the administration of the death penalty, which will be
an additional safeguard against arbitrariness and an assistance to the Court in its de-
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prosecutors adopted a set of Guidelines. 2 38 The Guidelines directed
each county prosecutor to screen all death eligible homicide cases in
the jurisdiction and then decide whether or not a notice of factors
should be served in any individual case. The Guidelines stated that
the goal is to achieve uniform statewide standards for the charging of
capital murder: "It is neither desirable nor acceptable to have a capital
23 9
charging standard dependent upon individual attitudes."
The Guidelines Preamble asserts that "race, sex, social or economic religion and/or national origin of a defendant [or victim] has
not in the past, nor will in the future be considered in any fashion to
veloping proportionality review. Accordingly, we strongly recommend that the Attorney General, and the various County Prosecutors, in consultation with the Public
Defender, adopt guidelines for use throughout the state by prosecutors in determining the selection of capital cases.
State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 955 (N.J. 1988) (citing State v. McCrary, 478 A.2d 339,
340 (N.J. 1984)). In December of 1995, using the analytic framework established by the
Proportionality Review Project, the administrative office of the Courts reported a statistically significant race effect. See also infra Appendices B and C.
The majority opinion in MarshallIT reasserted the court's willingness to review the
charging decisions of prosecutors. MarshallIT,613 A.2d at 1071. The court suggested that
the Attorney General set up a statewide panel to review the charging decisions of county
prosecutors.
We have encouraged the Attorney General, as the chief law-enforcement officer of the
State of New Jersey, to exercise his undoubted authority to instill uniformity in the
charging and prosecuting practices throughout the state. We realize the differing attitudes in counties and the jurisdictional concerns. If the system fails to eliminate unconstitutional disparities, that failure should not be because of hesitancy to invoke
authority currently conferred on the Attorney General. A statewide review panel, appointed by the Attorney General in consultation with prosecutors, would be able to
screen out any possible effects of race or socioeconomic status in the charging and
selection process.
Id. at 1112.
Not all members of the court subscribed to the majority's view, however, that the review of
prosecutorial discretion in charging was an appropriate consideration in performing proportionality review.
Second-guessing prosecutorial decisions to pursue capital sentences will riddle the
proportionality review with uncertainty ....
The Special Master's classification of
death-eligibility cases is an extremely-subjective process carried out in the absence of
factual findings or jury determinations .... Such determinations [as to why a case was
not prosecuted as a capital offense] are clearly outside the scope of a proper proportionality review.
Id. at 1118 (Garibaldi, J., concurring and dissenting).
But "[p]roportionaity review is the obvious antidote for the enduring arbitrariness of disparate sentencing .... The legislative history to NewJersey's death-penalty statute evinces
similar concerns: proportionality review ensures that death sentences 'are being meted out
in a fair, even-handed way throughout the State.'" Id. at 1121-22 (Handler, J. dissenting)
(citations omitted).
238 These Guidelines are reprinted in Bienen et al., supra note 45, at 791-93 and discussed at 732-34. The Guidelines were submitted on February 22, 1989 to the ChiefJustice
of the Supreme Court and to the Special Master and have been in effect ever since.
239 Preamble to the Guidelines for the Designation for Capital Prosecution, repfinted in
Bienen et al., supra note 45, at 791-92.
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determine whether or not a case warrants capital prosecution." 240
The Preamble further states that "economic or other resource constraints of their respective offices shall not be a factor in determining
whether or not the case warrants capital prosection nor shall it in any
specific case play any role whatsoever in the capital designation deci24 1
sion making process."
The reference to economic or resource constraints is particularly
noteworthy.2 42 There are several aspects of the costs issue. To begin
with, no one disputes that capital cases cost the system considerably
more than non-capital cases-for the prosecution, the defense, and
the courts. The question of who pays is always relevant. Another aspect of the cost issue is whether prosecutorial charging decisions are
influenced by the budgetary constraints of local prosecutors, and/or
the relative prosperity of individual counties. 243 A cost issue which did
not arise during this period in NewJersey, but which is very much in
the forefront elsewhere, is whether the state can effectively limit the
defense of capital cases by refusing to authorize adequate funds for
indigent capital defense. 244 Related to the defense limitation issue is
the question of whether states may prohibit expenditure of funds for
the development of a factual basis for a constitutional challenge. In
New Jersey the legal costs of developing defense arguments on proportionality were not initially allocated to the county, thereby postponing some of these problems.
Capital murder prosecutions are significantly more expensive to
prosecute than cases which do not proceed capitally.2 45 In NewJersey
240 Id. at 792. A communication subsequent to the original letter added that the words
"or victim" were inadvertently left out of the Preamble. The Guidelines were formally
amended on January 23, 1990, by the County Prosecutors to correct this oversight. Id. at
791 n.2.
241 Id. at 792.
242 Marshall II, 613 A.2d at 1118 (Garibaldi, J., concurring and dissenting).
243 See Appendix B for the selected economic and demographic indicators of the New
Jersey counties.
244 At the time of the Proportionality Review Project, all indigent capital cases were represented by the public defender or by counsel appointed and assisted by the public defender. This is atypical. Also exceptional was that the Office of the Public Defender in
New Jersey did not place an overall per case limit on capital defense expenditures.
For example, an audit established that New Jersey spent nearly $3 million extra in
1984 to defend indigent defendants charged with capital crimes .... Specifically, of
the $296,449.41 the Public Defender's Office spent to defend Thomas Ramseur at
trial, the largest portion, $191,881, was spent on psychiatrists. The Public Defender
spent more than $75,000 successfully attacking the makeup of grand and petit juries
in Atlantic County.
MarshallII, 613 A.2d at 1144-45 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
245 The exceptionally high expenses for capital trials begin long before the trial itself. If
a case is to proceed capitally, there will be special pretrial motions concerning the Notice
of Aggravating Factors. Moreover, if a case is going to trial as a capital case, typically both
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the twenty-one county prosecutors are funded by twenty-one separate
and autonomous authorities of the county freeholders. 246 Some
counties are very rich, while other counties face severe budgetary constraints. The urban counties, such as Essex County, which includes the
city of Newark, and Camden County, are characterized by a declining
inner city tax base and high maintenance expenses. 2 47 The problem
of vastly different economic resource distribution among counties is
replicated in most large industrial states, the majority of whom now
have substantial death row populations. 248
Homicides themselves are also unevenly distributed across the
state. 249 For instance, Essex County reports over 140 homicides a year
on average. 250 A significant fraction of these are felony murders.
Under the definition of the felony factor in the New Jersey statute,
every felony murderer is potentially death eligible if he committed the
homicidal act by his own conduct with the requisite specific intent to
kill.2 5 ' During the period studied by the Proportionality Review Prosides will assign additional resources and an extra attorney to prepare the case. Also, prior
to the trial, the special procedures for the selection of a death-qualified jury will consume
considerably more resources than the selection of an ordinaryjury. See id. at 114449 (Handler, J. dissenting) for the most complete annotation to date of sources on the differential
cost of capital prosecutions.
246 At least one state, New Hampshire, has provided for centralized decision making
within the state for the prosecution of all homicide cases, including all capital cases, in
order to insure uniformity in the application of prosecutorial standards. See N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 7:6 (West, WEST.AW, updated through 1996).
247 See infra Appendix B for statistics on selected demographic characteristics of New
Jersey counties. See also South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336
A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975) (discussing regional economic disparities in the context of a community's obligation to provide low income housing).
248 See supra Table 2.
249 See supra Table 1.
250 Since reenactment, there have been years when the Essex County Prosecutor's Office
had no cases or one to two cases that proceeded as capital trials. There were at least two
dozen cases whose facts would have supported a prosecution for death-eligible murder
during the period when the Essex County Prosecutor brought no capital prosecutions.
Prior to the Koedatich Guidelines, see supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text, a New
Jersey Superior Court ordered the Essex County Prosecutor to come forward with guidelines for the selection of cases for capital prosecution because of the arbitrariness with
which this defendant was singled out for capital prosecution. State v. Smith, 495 A.2d 507,
516 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985). The court noted that there were 15 similar cases of
felony murder which had not been designated capital offenses. Id. at 514. The Smith case
eventually pled out to manslaughter.
251

a. Except as provided in NJ.S.2C:11-4 criminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting death; or
(2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
(3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other
persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping or criminal escape, and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight there-
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ject, the Essex County Prosecutor alone could have averaged 20 capital murder prosecutions a year for felony murder cases.
On April 6, 1989 the Attorney General and the County Prosecutors jointly asked the Supreme Court to rule on the appropriate universe of cases for proportionality review. 2 52 The Attorney General and
the County Prosecutors saw proportionality review as a limited remedy
whose purpose was to correct aberrational judgments. In their view,
proportionality review was inappropriate for consideration of possible
racial bias or other systemwide defects in the operation of the state's
capital-case processing system, irrespective of whether racial or other
disparities were introduced by prosecutorial discretion or other
255
factors.
The Office of the Public Defender took the position that the
court must have a sufficiently large data base of cases from which to
from, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; ....
c. Any person convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal
act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the
offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3a, c (West 1996).
252 In their Notice of Motion, the Attorney General and the County Prosecutors took
the position that: 1) the only appropriate universe of cases for proportionality review consists of other cases in the state in which the death sentence has been imposed; and 2)
prosecutorial discretion in the selection of cases for capital prosecution should not be
reviewable within the context of proportionality review. In re Proportionality Review Project, 585 A.2d 358 (NJ. 1990) (rejecting point 1 and not addressing point 2).
On November 1, 1989, the New Jersey Supreme Court asked the Special Master to
provide his
analysis as to the advantages and disadvantages of each potential alternative "universe"
of cases. Your analysis should consider the impact on the process of proportionality
review if the universe were to include, for instance, on death-sentenced cases, or cases
which advance to a capital sentencing proceeding, or broader universes such as all
cases where a notice of aggravating factors was served. Your analysis should discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of each alternative "universe" in terms of cost, the validity of the process, the utility of the final product, the ability to address broader issues
related to proportionality, the criteria defining the universe, the standards used to
determine whether individual cases should qualify to be ultimately considered in an
actual proportionality review, the effect of recent decisions on the includability of
prior death eligible cases, availability of data, the ability of county agencies to sustain
and assist the research, and any other related issues which you care to raise.
Letter from ChiefJustice Robert N. Wilentz to Professor David C. Baldus (Nov. 1, 1989)
(on file the State Documents Collection of the Northwestern University School of Law).
See, e.g., David Baldus, Death Penalty Proportionality Review Project Final Report (Sept. 24,
1991) (unpublished report); Herbert I. Weisberg, Proportionality Review of Death
Sentences in New Jersey (Nov. 26, 1991), reprinted in Brief of Attorney General, State v.
Marshall, 586 A.2d 85 (N.J. 1991).
253 On September 11, 1989, at oral argumentJustice O'Hern asked the Attorney General if the court should be prevented from considering the possibility of racial imbalance
in a situation where, for example, nine death sentences had been imposed and all of the
defendants were Asian. The Attorney General replied that under its proposed formulation
of proportionality review the court would be prevented from considering the possibility of
racial disparity in the implementation of the death penalty in that circumstance. Oral
Argument, In re Proportionality Review Project, 585 A.2d 358 (NJ. 1990).
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select appropriate categories of similar cases if proportionality review
was to be meaningful. 2 5 4 The data base must include information on
cases which were not prosecuted as capital cases so that prosecutorial
discretion in charging can be subject to judicial review by the State's
highest court. Proportionality review was created, the Public Defender argued, to allow the court to identify and correct systemwide
defects, such as disparities related to race or economic factors, which
might have been introduced by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, caprice, or any other extra-legal factor.
The Attorney General and the County Prosecutors maintained
that the New Jersey capital punishment system did not exhibit constitutionally impermissible disparities, and that proportionality review
was not the mechanism for identifying or correcting such systemwide
defects, even if there was evidence of them. They were unpersuaded
by data and analysis presented by the Public Defender Homicide
Study or the Special Master's Final Report, or by studies from other
jurisdictions indicating that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in
the selection of capital cases had resulted in evidence of systemwide
disparities. 2 5 5 The Public Defender argued there was no reason to
think that such systemwide disparities are confined to a single aber254 "Although there were over 250 cases where the death penalty could have been
sought, and over 120 cases which went to a capital penalty trial after a verdict of guilty of
capital murder, less than a quarter of all aggravated murders and less than a third of the
cases which reached the second stage of a penalty trial resulted in the jury imposing a
death sentence." Bienen, supra note 103, at 593.
255 E.g., Maryland:
For the first time, this Court has before it data concerning the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in death penalty cases. This data dramatically demonstrates
that the inventory of relevant cases for proportionality review must include all deatheligible murder cases-not only those in which the prosecutor sought the death penalty, but also those in which he did not.
This data reveals that in Maryland prosecutors seek the death penalty in only
7.8% of the death-eligible cases, whereas in 92.2% of the death-eligible cases the death
penalty is not sought. Consequently, this data establishes that Maryland prosecutors
rarely seek the death penalty, afact that is relevant, in and of itself, in determining
whether the death penalty is disproportionate .... In addition, the data concerning
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion reveals that in cases in which the death penalty
has been sought juries in Garrett County have imposed the death penalty in 50% of
the cases, whereas juries in Baltimore City have imposed the death penalty in 33%.
This data suggests that in these two jurisdictions the death penalty has been imposed
in a somewhat consistent manner. The data further reveals, however, that in Maryland
there is a substantial variation in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In Garret
County prosecutors seek the death penalty in 100% of the death-eligible cases,
whereas in Baltimore City, they seek that penalty in only 1.8%. This data further
shows that when prosecutorial discretion is taken into accountjuries in Garret County
have imposed the death penalty in 50% of all the death-eligible cases, whereas juries
in Baltimore City have imposed the death penalty in only .6%. Consequently, this data
demonstrates that in these two jurisdictions the death penalty has been imposed in an
inconsistent manner.
Tichnell v. State, 468 A.2d 1, 31-32 (Md. 1983) (Davidson, J., dissenting) (foomotes
omitted).
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rant jurisdiction or a particular period. The preliminary results of its
own research suggested that racial and geographic disparities were
present in the New Jersey capital case processing system. In Marshall
II, the court adopted this position:
That, we believe, is an acceptable understanding of the intentions of the
framers of our Act-that statutory proportionality review should seek to
ensure that the death penalty is being administered in a rational, nonarbitrary, and evenhanded manner, fairly and with reasonable consistency. That review serves as "a means through which to monitor the imposition of death sentences and thereby to prevent
any impermissible
25 6
discrimination in imposing the death penalty."
Especially noteworthy is the court's willingness to analyze the capital
case-processing system from its earliest stages, beginning with every
indictment for homicide in the state. 257 Even Justice Garibaldi, who
took the position that prosecutors' discretionary decisions not to seek
the death penalty should not be reexamined, was persuaded that the
data base must include all cases that the prosecutors declared
258
capital.
6.

The Methods of Analysis

The 1991 Final Report of the Proportionality Review Project describes in detail its methodology for classifying cases as clearly death
eligible. 259 This is a critical methodological decision and one which
256 Marshall I, 613 A.2d 1059, 1069 (N.J. 1992) (quoting State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d
188, 292 (N.J. 1987)). "That" refers to an opinion offered by the dissent in Pulley v. Harris
which "suggested only that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. In their view, proportionality review, although clearly no panacea, often serves to identify the most extreme examples of
disproportionality among similarly situated defendants." Marshall., 613 A.2d at 1069 (citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 71 (1984) (Brennan,J., dissenting)) (quotations omitted).
257 "The focus in the Marshallcase was on the constitutional legitimacy of the system as a
whole, rather than on the risk that race might have adversely influenced the decision of
the prosecutor or jury in an individual case." Baldus et al., supra note 37, at 406.
258

I would limit the universe of cases considered during proportionality review to those
in which a prosecutor has served a notice of aggravating factor, thereby indicating an
intention to seek a capital sentence .... Most prosecutorial decisions concerning the
pursuit of capital sentences rely on permissible considerations. Most prosecutors will
seek the death penalty for homicides that objectively satisfy one or more of the aggravating factors and where the physical and testimonial evidence create a reasonable
likelihood that the State will be able to meet its burden of proof.
MarshallAl, 613 A.2d at 1116, 1118 (Garibaldi, J., concurring and dissenting).
259 The initial screening removed cases involving death by auto, cases in which the
homicide charge was only for an attempt or conspiracy to commit homicide, cases that
resulted in an acquittal or dismissal of homicide charges, and cases in which the defendant
was ajuvenile. This reduced a data base of over 3000 cases to a screened data file of 1372
murder cases. See infra Appendix B tbl. 1.
The Project began with the State Police (SBI) list of 2300 persons arrested for a homicide offense between 1982 and 1988. This list was supplemented by an additional 500 cases

1996]

PROPORTIONAITY REVIEW

203

the Special Master addressed with care. What facts are sufficient to
define the presence of statutory aggravating factors absent a penaltyphase determination, and how are these facts established? How are
"cases" similar, considering both the "crime" and the "defendant"?
The research in New Jersey gave new meaning to the abstraction: "in
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." 260 The
preparation of detailed narrative summaries of the circumstances of
the offense and the procedural history of the case was a crucial part of
this methodology. Even with a detailed data collection instrument,
maintaining an accurate record of the procedural events and circumstances of the crime was impossible without a narrative description.
The narrative description for each case also gave the court concrete
and specific facts for its qualitative analyses.
The 1991 Final Report addressed the methodological problem of
how facts relevant to aggravating and mitigating factors are to be determined absent a penalty phase jury verdict. The methodology developed in New Jersey for classifying cases as death eligible takes into
account the strength of the evidence in the case on the elements of
capital murder and is fact sensitive. 26 1 This "strength of the evidence"
typology sets out what constitutes an overwhelming case, a strong case,
a clearly defensible case, and a clearly insufficient case on all of the
elements of capital murder, including statutory aggravating factors. 262
identified by the Administrative Office of the Courts and by yet an additional 200 cases
which were identified by the Public Defender Homicide Study. In other words, the Administrative Office of the Courts and the Public Defender together identified an additional 700
cases which were not in the official files of the State Police. The State Police files, the
source of data for the F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports, were missing almost one-sixth of the
cases. These missing cases were all cases which were formally charged as homicide offenses, cases that went to final disposition at the trial court stage. After removing the identifiers for some variables, the Public Defender turned over to the Proportionality Review
Project its data tapes on the 703 cases. See Bienen et al., supra note 21 (analyzing the
cases).
260 GA. CODE ANN.§ 17-10-35(c) (3) (Westlaw, updated as of 1996) (statutory language
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)) (formerly codified at § 27-2537).
261 This methodology was refined to address the concerns of trial attorneys expressed in
the proportionality review meetings held throughout the four years of data collection. Factual summaries of identified homicides were presented to prosecutors and defense attorneys who were then asked for their suggestions on ways to code ambiguous facts or classify
problematic variables. See David C. Baldus, Death Penalty Proportionality Review Project,
Final Report to the NewJersey Supreme Court (September 24, 1991) (unpublished report
on file with State Documents Collection at Northwestern University School of Law) [Hereinafter PRP Final Report]
262 "We have used scientific and statistical measures, when helpful, although we recognize that a value judgment is built into practically every measurement." Marshall 1,613
A.2d at 1064. This recognition was a hallmark of all of the opinions in Marshall IT. The
majority and thejustices writing separately acknowledged that their opinion reflected their
personal experiences and ultimately a value judgment. In some sense, statistics were the
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An overwhelming case, for example, would include evidence from
eyewitnesses or a full confession which completely corroborated all of
the elements of capital murder, including the "by his own conduct"
requirement, the presence of at least one statutory aggravating factor,
and the requisite mens rea under the legal standard in effect at the
time. 263 Finding a measure for mens rea in cases which did not result

in a jury verdict proved to be one of the Project's most challenging
tasks. A clearly insufficient case, on the other hand, would include
eyewitness evidence which only placed the defendant at the scene of
the crime, or evidence which was inconclusive or unreliable. Nonpenalty phase cases are identified as clearly death eligible only if there
is overwhelming or strong evidence for all of the elements of capital
2 64

murder.

In another notable methodological advance, the 1991 Report developed two separate streams of analysis-one for decision making by
juries and another for decision making by prosecutors, judges and
others.2 65 Jury decisions regarding facts and culpability trumped all
other decisions. The methodological question was, how to determine
facts when ajury was never presented with them, when ajury decision
was preempted. Ajury finding of intent less than the requisite intent
least of it.
263 The data analysis of death eligibility incorporated relevant changes in the legal definition of the intent requirement fop-capital murder as they occurred. See State v. Gerald,
549 A.2d 792 (N.J. 1988) (declaring death penalty disproportionate under NewJersey constitution where defendant acted without intent to kill and without knowledge that death
would result).
264 An important distinction between NewJersey and other states lies in the fact that in
New Jersey non-slayer participants in felony murders are not eligible for capital prosecution. As a result, the NewJersey Supreme Court has not yet been required to address the
constitutional issues raised by the attribution of intent to kill to a person who did not
commit the homicidal act. See Bienen et al., supra note 45, at 722-32 (describing the history
of felony murder at British common law and in New Jersey law, and the distinction between death eligibility for principals and co-defendants). These issues have been troublesome for many state supreme courts and have produced an opaque series of opinions from
the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Moreover, the issues arise frequently in the context of
proportionality review when courts are asked to consider the comparative proportionality
of the death sentence of a relatively less culpable codefendant, when the principal was
sentenced to life or less, or when two equally culpable co-defendants receive disparate
sentences. See State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing constitutionality of death penalty as punishment for felony murder under state and federal constitutions, and interplay between state and federal principles on that issue).
265 "The NewJersey court in Marshall expressed concern about the evidence of discrimination in its capital sentencing system, especially injury sentencing decisions." Baldus et
al., supranote 37, at 412-13 (citing MarshallI, 613 A.2d at 1112). "As noted, the focus of
Marshall was a 'structural challenge' to the system as a whole." Id. at 419 n.182 (citing
MarshallII, 613 A.2d at 1112). See id. at 405-13 (comparing the race effects reported in the
1991 Final Report with the race effect found in the Georgia studies).
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for capital murder, for example, a jury verdict for manslaughter,
would automatically exclude a case from the category of death eligible
murder-and thus from proportionality review-no matter how
strongly the factual circumstances suggested a basis for death
eligibility.
One of the Project's principal goals was to identify why some
cases reach capital trial while others, which meet the "legal" criteria
for death eligibility, do not.26 6 The Project built upon the stage analy-

sis of the earlier reports of the Public Defender Homicide Study,
which began with an analysis of cases which dropped out of the capital
case processing system. A sharp decline in the number of potentially
capital cases at each successive capital case processing stage is typical.267 Each county prosecutor unilaterally makes decisions about
whether to declare a case capital. In almost all jurisdictions, prosecutors are elected and capital case prosecutions are vehicles for keeping
the prosecutor in the public eye.2 68 New Jersey is exceptional in that
266

There were five main goals in this project. The first was to conduct a census of New
Jersey homicide cases and to identify those defendants who were death-eligible under
the NewJersey capital-sentencing statute. Our second task was to develop a machinereadable data base of these cases that could be used by us to develop and refine measures of defendant culpability and, by interested parties, to evaluate the evenhandedness and consistency of NewJersey's capital sentencing system. The third task was to
develop measures of defendant culpability which will assist the Court in identifying
death-eligible cases that are "similar... considering both the crime and the defendant" within the meaning of NJ.S.A. 2C:11-3e. Our fourth task was to recommend
approaches to proportionality review, including the basic universe of cases 'that the
Court should routinely consider in its reviews. Our final assignment was to recommend an ongoing system of (a) contemporaneous data collection at the trial court
level, and (b) data management and analysis in the AOC.'
PRP Final Report, supra note 261, at 1-2.
267

Five capital case processing stages are analyzed in this study. Beginning with all homicides in the data base [N=703], the first stage is death-possible, cases identified as
having a factual basis for serving a notice of factors [N=404]. The second stage is
death-eligible, cases where the prosecutor actually serves a notice of factors, designating the case capital [N=131]. The third stage is capital trial, cases which progress to
capital trial before ajudge or a death qualified jury [N=94]. The fourth stage is penalty phase, cases which result in a conviction for death-eligible murder and consequently progress to a penalty phase decision before ajudge or a death qualified jury
[N=69]. The fifth or final stage is the imposition of the death penalty [N=25].
Bienen et al.,
supra note 21, at 164 (foomotes omitted).
Our analysis of prosecutorial decision making in felony murder cases focuses on the
early stages of capital case processing because it is there that key determinative decisions are made. Seemingly technical or procedural pretrial decisions concerning
charging may well determine a case's outcome and have other far-reaching consequences for the defendant and all other participants in the criminal justice system.
Bienen et al., supra note 45, at 739.
268

One thing the most fervent district attorneys share is political ambition. For example,
take the three recent Chicago prosecutors who have been avid users of the death
penalty in Cook County, the only large county that rivals Philadelphia for aggressive-
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neither county prosecutors norjudges are elected. Prosecutors are appointed for five-year terms. Local and party politics, however, play a
2 69
role in the appointment process.
The 1991 Final Report identified a significant race of defendant
effect which has been replicated by subsequent research of the Proportionality Review Project. This effect was not considered by the
court to be a sufficient basis for declaring the death sentence imposed
upon Robert Marshall to be disproportionate.2 70 In Marshall the
court expressed its ongoing concern that decision making by prosecutors could be the cause of racial disparities in capital case processing.2 7 1 The court continues to conduct proportionality analysis with

an updated data base. The most recent proportionality review research, prepared for State v. HaTis2 72 , yielded significant race
ness. ... Richard M. Daley [former Cook County Prosecutor] is now Mayor and the
current prosecutor, Jack O'Malley, has openly been contemplating higher office.
Harry Connick Sr., New Orleans's District Attorney, ran for Louisiana Attorney General in 1987.
Rosenberg, supra note 115, at 46. See also Bright & Keenan, supra note 81.
269 In only three states are prosecutors not elected: Connecticut, Delaware and New
Jersey. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, and Rhode Island do not elect judges, either initially or for retention. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS

(1994).
270 Marshall , 613 A.2d at 1110-12.
[The court] concluded, however, that the data were less strong than the evidence
presented in McCleskey and did not establish a constitutional violation. In terms of
the overall race-of-victim effects.., this conclusion seems correct because the disparity
is smaller than the McCleskey disparity and is not statistically significant. As for the
race-of-defendant effects in the jury penalty-trial data, the court was cautious because
changes in the law that would be likely to reduce discrimination had occurred in 1987
and 1988 and because there were an inadequate number of post-1988 cases with which
to estimate race-of-defendant effect.
Baldus et al., supra note 37, at 413 (footnotes omitted).
271

There was stronger evidence of race effects in prosecutorial decision making. Nevertheless, the practical effect of these prosecutorial decisions has been ameliorated by
the fact that according to the records of the Administrative Office of the NewJersey
Courts, over 80% of all of NewJersey's death sentences imposed since 1982 have been
vacated because of legal errors unrelated to racial issues. The data are disturbing
nonetheless. To meet those concerns, the New Jersey court in Marshall urged the
state's Attorney General and prosecutors to cooperate with the court and its staff in
maintaining and improving the court's data base in order to enhance its capacity to
detect sign of discrimination in the system. The court also suggested that its "unease"
about racial issues would be ameliorated "if there were some type of inter-agency review to provide the most rudimentary monitoring of [prosecutorial] capital-charging
decisions."
Id. at 413 (footnotes omitted) (discussing Marshall HI, 613 A.2d at 1110-14).
272 662 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1995). Joseph Harris died prior to the scheduled oral argument
in his case before the Supreme Court of New Jersey. His appeal was then dismissed as
moot. The proportionality issues and the question of possible race effects will be addressed in State v. Loflir. See infra Appendix C.
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7.

The Politics of ProportionalityReview in New Jersey: Conflict between
the Legislature, the State Supreme Court, and the
Attorney General

In spite of or perhaps because the principled commitment of the
NewJersey Supreme Court and its Proportionality Review Project, the
court was sharply criticized by state legislators, the press, and the New
Jersey Attorney General on capital punishment issues, particularly
proportionality review, during the period from 1982 until 1992. The
antagonistic relationship between the Attorney General, the state legislature, and the court was influenced by a variety of national and state
events, not all of which were related to capital punishment, or to proportionality review, although capital punishment issues were prominent in the five year period between Ramseur274 and Marshall B7-75 .
Capital punishment in the late 1980's and early 1990's was a salient political issue which politicians ignored at their peril.27 6 There
was then and is now no political support for those accused of capital
murder and their representatives in the legal system. Moreover, the
issues surrounding the cost of the reimposition of the death penalty,
which might have caused some members of the public or the legislature to question the reimposition of capital punishment, have never
been documented or treated seriously by the public, the press, or the
legislature. 277
273 See Appendix C for the models and significant race effects found in State v. Harris.
The court has appointed Judge Richard S. Cohen as the new Special Master for Proportionality Review. See infraAppendix C (State v. Loftin, No. A-86 (NJ. Oct. 22, 1986) (order
appointing new special master). The Oct. 22, 1996 Order demonstrates that the newly
constituted court will continue the court's prior commitment to a rigorous scientific analysis based upon a reliable factual foundation. The new Chief Justice, Deborah T. Poritz,
formerly Attorney General of New Jersey, announced that she would recuse herself from
those pending capital appeals with which she had been directly involved. See Stephen W.
Townsend, Clerk of the Supreme Court, Notice to the Bar, Recusal Polity of the Chiefjustice,
NJ. LJ., Sept. 2, 1996, at 2.
274 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987).
275 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992).
276 See Bright & Keenan, supranote 81, at 770-76. See also Rosenberg, supra note 115, at
46 ("[The death penalty's] political value is the unstated dark side to prosecutors' argument that they use the death penalty because their public demands it. One thing the most
fervent district attorneys share is political ambition."); id. at 42 ("The 1994 campaign [for
governor of Pennsylvania] was in itself a classic illustration of the political pressures on
officials who deal with crime .... There is only one way to be safe: Always take the most
hard-line position possible.") See Bienen, supra note 103, at 585 for other arguments regarding the politics of the death penalty, with specific reference to the high publicity circumstances surrounding Robert Marshall's trial.
277 Prior to reenactment, there was an unsuccessful attempt by Assembly Speaker Alan
Karcher to attach a fiscal note to the bill reenacting capital punishment. See Untitled, UPI,
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The conflict between the New Jersey Legislature and supreme
court over capital punishment was preceded by sharp disagreements
on other highly political issues, such as school funding and mandated
low-income housing in suburban residential communities. 278 Conflict
between the state high court and legislature occurs in many jurisdictions, however, the Supreme Court of New Jersey under the leadership of Chief Justice Wilentz provoked more than the ordinary
amount of controversy. It was the Wilentz court's willingness to adopt
principled and politically unpopular positions that led to its preeminence among state high courts.
Conflict between the court and the legislature began with a 1985
amendment to the capital punishment statute which retained the proportionality review requirement but removed the provision making
such review mandatory in all appeals of death sentences. 2 79 In its first
capital punishment decision the Supreme Court of New Jersey indicated that it did not intend to have its constitutional jurisprudence on
capital punishment dictated by the legislature. 28 0 The court simply
continued to prepare to conduct a proportionality review of every
death sentence which was not reversed on other constitutional
28 1
grounds.
May 19, 1982, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NEAST File. "In New Jersey, sentencing

one person to death has been estimated to cost about $7.3 million .... For example, the
prosecution estimated that the Ramseur case cost $60,000 a year to litigate." Marshall 1,
613 A.2d. at 1144 (HandlerJ, dissenting). In New York, the 1995 reenactment legislation
did appropriate additional funds for the reimposition.
278 For almost 20 years the question of the constitutionality of property-tax-based school
funding in NewJersey has oscillated between the state legislature and the courts, with the
Supreme Court of NewJersey as final arbiter. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 477 A-2d 1278 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), rev'd, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985); Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d
187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972), modifled, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). See also Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 V~AD. L. REv. 101
(1995). The role of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in mandating affordable housing
provoked similar conflict between that court and other branches of state government. See,
e.g., South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975)
and subsequent cases.
279 See 1985 N.J. Laws 1935, 1940 (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3). The amended
statute required the appeal of all death sentences, even over the objection of the defendant, with representation by the Public Defender or other court-appointed counsel. This
mandate was similar to action taken by other state legislatures after Pulley v. Harris, 465
U.S. 37, 50 (1984) held that the United States Constitution did not require proportionality
review.
280 State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 292 (N.J. 1987) ("While proportionality review is no
longer mandatory, and shall be undertaken only '[ulpon the request of the defendant,' we
assume that almost all defendants who are sentenced to death will request such review."
(citation omitted)).
281 In Marshall II the court sidestepped the question of whether a 1992 legislative
amendment limiting the universe of cases to death sentences only would violate the ex post
facto clause of the United States Constitution:
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The New Jersey Supreme Court waited five years before holding
the revised capital punishment statute constitutional on state and federal grounds. 28 2 Given the direction of federal constitutional law, the
state constitutional holding was the important interpretation. Many
state legislators were impatient with this delay and even more antagonized by the fact that the court reversed 27 death sentences before
upholding the death sentence of Robert Marshall on direct appeal in
January of 1991.283
The impatience of state legislators reared itself at Chief Justice
Wilentz's reconfirmation in 1986. In New Jersey, judges are not
elected. They are appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation
by theJudiciary Committee of the NewJersey Senate. 284 The reconfirmation of the Chief Justice in 1986 was delayed by legislators who
were frustrated by the court's independence under his leadership.
The Attorney General has filed a letter memorandum suggesting that the 1992
amendment be applied to this appeal. Were the amendment to be applied to pending
appeals, we would undoubtedly be required to resolve whether, as applied to offenses
committed before its effective date, the Act might constitute an ex post facto law ....
Because of the long pendency of this appeal, we decide this appeal under prior law
We therefore have no occasion to consider either its applicability or validity ....
Because there are several capital appeals pending under the prior law, we address the
issues in sufficient detail to deal with those appeals as well.
State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1063-64 (NJ. 1992). In both State v. Martin4 651 A.2d
949 (NJ. 1994), cet. deniA, 116 S. Ct. 203 (1995), and State v. Bey, 645 A.2d 685 (NJ. 1994),
the court found the death sentences proportionate and based its proportionality review on
an analysis similar to that in Marshall i using an updated and expanded data set prepared
for each case.
282 Section 2C:11-3 was enacted in 1982, see supra note 197 and accompanying text, but
the statute was not held constitutional until State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 216-21 (1987).
283

After the re-enactment in 1982, the majority of legislators expected executions to occur relatively quickly; they are disappointed that the statute has not been implemented as planned. "I expected that capital punishment would be the law of the state
and that there would be executions. I had no idea the Supreme Court would thwart
the will of the people," said [Assemblyman] Hardwick. The fault with the lack of complete implementation lies with a recalcitrant court, not with the legislators, says Hardwick. Other legislators expressed similar opinions. "I never imagined people would be
languishing in jail while the courts fought it out," said [Senator] Orechio. Most of the
legislators [interviewed] who supported the re-enactment expressed frustration at the
"law in name only" that the death penalty statute has now become. According to
Horan, Senator Dorsey thinks "it is a travesty that what the people want is not happening. It is almost like to was a waste of time to pass it." Dorsey would be bothered by the
execution of another human being, but what has happened is "just opposite" from
what he had expected. He never realized the legislation would be such an "exercise in
futility. Why vote for something if nothing's going to happen?" said [Legislative Aide
to Dorsey] Horan. The string of reversals has subsequently caused several legislators
to accuse the New Jersey Supreme Court of legislating from the bench.
Chen, supra note 197, at 47-48 (footnotes omitted).
284 The Wilentz court era ended in 1996, when the ChiefJustice resigned and died in
July of 1996. Deborah T. Poritz, the former Attorney General and Governor's Counsel, was
immediately appointed and confirmed as the new Chief Justice. Republican Governor
Christine Todd Whitman also appointed the replacement forJustice Clifford, who retired
in 1994. See Rocco Cammarere, Coleman Passes Unanimously, NJ. Lw., Oct. 24, 1994, at 1.
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The court's decisions in capital cases were a large part of the controversy. 285 Legislators, the governor, and state law enforcement officials
expressed the view that the court was determined not to enforce the
capital punishment statute, even though the court had been unwilling
2 86
or unable to declare the statute unconstitutional.
In 1988, conflict between the state legislature and supreme court
and criticism of the court by the law enforcement community intensified after the court held in State v. Gerald2 s 7 that proof of a specific
intent to kill, not merely an intent to cause bodily harm, was a prerequisite for a conviction for capital murder.2 88 Ironically, the death sentence was reversed on other gounds as well, but this became the
general doctrine. The New Jersey Legislature and state law enforcement personnel became even more outraged when a series of death
28 9
sentences were overturned by the court on the basis of Gerald.
Since before Gerald the court has based its constitutional rulings in
capital cases on independent state constitutional grounds, leaving no
basis for an appeal to or the possibility of reversal by the Supreme
2 90

Court.

285 In California, Rose Bird was defeated in a retention election because of the unpopularity of the California Supreme Court's reversals of death sentences. See supra note 81.
For a discussion ofjudicial election, selection, and accountability, see Joseph R. Grodin,
Developing a Consensus of Constraint:A Judge's Perspective on JudicialRetention Elections, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1988); Gerald F. Uelmen, Commentay: Are We Reprising a Finale or an
Overture, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2069 (1988).
286 "'[The court] is looking for ways to circumvent [the death penalty statute] on a caseby-case basis, by splitting hairs... You can pass all the legislation in the world, but if the
Court is going to move along this road, it doesn't mean anything.'" Tracy Schroth, Gerald
Nearly Fatalto Death Appeals, N.J. LJ.,July 5, 1990, at I (footnotes omitted) (quoting former
NewJersey SenatorJohn Lynch). See also Kathleen Bird, FlorioFaultsSupreme Court on Death
Penalty: Governor ChallengesJusticesto Enforce the Law orStrike it Down, N.J. LJ., Dec. 20, 1990,
at 3.
287 549 A.2d 792 (NJ. 1988).
288 Following that decision in 1988, a number of other death sentences were set aside by
the New Jersey Supreme Court on the grounds that the jury had not been appropriately
instructed under the Gerald standard. Some of these cases went to penalty-phase retrial,
others were resolved with a plea to a non-death sentence. See Bienen et al., supra note 45,
at 713 n.12.
289 See, e.g., Bird, supra note 286; Schroth, supra note 286.
290 See generally, WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977); Developments in the Law: The Interpretationof State Constitutional Rights, 95 HIAv. L. Ruv. 1324 (1982); Jose L. Fernandez, The New Jersey Supreme
Court's Interpretation and Application of the State Constitution, 15 RUTGERS LJ. 491 (1984);
Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as SeparateSources of FundamentalRights, 35 RurGERS L.
R-v. 707 (1983); Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HAav. C.R.C.L. L. Rtv. 284 (1973); Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled
Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L REv. 297 (1977). The United States
Supreme Court is "utterly without jurisdiction to review... state decisions" resting in
whole or in part on state constitutional law. Brennan, supra, at 501. Justice Brennan uses
as an example of this doctrine another highly controversial case decided by the NewJersey
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In the period between 1982 and 1991 public support for capital
punishment in the country as a whole stayed high and showed little
sign of being eroded, although there was no state poll on the issue in
NewJersey from 1982 to 1992.291 Even if the "public" was not more in
favor of capital punishment and executions than they had been in the
past, it was clear to NewJersey legislators and others that the Supreme
Court had undergone a substantial doctrinal shift during the intervening decade. 29 2 The federal courts were not predictably going to interfere with any state supreme court ruling or statute which had the
intention or effect of streamlining the process of carrying out executions. 2 93 Federal remedies became increasingly un available to state

capital defendants during the period.2 94 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey was correctly perceived to be the principal impediment to executions being carried out in the state.
An unusual election in November of 1991 in which the entire
NewJersey Senate and Assembly stood for election resulted in a vetoproof Republican majority in both houses for the first time in twentyfive years. Thereafter, on March 12, 1992, the Governor of NewJersey
signed into law legislation restricting proportionality review in capital
cases to cases in which the death sentence was imposed.2 95 The newly
Supreme Court: South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d
713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 808 (1975).
291 See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardeningof the Attitudes: Americans' Views
on the DeathPenalty, 50J. Soc. IssuEs 19, 19-21, 48-49 (1994). See also WiliamJ. Bowers et
al., A New Look at Public Opinion on CapitalPunishment: Vat Citizens and LegislatorsPrefer,22
AM.J. CaUm. L. 77 (1994). The highest level of public support for the death penalty was in
1988, 79%, with a low of 42% expressing their support in 1966. Ellsworth, supra,at 48-49.
After 1974 the polling question asked was: Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons
convicted of murder? SeeJames Alan Fox et al., Death Penalty Opinion in the Post-Furman
Years, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 499, 502 n.12 (1991). See also D. Milan, Capital
Punishment and Perception: Public Opinion and its Influence in 1992 WWS Final Report;
Minhas, supra note 197; A. Southwell, Life or Death? Analysis of the Current Public Opinion andJustifications: The Death Penalty and its Alternatives, in 1992 WWS Final Report.
292 "[W]hen the Legislature originally enacted the death-penalty statute, they most likely
operated under the misconception that the United States Constitution required proportionality review as an essential element of a valid death-penalty system. That assumption
was proven incorrect by the holding in Pulley v. Harris." State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059,
1116 (N.J. 1992) (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
293 See supra Part ]1.
294 For example, the United States Supreme Court restricted access to the federal courtsby 1) narrowing the procedural and substantive grounds for federal habeas review, while
making those grounds much more technical; 2) interpreting the definition of incompetence of counsel so that only a very small subset of cases meet the standard for the appointment of counsel; and 3) tightening time requirements and strictly interpreting waiver
questions. The goals of shutting down federal habeas review to capital defendants has
been facilitated by the appointment of federal judges in favor of speeding up executions
and limiting federal capital appeals. See supra Part II.
295 NJ. LAvs ch. 5 (1992). The provision amended § 2C:11-3e by adding the following
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elected legislature also directly challenged the independance of the
New Jersey Supreme Court by passing a proposed constitutional
amendment 2 96 that overturned the court's holding in State v.
Gerald.2 97
These actions appeared to be part of a broad conservative agenda
of the newly elected members of the legislature, 29 8 but the court did
not change its procedure for conducting proportionality review when
the "death only" law was enacted.2 99 At some point the court will necessarily conduct proportionality review with the new reduced comparison category of death sentence cases only, but the practical effect of
the amendment may be minimal. In Marshall II the court stated its
commitment to the larger universe for the consideration of broad
constitutional issues such as racial discrimination and arbitrariness in
capital sentencing generally.3 0 0
V.

THE

1995 REENACTMENT IN NEW YORK: NEW RULES FOR THE

REIMPOSITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE

1990's

The election of Republican Governor George Pataki in 1994
marked a turning point in New York politics. 30 Governor Mario
language: "Proportionality review under this section shall only consist of a comparison of
similar cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed under subsection c. of this

section." NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2c:11-3e (West 1995). Principles of ex post facto prevent this
provision from having a retrospective effect upon the Marshall case or upon any case in
which the crime occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment. See infra notes
299-300 and accompanying text.
12 (amended 1992).
296 NJ. CONST., art. I,
297 549 A.2d 792 (NJ. 1988).
298 SeeJerry Gray, G.O.P.Is Told Not to Alter Constitution, N.Y.

TIMES, July 14, 1992, at B6.
The article states:
Blaming what he called "right wing extremists" within the Republican Party, the Senate Democratic leader, John A. Lynch, accused the Republican legislative majority today of trying to undermine the state constitution .... Since the Republican-controlled
205th Legislature began its two-year session in January, legislators have introduced
nearly 90 bills to amend the State Constitution, about a dozen of them sponsored by
Democrats.
299 Marshall I, 613 A.2d at 1071-73.
300 Id.
301

Surrounded by lawmakers, district attorneys and relatives of murder victims, Pataki
used the pens of two slain police officers to sign the death penalty legislation into law
shortly after noon Tuesday. It's a bill that backers have been trying to get a New York
governor to approve for 18 straight years. "This bill is going to save lives. This bill is
going to be a deterrent and it's going to allow us to have a system that imposes justice
fairly and appropriately in New York state," Pataki said .... Assembly Speaker Sheldon
Silver, Senate Majority LeaderJoseph Bruno and other lawmakers joined Pataki at the
ceremony .... "I think it's a deterrent. Maybe they'll think twice before they'll pull
triggers," saidJanet McDonald, whose police officer husband, Sean, was murdered last
March execution-style after he came upon a robbery .... Another murder victim's
relative, who was featured in a campaign ad last fall for Pataki, said Tuesday's signing
helped in the healing process. "It's an important day," said Carol McCauliff, whose
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Cuomo was defeated in the 1994 election in part because of his continued opposition to capital punishment, even though he had been
elected over pro-death penalty opponents in 1986 and 1990. His defeat in November of 1994 followed a campaign in which Pataki kept
Cuomo's opposition to the death penalty in the public eye.
Reenactment was a certainty after the election of Governor
Pataki, and a reenactment bill was passed less than six months after
Pataki took office.8 0 2 The timing of reenactment in New York strongly
influenced the structure of the New York statute.3 0 3 Experienced New
York prosecutors and defense attorneys watched for twenty years as
the number of persons on death row across the nation climbed to
over 3,000 and the number of executions passed 300 with relatively
little public protest.8 0 4 New York was no longer going to be the
exception.
A.

THE IMPORTANCE OF NEW YORK FOR PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

By 1995 all efforts to enact national legislation addressing the
persistent evidence of racial disparities in the application of state capi30 5 With
tal statutes had been rejected by the United States Congress.
no foreseeable prospect of the Congress enacting legislation which
stepson Thomas was killed last year allegedly by a repeat offender given early release
from prison. McCauliff appeared in one of the campaign's more controversial ads,
when, concerning her stepson's murder, she proclaimed, "I blame it all on Cuomo
and his policies."
Tom Precious, justice Will Be Served, TIMES UNION (Albany), Mar. 8, 1995, at Al.
802 Act of March 7, 1995, 1995 N.Y. Laws c.1.
803 See Death Penalty Symposium, 23 HoFSrRA L. REv. 627 (1995); R. Tabak, Are Executions
in New York Inevitable, 22 FORD. U"B. LJ. 557 (1995). See also Mary R. Falk and Eve Cary,
Death-DefyingFeats: State ConstitutionalChallenges to New York's Death Penalty, 4 J.L. & POL'Y
161 (1995); Robert Weisberg, The New York Statute as CulturalDocument: Seeking the Morally
OptimalDeathPenalty, 44 BuFF. L REv. 283 (1996); Franklin E. Zimring, The Wages ofAmbivalence: On the Contexts and Prospects of New York s DeathPenalty, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 303 (1996).
See generally The New York Death Penalty in Context: A Symposium, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 283 (1996).
See also James R. Acker, When the Cheeing Stopped: An Overview and Analysis of New York's
Death Penalty Legislation, 17 PACE L REv. (forthcoming 1997).
304 See supra tbl.2. Frank Zimring argues that the system's failure to execute a proportionate number of persons sentenced to death represents a societal ambivalence about the
death penalty. See FRANmiN E.

ZIMRING & G. HAWMINs, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERI-

(1986); Franklin E. Zimring, Ambivalence in State CapitalPunishmentPolicy: An
Empirical Sounding, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANcE 729, 729 (1991);
305 See Baldus et al., supra note 37, at 376-405. Section IV of that article discusses the
Racial Justice Act and the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, both designed to "bypass McCleskey by relying on the legislative power granted Congress under the Enabling Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." I& at 377. The Fairness in Death Sentencing Act "would
provide a condemned prisoner the opportunity to challenge his death sentence with statistical proof of racial discrimination and would also employ a risk-based model of proof." kI.
at 379 (citation omitted). It is noteworthy that as this article went to press the American
Bar Association House of Delegates voted for a moratorium on all executions because of
the persuasive disparities in their application.
CAN AcENDA
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would require states to address the constitutional issues raised by the
persistent evidence of racial disparities in capital sentencing, the procedures for appellate review included in the New York statute become
especially critical. While no one can predict how the New York Court
of Appeals will address issues of racial and geographic disparities in
capital charging and sentencing, it is certain such disparities will
emerge. 30 6 The statute anticipates that the court will consider the
constitutional issues from an empirical perspective.
The New York Court of Appeals is in a position to take advantage
of the strides made by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in defining
the constitutional parameters for proportionality review under state
constitutional law. Like the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the New
York Court of Appeals has a long and distinguished history of developing state constitutional doctrine. This court's consideration of the
constitutional issues raised by the reenactment of capital punishment
in New York will not be perfunctory or evasive. That litigation and the
development of state constitutional doctrine on the application of the
death penalty in New York is anticipated with great interest in the
national legal community.
No participant in the reenactment process in New York, including the state legislators, expects that the initial decision on the constitutionality of the New York statute will be made by a federal court.
This is an important difference from the view expressed in many state
legislatures in the past. Legislators in states where reenactment occurred prior to Pulley and McCleskey fully expected the Supreme Court
to rule on the constitutionality of their statute, and they fashioned
their statutes for review by the Supreme Court. State legislators copied the Georgia statute because they expected that was the only version of a capital statute which would be upheld by the Supreme Court.
No such expectation of imminent review by the United States
Supreme Court existed in New York in 1995. The New York Court of
Appeals will, in all likelihood, be the first and only court to address
the constitutional issues regarding the application of the New York
statute in this century.
The national and local politics regarding capital punishment
changed dramatically between 1976 and 1995, and the effects of these
changes are reflected in the structure of the New York statute. The
New York statute was designed to build in, to the extent the legislature
306 The dispute between Governor Pataki and Bronx Prosecutor Robert Johnson is a
highly publicized example of the different charging practices and the autonomy of local
officials. Johnson refused to charge capital murder in a case involving the killing of a
police officer. Pataki arguedJohnson must be removed to reduce county by county disparities in the application of the New York statute.
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was willing and able to do so, protections for the due process rights of
capital defendants. The statute is structured to preempt protracted
litigation on certain issues which have been exhaustively litigated in
other states or in the federal courts. Further, and most importantly,
the statute is very detailed, with specific provisions on several issues
which have been sharpened by extensive adversarial litigation in the
state and federal courts throughout the 1980's. This by itself is remarkable. There is no other capital legislation which attempts to preempt litigation to this extent. Many of the provisions in this statute
had previously been the subject of highly partisan debate in state and
federal courts, in the state legislatures, and before the United States
Congress.3 0 7 Ironically, however, the specificity of some provisions
may increase the likelihood of litigation, rather than preempt it.
B.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW AND
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

The specificity of the appellate review procedures incorporated
within the 1995 New York statute are unique. This comprehensive
statutory structure, including very detailed rules governing the procedures and substantive aspects of appellate review, means at the very
least that litigation under the statute will be governed by new principles. The Court of Appeals will first be required to address the statutory provisions under review and their effect and purpose. The
legislature's clear intention is that the New York Court of Appeals will
thoroughly review all constitutional issues, both state and federal, in
direct capital appeals.3 0 8
The New York Court of Appeals has a distinguished history and is
known for its independence. The experience of the Proportionality
307 For example, the provision requiring the prosecutor to give notice of the intention
to seek the death penalty was the subject of litigation in NewJersey prior to the Supreme
Court of NewJersey addressing the constitutionality of the death penalty statute as a whole.
See State v. McCrary, 478 A.2d 339 (N.J. 1984). New York addresses this issue by presumably preempting litigation in New York if prosecutors adhere to the time limitations. See
N.Y. CUM. PRoc. LAW § 250.40 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
308 See Governor's Memorandum of Approval of L.1995, c.1 [The Death Penalty].
Constitutional concerns and the infirmities in prior New York State law are fully met
in this bill, which establishes a bifurcated trial procedure and sets forth clear standards
to narrow the scope of the death penalty and guide thejury in determining whether to
impose the death penalty...." As one commentator observed: "In one sense the New
York law is itself a 'constitutional moment.' It might be read as the original MPC
[Model Penal Code] law with constitutional annotations folded into it. Line after line,
the New York law incorporates identifiable post-Furman Supreme Court cases. In its
aim at being proof against constitutional attack, it not only acquires the constitutional
wisdom of the last twenty years; it takes the most 'conservative' and prophylactic view
of constitutional law possible.
Robert Weisberg, The New York Statute as CulturalDocument:Seeking the Morally OptimalDeath
Penalty, 44 BuFF. L REv. 283, 293 (1996).
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Review Project in New Jersey can save the New York Court of Appeals
from time consuming litigation if the court institutes procedures for
maintaining a reliable factual record for proportionality review and
the consideration of other constitutional issues raised by racial and
geographic disparities in capital case processing.
Although no death sentence has been imposed in New York in
1996, there are already indications of disparities in the policies of local prosecutors. At the time of reenactment some New York prosecutors, most notably the District Attorneys in the Bronx and Manhattan,
had gone on record as saying they were not in favor of the reenactment.3 09 The District Attorney from the Bronx, in particular, stated
that his constitutents did not support the death penalty and that he
°
did not intend to seek it.31
309 During the Assembly Debate Mr. Stringer expressed concern about the misuse of the
potential publicity surrounding capital prosecution by prosecutors seeking reelection,
commenting upon the fact that Robert Morganthal, the District Attorney for Manhattan,
was known to be against the death penalty. See N.Y. State Assembly, Death Penalty Debate,
March 6, 1995, at 210 (on file with the State Documents Collection of Northwestern University School of Law). There is now a controversy regarding Governor Pataki's assertion
in December of 1995 that he can remove a District Attorney from a potentially capital case
if that District Attorney decided not to prosecute a case capitally. This raises the new issue
of separation of powers and the autonomy of prosecutors.
The amount and disposition of funds appropriated for the defense of capital cases
became, not surprisingly, both complicated and politically controversial. The Administrative Board of the New York Court of Appeals initially set the rates and requested comments. Differences arose in part because of large discrepancies in fee structures in various
sections of the state. See Daniel Wise, 4 Panels Named for Death Penalty Cases; Assignments
Include Counsel Compensation,N.Y. L.J., Aug. 16, 1995, at 1; Daniel Wise, Panels Split on Legal
Fees in Death Cases: Proposals Vary from $125 to $300for Lead Counsel, N.Y. LJ., November 15,
1995, at 1, 4; Daniel Wise, Comments Generally FavorRatesfor CapitalCounsel N.Y. LJ., March
6, 1996, at 1; and Daniel Wise, Pataki Urges CapitalCases Pay Cu N.Y. LJ., March 13, 1996,
at 1.
310 "Under the statute, prosecutors have the option of seeking the death penalty or life
without parole. The Bronx District Attorney suggested yesterday he would seek the latter.
'The law is that district attorneys have the discretion,' Mr. Johnson said in a short statement." Ian Fisher, DetailedRules on Executions Released by New York State, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 2,
1995, at 1. See also Ellen Yan & Robin Topping, Layers Dread Dealingwith It But.... NEWsDAY, Aug. 31, 1995, at A4:
Nassau and Suffolk district attorneys' offices don't believe more than a few death penalty cases will be handled each year, because of the time and cost. Death penalty cases,
which are appealed automatically, can drag on for years, possibly bankrupting counties and depleting state funds for the defense and prosecution of these cases .... "I'm
really dreading the first case I'm going to have to make the decision on," said [the
Nassau County Prosecutor] .... Like Nassau, the Suffolk District Attorney's Office
has looked up their murder cases for the past few years to determine how many would
have been eligible for the death penalty. About 20 to 25 cases met the criteria, said
DAJames Catterson Jr., and his prosecutors, in an informal survey, said they would be
hard-pressed to recommend the death penalty in even three or four [of those] cases.
In addition, a New York Times article stated that:
Prosecutors are discovering, however, that the state's first death penalty law in more
than two decades, which covers a dozen categories of murder and appears to cast the
widest of nets, is stitched so tightly that even the most heinous of September's murders
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All death sentences will be reviewed by the Court of Appeals, irrespective of whether the defendant requests such a review.31 ' This review cannot be waived by the defendant.3 1 2 A provision allows the
Court to set aside a sentence of death "in the interests of justice,"
which would encompass a variety of injustices at trial or incapacities of
31 3
representation.
The statute specifically provides for the court to consider, upon
written motion, cases in which the death sentence is imposed on the
grounds of improper conduct of ajuror or ajury, or newly discovered
evidence-grounds which are no longer considered sufficient to reopen a case by the federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings. 31 4 The
statute affords the State the opportunity to appeal from a trial judge's
order setting aside the sentence of death, another controversial procedural provision with constitutional implications strongly favoring the
31 5
prosecution.
The statute also contains provisions governing the court's consideration of evidence of racial disparities.3 1 6 The Court of Appeals must
determine whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of any "other arbitrary or legally impermissible factor including whether the imposition of the verdict or sentence was based upon
the race of the defendant or [the race of] a victim of the crime for
may not qualify .... There have been an estimated 65 homicides in New York City
alone since the law took effect, and 26just in Brooklyn-9 over the last weekend-Mr.
Hynes said. So, he added, the absence of capital cases hardly implies that would-be
killers.throughout the state skidded to a halt over the Labor Day weekend.
Jan Hoffman, Death Penalty Law Is Not Easy to Apply, N.Y. TImEs, Sept. 22, 1995, at B2.
311 N.Y. CrM. PROC. LAW §§ 470.30(2), 470.15(2) (c) (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 1996)
(courts can set aside a death sentence which is "unduly harsh or severe" as a corrective
action).
312 Id.
313

Court Set Aside of Death Sentence: Subdivision (d) authorizes the defendant upon
written motion, in cases where a death sentence is imposed to have the sentence set
aside upon any of the grounds set forth in section 330.30 of the Criminal Procedure
Law including newly discovered evidence, improper conduct of ajuror orjurors which
may have affected substantial rights of the defendant and any ground appearing in the
record which, if raised on appeal from a prospective judgement of conviction, would
require a reversal or modification as a matter of law .... In addition to ordering a new
sentencing proceeding, the court may take any corrective action an appellate court
could take upon reversing or modifying a judgment on the grounds at issue in the
motion.
Summary and Description of Provisions: D. Separate Sentencing Proceedings, N.Y. State
Assembly Committee Bill Memorandum-L. 1995, c.1. (available in Historical and Statutory
Notes to N.Y. Coiuiacr. LAw art. 22-B (McKinney Supp. 1996)).
314 § 470.30(3). For an analysis of the most recent Congressional enactments regarding
federal habeas, see Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BuFF. L.
Rv. 381 (1996).
315 § 400.27(11) (d).
316 § 470.30(3) (a).
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which the defendant was convicted." 3 17 And the statute has a proportionality review provision which requires the Court of Appeals to determine whether the sentence of death is "excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases considering
both the crime and the defendant."3 18 The proportionality review
provision additionally provides that the court shall, "upon request of
the defendant... review whether the sentence of death is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases by virtue of
the race of the defendant or a victim of the crime for which the defendant was convicted." 3 19 The presence of two such provisions
means that if the legislature should repeal only the requirement for
proportionality review, there would still be a second provision making
explicit reference to the court's obligation to consider racial disparities in the application of the statute. In other words, the statute
preempts the legislator's removal or limitation of proportionality
review.
The statute establishes that the Court of Appeals, and not another institution, has the authority and responsibility for creating and
maintaining a data base on capital case processing, including the creation of an accurate record of all murders and their disposition
throughout the entire state. 320 The Court of Appeals has broad au3 21 It
thority to set rules and procedures for the review of capital cases.
is noteworthy that the court has not limited its universe of cases to
penalty phase trials.
The fact that the statute refers to statistical evidence implies that
the Court intends to rule on the state constitutional issues based upon
317 Id.
318 § 470.30(3) (b).
319 Id. The court is required to list all similar cases considered in proportionality review.
320 § 211-a. The Court of Appeals set uniform rules for the Trial Courts in capital cases,
effective Feb. 7, 1996. See N.Y. R. U. Trial Cts § 218.1 et seq. These rules include the
requirement of the submission of capital case data reports:
in every criminal action in which the defendant has been indicted for murder in thefirst
degree (P.L. 125.27) including those actions resolved by pleas of guily, to assist the Court of
Appeals in determining whether a particular sentence of death is disproportionate or
excessive in the context of penalties imposed in similar cases.
See CAPrrAL CASE DATA REPORT (available from Counsel's Office, New York Court of Appeals, Albany, N.Y.) (emphasis added).
Proportionality review in New York will necessarily confront county by county disparities perpetuated by different charging policies of prosecutors, different patterns in the
incidence of homicide across jurisdictions and the factors seen in New Jersey and other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Daniel Wise, Prosecutors Want Death Penalty; Qualms Voiced About Costs,
Time, Training of Lauyers, N.Y. LJ., March 3, 1995, at 1; Jan Hoffman, BalancingPersonal

Beliefs and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, at B6. The existence of broad discretion in
their decision to charge capital murder has and will continue to exacerbate county by
county disparities.
321 § 211-a.

1996]

PROPORTIONAITY REVIEW

facts established in a scientifically reliable empirical study of its capital
case processing system, similar to the data and analysis prepared for
the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The court has already committed
to a uniform capital case data report form for systematic data collection. Importantly, the universe of cases is all indictments for first degree murder, whether disposed of by plea or trial. As part of
proportionality review, the court may consider statistical evidence to
determine whether the race of the victim or the race of the defendant
are having a "significant" impact upon the imposition of the death
penalty. The use of the term "significant" implies that the court anticipates a standard multivariate analysis such as that recommended by
the U.S. General Accounting Office.3 22 Such evidence may be based

upon the required data reports submitted and filed with the Court, or
upon evidence independently gathered by the defense. The specific
reference to data independently prepared by the defense implies that
the legislature intended the court to consider all relevant empirical
evidence. The legislative history supports that interpretation.3 23 With
this background, empirical findings are not likely to be ignored or
dissmissed by this court.
These provisions stand in sharp contrast to the proportionality
review provisions of any other state. The reference to the collection
of data on race is not now included in any other state statute. The
New York Court of Appeals called for comments on its proposed rules
very soon after enactment.3 24 Detailed comments on the proposed
rules for data collection and the maintenance of an adequate record
for proportionality review were submitted by attorneys with experience with the implementation of proportionality review in New Jersey
322 See the criteria for research quality specified by the U.S. General Accounting Office:

By quality we mean the strength of the design and the rigor of the analytic technique
that leads to a level of confidence we have in the study findings. We judged a study to
be high quality if it was characterized by a sound design that analyzed homicide cases
throughout the sentencing process; included legally relevant variables (aggravating
and mitigating circumstances); and used statistical analysis techniques to control for
variables that correlate with race and/or capital sentencing.
1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 38, at 3.
323 See Governor's Memorandum of Approval of L. 1995, c.1 [Death Penalty] and N.Y.
State Assembly Committe Bill memorandum L. 1995 [A.4843] issued on March 6, 1995.
324 On July 3, 1995, the Court released Proposed Rules of the Court of Appeals in Capital Cases and Proposed Uniform Procedures for Appeals from Pretrial Findings of Mental
Retardation in Capital Cases. On August 31, 1995, the Court released Proposed Uniform
Rules for the Trial Courts in Capital Cases and Proposed Minimum Standards for Lead
Counsel and Associate Counsel in Capital Cases. On September 15, 1995, the Court released the Proposed Uniform Rules for Capital Case Data Reports and the Capital Case
Data Report Form, with a comment period ending on October 16, 1995. See Richard R.
Zander, Public Information Officer, New York Court of Appeals, Statement Accompanying
Release of Death Penalty Rules for Public Comment (Sept. 15, 1995) (all on file with the State
Documents Collection of Northwestern University School of Law).
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3 25
and other states.

Twenty years ago legislators and lobbyists would not have considered including provisions explicitly stating that the Court of Appeals
can always consider questions "in the interests of justice," or on the
basis of newly discovered evidence of innocence. Prior to the present
holdings of the Supreme Court the assumption would have been that
newly acquired evidence of innocence could always be presented,
even after appeals were completed. However, given the present capital jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, such provisions have become
326
advisable, if not necessary.
The first capital case probably will not reach the New York Court
of Appeals on direct review for at least two or more years. Interlocutory appeals, and even perhaps statistical evidence on the operation of
the capital case processing system in New York may precede the first
direct capital appeal. The Court of Appeals will have the benefit of
the experience in Georgia, NewJersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and
other jurisdictions. Technical advice on systematic case tracking, the
necessity of a clear and concise narrative summary for each case, accessibility to and the appropriate use of the official data set and other
issues have already been the subject of comment. This court will be in
a better position to conduct systematic proportionality review than any
other state high court has been in the past.
In particular, the New York Court of Appeals will benefit greatly
from the expertise of the Proportionality Review Project commissioned by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The Court of Appeals
seems to recognize its responsibility to maintain an adequate record
so that disparities in capital sentencing based upon racial identification and other extra legal factors can be accurately identified and
measured. Without such documentation references to due process
protections by legislators and others are an empty litany, performing
lip service to the appearance, but not the fact, of justice.
VI.

CONCLUSION

State high courts have been the principal interpreters of state
325 Extensive comments were submitted to the court on the form and substance of the
data collection, record keeping, and certification of accuracy and reliability which the
court has a responsibility to undertake. These are preconditions to the systematic analysis
of racial and geographic disparities. Without reliable information on capital cases and
similar cases in which the death penalty was not sought or imposed, the Court cannot
address the constitutional issues. See cases submitted on October 16, 1995 by Professor
David Baldus et al. (comments on proposed rules of the court in capital cases) (on file with
State Documents Collection of Northwestern University School of Law).
326 Concerns for the execution of the innocent were expressed often in the Assembly
Debates. See, e.g., N.Y. Assembly Death Penalty Debate, at 165-75.
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constitutional doctrine in capital jurisprudence since Gregg. Overwhelmingly, these institutions have not been staunch guardians of the
constitutional rights of capital defendants, or so it would seem from
the way in which states have conducted proportionality review. As the
state by state analysis in Appendix A indicates, vast differences exist
among the states on this subject. The national frustration, even rage,
over what is perceived to be an intractable crime problem, and its
association, in the minds of the public, with minorities in large cities,
and the fragility fo courts in the face of political pressure seems to
make courts unwilling to reverse death sentences on grounds of documented racial or geographical disparities. Such documentation,
showing sharp differences in the administration ofjustice with respect
to the death penalty, might well persuade courts of the unconstitutionality of the application of capital punishment within ajurisdiction
if they were actually willing to review it. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey has been the exception. The Court of Appeals in New York now
has the opportunity to follow New Jersey's lead.
In the past few years a few other state supreme courts have also
refused to bow to the public's demand for vengeance. Too often,
however, it appears that, for the overwhelmingly white and middle
class members of the judiciary, young men, many of them minorities,
who have committed murder are the problem, not an allegedly discriminatory criminal justice system. And when, in jurisdiction after
jurisdiction, an innocent person is found to have been sentenced to
death, it has little or no impact upon the criminaljustice system in the
state. That an innocent person has been found to be sentenced to
death might in another era provoke a reaction of public outrage, but
in this period the public and the courts do not seem surprised.
Certainly the large number of people on death row, as well as the
sharp increase in the death row population in the period 1984 to
1996, has influenced the public, the judiciary, and the administration
of criminal justice. For the remainder of this century state high
courts, and legislatures will be the legal institutions with the primary
responsibility of protecting the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. These institutions, though they are beset by political pressures, by changing demographics, and by large and unwieldy
caseloads, will, hopefully, create a jurisprudence which they and we
can respect and recognize as principled.
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A

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN THE INDIVIDUAL STATES

Alabama
Both the intermediate appellate court and the state supreme
court are required to perform proportionality review. The requirement was imposed by the Alabama high court in Beck v. State.3 27 The
Alabama legislature subsequently adopted a statutory requirement
which codified the proportionality review procedures established by
3 28
the court in that case.
Beck remains the leading case on proportionality review in Alabama. In Beck the court provided extensive documentation of the legislative history and application of the death penalty in Alabama from
the time prior to the Civil War to the present. 32 9 On its own initiative
the court examined fifty post-Furman cases in which the death sentence had been imposed.3 3 0 The Beck opinion included statistics documenting the race of the defendant and victim for the persons on
death row at the time of Furmanand listed the offenses for which the
defendants had been sentenced to death.3 3 1
In Beck the court examined system wide racial disparities in capital sentencing post-Furman within the context of proportionality review, under the rubric of inquiring whether similar crimes were being
punished capitally. Racial disparities in capital case processing were
considered part of proportionality review because these disparities
suggested that defendants who committed similar crimes received dissimilar sentences. Although the court in Beck only included statistics
on other cases which resulted in the death sentence being imposed,
the court's repeated references to similar cases and its explicit reference to the sentence of a codefendant both imply that the court
327 396 So. 2d 645 (1980).
To insure that sentences of death will not be arbitrarily and capriciously imposed, we
hold that both the Court of Criminal Appeals and this Court should examine all death
sentences in light of the standards and procedure approved in Gregg. Each death
sentence should be reviewed to ascertain whether the crime was in fact one properly
punishable by death, whether similar crimes throughout the state are being punished

capitally and whether the sentence of death is appropriate in relation to the particular
defendant. In making this final determination, the courts should examine the penalty
imposed upon the defendant in relation to that imposed upon his accomplices, if any.
Id. at 664 (Ala. 1980).
328 CompareBeck, 396 So. 2d at 664, with AlA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b) (Michie 1982) (codifying the proportionality review procedures set out in Beck).
329 Beck, 396 So. 2d at 648-55.
330 "We researched independently the convictions for which a sentence of death was
imposed under Alabama's present Death Penalty Statute, and we also used information
furnished by the parties at our request." Id. at 654, n.5.
331 Id. at 653-54.
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would consider in an appropriate case data on non death sentences as
part of proportionality review. 332 The court also implied that it would

consider evidence concerning system wide discrimination based upon
race of the defendant or victim within the context of proportionality
review if such evidence were presented to them.333
Since Beck, the court has not overturned any death sentence on
grounds of disproportionality.33 4 Nor has the court readdressed issues
concerning system wide race effects in the Alabama capital punishment system since Beck. Proportionality review has been perfunctory
3 35
and conclusory.
Arizona

Arizona no longer conducts proportionality review.3 36 The Arizona Supreme Court formerly conducted proportionality review pursuant to a general mandate from the legislature to correct sentences
where the punishment imposed is greater than the circumstances of
332

The procedure we adopt requires that the reviewing court examine cases in which the
death penalty is imposed and ascertain that the death penalty is imposed with some
uniformity and that its imposition is not substantially out of line with sentences imposed for other acts. In other words, the reviewing court should not affirm a death
sentence unless the death penalty is being imposed generally in similar cases throughout the state.
Id. at 664.
333 "We were especially interested in determining whether racial discrimination may
have been present." Id at 652. In DeBrue v. Stat 651 So. 2d 624 (Ala. 1994), the supreme
court referred to the trial court's denial of defendant's "motion to preclude the death on
the grounds of racial discrimination for discovery," id at 628, as an attempt to raise the
issue of the disproportionate sentencing of blacks to death. The district attorney countered the defendant's motion by stating that there had been 15 whites sentenced to death
in the county compared to four blacks. Id
334 See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 542 So. 2d 1286 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
335 See, e.g., Gentry v. State, No. CR-92-0409, 1994 WL 529410, at *18 (Ala. Crim. App.
Sept. 30, 1994) ("[S]imilar crimes are being punished capitally throughout this state ....
considering the premeditated, vicious, and unnecessarily tortuous nature of the crime
committed and considering the appellant, we find that the sentence of death is neither
excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases." Id). This was the
extent of the proportionality analysis. In other cases the court has simply concluded that
the sentence of death was neither excessive nor disproportionate. E.g., ExparteRieber, 663
So. 2d 999, 1015 (Ala. 1995); ExparteDeBruce, 651 So. 2d 624, 635 (Ala. 1994) (not "disproportionate to the penalty imposed in other robbery-intentional killing cases"); Exparte
Williams, 627 So. 2d 999, 1005 (Ala. 1993).
336 State v. Salazar, 844 P.2d 566, 583-84 (Ariz. 1992). Accord State v. Bolton, 896 P.2d
830, 856 (Ariz. 1995); State v. Hinchey, 890 P.2d 602, 605 (Ariz. 1995); State v. Ross, 886
P.2d 1354, 1358 (Ariz. 1994). Previously, the court held that it was inappropriate for the
trial court to consider sentences imposed in other cases when sentencing a defendant. See
State v. Greenway, 828 P.2d 22, 38 (Ariz. 1991). But see State v. White, 815 P.2d 869, 882-83
(Ariz. 1991) (discussing whether the death penalty is disproportionately applied to men
and women).
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the case warrant.3 3 7 There was never a statutory requirement to conduct proportionality review. The Arizona Supreme Court established
3 38
proportionality review itself and then abolished it after Pulley.

In defining similar cases, the Arizona Supreme Court formerly
considered the aggravating circumstances and the similarity of the circumstances of the offense, as well as characteristics of the defendant
which might serve as mitigating factors.33 9 The proportionality re337 The court established proportionality review in State v. Richman, 560 P.2d 41, 51
(Ariz. 1976) (citing statutory provisions). The Arizona Supreme Court said that as part of
its review of capital cases the court found it necessary to determine whether the sentence
of death is "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." Id. (citing Gregg v. State, 220 S.E.2d 659 (Ga.
1974), affd, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
338 Justice Corcoran argued against the continued use of proportionality review and set
forth its history in the state. See State v. White, 815 P.2d 869, 866 (Ariz. 1991) (Corcoran,
J., concurring). In Salazar, the court commented that the composition of the court had
changed and since the court was examining its own rules, and not the interpretation or
application of a statutory or constitutional interpretation, the court had "more latitude in
reexamining earlier precedent." Salazar,844 P.2d at 583. A concurring Justice Martone
stated:
It is also clear that the practice of proportionality reviews in death penalty cases had its
origin in the mistaken notion that because some other state's statute required them,
so did the United States Constitution. Pulley v. Harrisput that erroneous notion to
rest .... Our cases reveal that proportionality reviews are judicial afterthoughts, mere
appendages to already lengthy opinions. They are performed in a non-adversarial
setting, without any pretense at real science. They require a court to engage in the
alchemy of measuring degrees of depravity among a handful of selected cases. The
pursuit ofjustice does not require us to engage in unauthorized false science.
Salazar, 844 P.2d 566, 584-85 (1992) (Martone, J., concurring) (citation omitted). The
dissent replied that:
Implicit in this, I fear, is the idea that death penalty jurisprudence is some form of
.real science" and that, in deciding who should live and who should die, courts do not
.engage in the alchemy of measuring degrees of depravity" .... Proportionality review
is simply another form of comparison entailing no more "alchemy" than the rest of
our capital jurisprudence. It is a tool by which the court can compare and remedy
injustice when, as, and if it is perceived. It is wrong to discard this tool, especially ifwe
do so under the illusion that we will thereby return to some scientific method of capital punishment. We are not smart enough to know the answer to the age-old question
of who should live. It is one that can be correctly answered only with divine knowledge of proportionality and purpose. Because we must stumble on with human intelligence, we should use every tool in our possession to hold error and injustice to a
minimum.
Id. at 585-86 (Feldman, CJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
339 The court described its decision making process as follows:
Based on our review of other decisions of this court, we believe that the circumstances
of this murder indicate it is above the norm of first degree murders and that the
defendant is above the norm of other first degree murderers. Therefore, we find that
the imposition of the death penalty is proportional to the penalties imposed in similar
cases.
State v. Castaneda, 724 P.2d 1, 14-15 (Ariz. 1986) (citation omitted). For example, the
court defined as similar cases those in which a defendant abducted, sexually assaulted and
strangled a child. The court cited to four death sentences and to six other cases where the
death sentence had been reduced to a life sentence, primarily because of mitigating circumstances regarding the defendant. Id. at 15.
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views previously conducted were not always perfunctory.3 40 The universe of cases seems to have included cases where a death sentence
was reduced to life imprisonment, in addition to other death
sentences. 34 ' The Arizona Supreme Court never overturned a death
sentence because of disproportionality. However, since State v. Salazar,
Arizona has conducted one proportionality analysis without calling it
such.3 42

Arkansas

Arkansas does not require proportionality review by statute.343
The Arkansas supreme court, however, made proportionality review
4 The pool of comparison cases is
mandatory in Sheridan v. State.3
3 45
appeals.
other death sentence
California

The California capital punishment statute has never included a
provision for proportionality review. It was challenged on that basis
and upheld in Pulley v. Harris. Although it is not required, the court
on its own initiative conducts intracase proportionality review. 34 6 In340 See, e.g., State v. Cook, 821 P.2d 731, 756 (Ariz. 1991). However, the court did not
always perform a review. See State v. Rossi, 830 P.2d 797 (Ariz. 1992). In State v. Brewer, 826
P.2d 783 (Ariz. 1992), the majority opinion did not perform a proportionality review while
a concurring opinion conducted a thorough review.
341 "In conducting this review, we have considered those cases involving the presence of
one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to
call for leniency .... We also have considered those cases where a [death] sentence has
been reduced to life imprisonment." State v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 232, 240 (Ariz. 1983).
342 See State v. Willoughby, 892 P.2d 1319, 1338 (Ariz. 1995) (comparing two cases in
evaluating the quality of the aggravating factor of murder for pecuniary gain). Arizona
does independently consider and weigh aggravating and mitigating evidence in every
death case. See State v. West, 862 P.2d 192, 215 (Ariz. 1993).
343 The Arkansas Supreme Court is only required to conduct a harmless error review of
the defendant's death sentence, determining that the remaining aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt and that theyjustify a sentence of death beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the Arkansas Supreme Court concludes that the erroneous finding of
any aggravating circumstances by the jury would not have changed the jury's decisions to
impose the death penalty, a simple majority of the court may vote to affirm. Aim CODE
ANN. § 5-4-603(d) (Michie 1994).
344 852 S.W.2d 772, 780 (Ark. 1993) ("Finally, we undertake a 'proportionality review' of
[the defendant's] case which we have made a requirement under Arkansas lawv... to
insure that the sentence is not imposed in a freakish, capricious, or whimsical manner.").
345 The defendant's position was that the universe of cases should be all capital and first
degree murder cases occurring after July 3, 1989, charged as 'premeditated or deliberated.' Id. The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected this position, stating that the court would
"only compare death sentence appeals to other death sentence appeals. To do otherwise
would be to compare apples to oranges." Id.
346 See People v. Champion, 891 P.2d 93, 136 n.35 (Cal. 1995); People v. Webb, 862 P.2d
779, 806 (Cal. 1993) (considering whether death penalty is disproportionate to defendant's relative culpability); People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099, 1156 (Cal. 1993).
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tracase proportionality review compares the death sentence under review to the sentences of codefendants in the same case. In one
appellate level case the trial court conducted an intercase proportionality review, and the higher appellate court said that this was an error,
and remanded for reconsideration "based solely on the evidence
presented to the penalty jury."3 47
Colorado
The Colorado statute does not require proportionality review,
and thus, it is not conducted by the court.3 48 The court does use proportionality review for life sentences, however.3 4 9 In 1990 the Colorado Supreme Court rejected a claim under the state constitution that
the death penalty was disproportionately imposed upon the poor, on
blacks and on members of unpopular groups on the basis that the
defendant did not present any data proving that contention. 35 °
Connecticut
Connecticut has a standard proportionality review provision, using a slight variant of the language in Gregg.351 In the first case in
which the court considered federal and state constitutional challenges
to the statute, the court reversed the death sentences imposed and
upheld the constitutionality of the statute on its face, based upon fed352
eral and state constitutional principles.
Delaware
Delaware requires proportionality review by statute. 35 3 Although
347 People v. Crew, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 756 (Cal Ct. App. 1991).
348 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 1963). The original statute was repealed as
reenacted by Act of Sept. 20, 1991, ch.4, 1991 Colo. Sess. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 8, and amended
further in 1993, 1994, and 1995.
349 People v. Valenzuela, 856 P.2d 805, 809 (Colo. 1993). The Supreme Court of Colo-

rado is required to review the "propriety of [the death] sentence, having regard to the
nature of the offense, the character and record of the offender, the public interest, and the
manner in which the sentence was imposed, including the sufficiency and accuracy of the
information in which it was based." People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 174 (Colo. 1990).
350 Id.
351 "[Tjhe sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases considering both the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the
defendant." CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 53a-46(b) (s) (West 1994). The proportionality review provision was enacted in 1980. 1980 Conn. Acts 80-332 (addressing the entire issue of
appellate review in capital cases). See also State v. Cobb. 663 A.2d 948, 954 (Conn. 1995)
(citing the HouseJudiciary Committee Chairman as saying that appellate procedures were
enacted in 1980 to put the existing capital statute in compliance with federal constitutional
standards). The first death sentence to reach the court did not address the state of federal
constitutional issues. See State v. Breton, 562 A.2d 1060 (Conn. 1989).
352 State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318 (Conn. 1994). See supraPart III.C.
353 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g) (2) (a) (Michie 1995). The supreme court shall
determine whether the death penalty was "disproportionate to the penalty recommended
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the Delaware Supreme Court has defined its universe as all convictions for capital murder, the court only compares the death sentence
under review with "those other first degree murder cases that have
arisen under our statute and in which a statutory aggravating circumstance was found by ajury."3 Effective November 4, 1991, the Delaware legislature changed the
Delaware capital sentencing scheme in several important ways, some
of which had an ancillary effect upon proportionality review.3 5 5 Prior
to 1991, the jury was required to vote unanimously for a death penalty.
Subsequent to the 1991 amendment, in order to impose the death
penalty the jury is only required to answer two questions: whether
there is at least one aggravating circumstance found beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. Thejury is required to report its final vote to the court on
each question. The court then decides whether to impose the death
penalty. The statute relieves jurors from the responsibility of making
the decision to impose the death sentence, following the Proffitt v.
FKoidamodel. 3 56 The purpose of this amendment was, presumably, to
make it easier to impose the death sentence, on an assumption that a
judge would be more likely to impose a death sentence than a jury.
One result of this statutory change has been a change in the universe of cases the Delaware Supreme Court considers when conducting proportionality review. Immediately after the 1991
amendment, these cases consisted of "those First Degree Murder
cases since 1985 which have gone to a penalty hearing and where the
sentence has become final, either without or following review by this
Court."3 57 In Gattis v. State,358 the court listed all first degree murder
or imposed in similar cases .... " Id. For a discussion of the methodology, see Red Dog v.
State, 616 A.2d 298 (Del. 1992).
354 Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 602 (Del. 1985). The court did not describe its
process:

We have made the appropriate proportionality review and find, after careful consideration, that the imposition of the death penalty on Deputy was not disproportionateto the

penalty recommended or imposed in those otherfirst degree murder cases that have arisen under
our statute and in which a statutory aggravatingcircumstance was found by the jury ....
Deputy, like the other defendants in Delaware who have been sentenced to the death
penalty under 11 Del.C. sec. 4209, was found guilty of an "unprovoked, cold blooded
murder of [two] helpless [persons] committed upon victims lacking the ability to defend themselves and solely for pecuniary gain .... "
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
355 See Act of November 4, 1991, ch. 189, 1991 Del. Laws 689 (amending DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 11, § 4209).
356 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976). The trial court judge is required to impose the death
penalty on all first-degree murderers for whom the statutory aggravating statutory factors
outweigh the mitigating factors. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (2).
357 Wright v. State, 633 A.2d 329, 342 (Del 1993) (citing Red Dog 616 A.2d at 311).
Since the revision of the death penalty procedure in 1991, the jury's determination is
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cases that went to penalty phase from 1985 to date, and considered
cases from both before and after the 1991 statutory alteration for its
proportionality review, "since all such cases are pertinent to the proportionality analysis."3 59
Beginning with Lawrie v. State,36 0 however, this universe of cases
changed. In Lawrie, the court adopted a different standard for simi36
larity based upon the changes introduced by the 1991 amendment. '
The applicable universe of cases then became: "those First Degree
Murder cases governed by the 1991 amendment to the death penalty
statute which have continued to a penalty hearing and where the sentence has become final." In Weeks v. State,362 the court held that the
different manner of sentencing by definition made the cases before
and after the amendment dissimilar, irrespective of other considerations. 3 63 As of Weeks, the court also stopped including a list of similar
cases. 364 The court has, however, reviewed the sentencing determination in cases where the defendants received life imprisonment rather
3 65
than death.
no longer conclusive. However, pre-1991 death penalty cases involving jury determination are nevertheless pertinent to the proportionality determination since those
cases do reflect a jury consensus on the appropriateness of imposing the death penalty. More importantly, in all cases in which the death sentence was imposed, this
court conducted proportionality review.
Id. at 342 n.21.
358 637 A.2d 808 (Del. 1994).
359 Id. at 822-23.
360 643 A.2d 1336 (Del. 1994).
361

Although the significant 1991 changes in the statutory scheme create a significant
dissimilarity between the pre-1991 cases and the post-1991 cases in the universe, pre1991 jury decisions are nevertheless "pertinent" to our proportionality analysis ....
the Chao, Liu, and Fleming [similar cases where only life sentences were issued], while
"pertinent," are clearly distinguishable from the instant case because they were decided under the significantly dissimilar statutory scheme which requires a unanimous
jury verdict to impose the death penalty.
Id. at 1350.
362 653 A-2d 266 (Del. 1995).
363

The pre-1991 cases required a unanimous jury verdict to impose the death penalty. In
the post-1991 cases, it is the trial judge who has the final responsibility for sentencing,
and the jury's recommendation need not be unanimous. As a result, we held that the
pre-1991 cases "are not similar cases arising under this section. Thus, while pertinent,
they are not dispositive ...."
Id. at 273 (quoting Lawrie, 643 A.2d at 1350). This procedure was upheld as constitutional
in Shelton v. State, 652 A.2d 1, 6-7 (Del. 1995). The evidentiary standard for the jury's
decision weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors is only by a preponderance, and
that has also been upheld against a constitutional challenge. State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846,
851 (Del. 1992).
364 See, e.g., Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808, 823-24 (Del. 1994); Wright v. State, 633 A.2d
329, 344-45 (Del. 1993).
365 Weeks, 653 A.2d at 274-75. "Although a 'definitive comparison of the universe of
cases is almost impossible,' this Court has relied upon the factual background of relevant
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The Delaware Supreme Court has not overturned any death
sentences for reasons of disproportionality, nor have there been any

published empirical studies of the Delaware capital punishment system. For a state with a small death row population, Delaware has had
a relatively large number of executions.3 66
F/ofida

There is no statutory requirement for proportionality review in
Florida. 367 However, the Florida Supreme Court conducts proportionality review on its own initiative. When it does, the universe of
cases it examines is other verdicts of death.368 The Florida Supreme
Court does not document or explain its procedures for conducting
proportionality review. 369 In overturning a 1986 death sentence as
disproportionate, the court cited to two earlier, allegedly similar cases
in which the death sentence was overturned as disproportionate. 37 0
cases to determine the proportionality of a sentence." Outten v. State, 650 A.2d 1291, 1301
(Del. 1994) (citing Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1376-77 (Del. 1992)). See also Shelton v.
State, 652 A.2d 1 (Del. 1995). The court also analyzes "intentions,'expectations, and actions" to determine whether a defendant's culpability level is sufficient to justify capital
punishment under a proportionality analysis. Outten, 650 A.2d at 1301 (citing Lawrie 643
A.2d at 1349).
366 See supra table 1.
367 The capital statute requires a general review by the state supreme court within 60
days after certification. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West 1996).
368 In two recent cases, the sentencing order did not provide a sufficiently reasoned
analysis for meaningful proportionality review, and the cases were remanded. See Larkins
v. State, 655 So. 2d 95, 101 (Fla. 1995); Crump v. State, 654 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1995). See
also Scott v. State, 657 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1995) (considering proportionality issue on remand). In a case where the defendant tried to raise proportionality for a second time on
appeal because there was new evidence of mitigation not considered at trial, the court said
that the claim was procedurally barred. Rose v. State, 617 So. 2d 291, 297 (Ha. 1993). In
Farrv. Stat4 the court considered its obligation when the defendant refused to challenge
his death sentence and consequently the record was so deficient that a proportionality
analysis, required absolutely by the Florida Constitution, could not be carried out. 565 So.
2d 448, 450 (Fla. 1995). In Johnson v. Singletay, proportionality was brought up in a concurring opinion without being raised by the defense. 612 So. 2d 575, 577-81 (Fla. 1993)
(Kogan, J., concurring).
369 See, e.g., Garciav. State, where the court merely stated: "We have conducted a comparative proportionality review of appellant's death penalty and we are satisfied that the sentence is not disproportionate to the crime or to the death sentences that we have approved
or disapproved statewide." 492 So. 2d 360, 368 (Fla. 1986). The nature of the Florida
Supreme Court's proportionality review is difficult to determine. See Neil Skene, Review of
Capital Cases: Does the FloridaSupreme CourtKnow What It's Doing?, 15 STSON L. REV. 263,
296 (1986); Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the DeathPenalty: TheFloridaExperience, 95 HI-tv. L. REv. 456 (1981) (discussing racial bias in Florida's proportionality
review).
370 See Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019, 1023 (Fla. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Ross v.
State, 474 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1985); Blair v. State, 406 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1981)). In other
words, the pool of similar cases consisted of other death sentences that had been declared
disproportionate. A dissenter, on the other hand, distinguished the two earlier cases because in those cases the court had reassessed the mitigating factors and found the death
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Because there are so many death sentences the Florida Supreme
Court can compare, there is often considerable discussion of propor3 71
tionality review.
The Florida capital punishment scheme contains a statutory provision giving the trial court judge the power to override the jury's verdict in capital cases.3 72 Cases in which the judge imposed a death
sentence after overriding the jury's recommendation of life are particularly likely to have the sentence overturned by the Florida Supreme
Court. In the opinion of at least one commentator these reversals of
jury overrides are essentially indistinguishable from reversals on
3 73
grounds of disproportionality.
sentence disproportionate on that ground. Id. at 1024 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
371 Cases with relatively extensive analysis of proportionality before upholding the death
sentence as proportionate include Hunterv. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1995); Bogle v. State,
655 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1995);Jonesv. State, 652 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1995); Heny v. State, 649 So.
2d 1366 (Fla. 1994); Pietriv. State, 644 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1994); Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d
730 (Fla. 1994) (holding that the death penalty is not disproportionate where the defendant is the shooter despite a codefendant receiving a lesser sentence); Smith v. State, 641 So.
2d 1319 (Fla. 1994); Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994); Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d
361 (Fla. 1994) (holding that a codefendant's sentence may be relevant to proportionality
analysis where the codefendant is equally or more culpable); Hannon v. Stae 638 So. 2d 39
(Fla. 1994) (ruling that death sentence is not disproportionate when a less culpable codefendant receives a lighter punishment); Lindsey v. State, 636 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1994);
Mordenti v. State, 630 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1994); Arbeiaez v. State, 626 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1993);
Sochorv. State, 619 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1993); Duncan v. State, 619 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1993); Hallv.
State, 614 So. 2d 473, 479-82 (Fla. 1993) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (disagreeing due to the
defendant's mental retardation); Clark v. State, 613 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1992).
Cases with cursory analysis include Gamble v. State; 659 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1995); Windom
v. State, 656 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1995); Lowe v. State 650 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1994); Heny v. State,
649 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1994); Whitton v. State, 649 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1994); Thompson v. State,
648 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1994);Jones v. State 648 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1994); Davis v. State, 648 So.
2d 107 (Fla. 1994); Pittman v. State, 646 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1994); Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d
1336 (Fla. 1994); Green v. State, 641 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1994); Derrick v. State 641 So. 2d 378
(Fla. 1994); Parkerv.Stae; 641 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1994); Griffin v. State 639 So. 2d 966 (Fla.
1994); Rhodes v. State, 638 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1994); Street v. State, 636 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 1994);
Fergusonv. Singletary, 632 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1993) (stating that no mention of a proportionality analysis in a written opinion does not mean that one was not conducted); Atwater v.
State, 626 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1993); Garcia v. State, 622 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1993); Trepal v.
State, 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993); Stewart v. State, 620 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1993); Slawson v.
State, 619 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1993) (performing proportionality analysis voluntarily even
though defendant did not raise proportionality claim); Thomas v. State, 618 So. 2d 155 (Fla.
1993); Lucas v. State, 613 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1993); Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1992).
372 FLA. STAT. ANN § 921.141(3) (West 1996). If the judge overrides the jury's recommendation of life and substitutes a death sentence, the judge must set forth in writing the
finding on which the sentence of death is based. This includes a finding that sufficient
aggravating circumstances exist and that mitigating circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
373 See Michael Mello, The Jurisdictionto Do Justice: Florida'sJury Overrideand the State Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L REv. 923 (1991) (providing data on 134 cases in which a death
sentence was imposed after the jury recommended a life sentence); Michael Radelet &
Michael Mello, Death-to-Life Overrides: Saving the Resources of the FloridaSupreme Court, 20 FLA.
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Florida has one of the largest death row populations, and it has
been one of the states leading in executions.3 7 4 Florida has also been
a state where a great deal of empirical work has been done of the
application of the death penalty. Proportionality review by the Florida
Supreme Court has resulted in overturning at least ten death
sentences in Florida. 75
Georgia
The Georgia proportionality review process was notjust cited with
approval in Gregg, it became a model for many other states.3 76 Because
the Georgia proportionality review provision was the subject of such
favorable attention by the Supreme Court, the applications of that
proportionality review provision and other state court appellate procedures in Georgia have been of considerable interest both to research3 77
ers and to other state supreme courts.

ST. U. L. REv. 195 (1992). The Florida Supreme Court has reversed ajudge's imposition of

the death sentence after a jury recommended a life sentence in a total of 65 cases. In
another 11 cases in which the judge exercised the override provision to sentence the defendant to death after the jury recommended life, the Florida Supreme Court reversed
both the guilt phase and the penalty phase verdicts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
the death sentence in 29 other cases in which the judge exercised the override provision
and sentenced the defendant to death. These 127 cases of death sentences imposed by a
judge after the jury recommended life compose approximately one-sixth of all the death
sentences imposed in Florida. See also Michael Radelet & Glenn Pierce, Choosing Those Who
Will Die: Race and the Death Penalty in Florida,43 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1991).

See supra table 1.
See Steven Sprenger, Note, A CriticalEvaluation of State Supreme Court Proportionality
Review in Death Sentence Cases, 73 IowA L. Rxv. 719, 738 n.61 (1988) (identifying 10 death
sentences that had been overturned in Florida through 1987). See also Besaraba v. State,
656 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1995); Chaky v. State, 651 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1995); Morgan v. State,
639 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1994); Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1994) (discussing gender
equality in death penalty sentencing); Santos v. State, 629 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1994); Knowles
v. State, 632 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1993); Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1993); Deangelo v.
State, 616 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1993); White v. State, 616 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1993).
376 Gregg v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (affirming lower court's holding that
death sentence imposed for armed robbery was disproportionate). The capital punishment scheme in Georgia has been the subject of a number of empirical studies since Gregg.
The work of Professor Baldus and his colleagues is the most systematic and extensive. It
includes an analysis of several different data sets covering different periods. See DAVID C.
BADus ET Ai., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENaL-ny (1990). See also Arnold Barnett,
Some DistributionPatternsfor the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1327 (1985);
Ursulla Bentele, The Death Penalty in Georgia: Still Arbitrary, 62 WASH. U. LQ. 573 (1985);
WiliamJ. Bowers, The Pervasiveness ofArbitrarinessand DiscriminationUnderPost-FurmanCapital Statutes, 74 J. Cam. L & CRIMrNOLOCy 1067 (1983); William J. Bowers & Glenn L
Pierce, Arbitrariness and DiscriminationUnder Post-Furman CapitalStatutes, 26 CmiE & DELINQ. 563 (1980); George E. Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO. LJ.
97 (1979); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patternsof Death:An Analysis of RacialDisparities in CapitalSentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27 (1984).
377 Se, e.g., Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 655 (Ala. 1981) (citing Gregg); Tichnell v. State,
468 A.2d 1, 13 (Md. 1983) (same).
374
375
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Initially, the Georgia Supreme Court overturned some death
sentences as disproportionate.3 7 8 The court reversed one death sentence on grounds of proportionality before the United States
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Gregg. 79 When death
sentences were not found disproportionate, the court has included an
appendix of similar cases, including life verdicts.3 8 0 In 1984, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Georgia Supreme Court did not need to
consider life sentences in proportionality review.3 8 1 These appendices
have since become increasingly perfunctory.38 2 In recent cases the
court has discussed how comparisons are made or the criteria applied.3 8 3 Recently, the Georgia Supreme Court has not overturned
38 4
any death sentences as disproportionate.
Idaho
Proportionality review was not included in Idaho's original capi378 See, e.g., Hall v. State, 244 S.E.2d 833, 839 (Ga. 1978).
379 In Coley v. State, the court stated that where prior cases indicate that the past practice
amongjuries faced with similar fact situations has been to impose a life sentence, the court
has no alternative but to set aside the sentence of death. 204 S.E.2d 612, 616-617 (Ga.
1974).
380 E.g., Moore v. State, 213 S.E.2d 829 (Ga. 1975). In Moore, the court included as an
appendix cases of robbery-murder in which the defendant was sentenced to life and indicated that it had compared the death sentence under review with those cases:
We find that the sentence of death in this case is not excessive or disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
Notwithstanding the fact that there have been cases in which robbery victims were
murdered and the juries imposed life sentences .... the cited cases show that juries
faced with similar factual situations have imposed death sentences.
Id. at 833 (citations omitted).
381 See Cape v. Francis, 741 F.2d 1287, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 1984).
382 See, e.g., McMichen v. State, 458 S.E.2d 833, 847 (Ga. 1995) (containing appendix
which cites to eight presumably similar cases without indicating whether they involve life
sentences, death sentences, or other reasons for their selection).
383 See, e.g., Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989). See alsoMcMichen, 458 S.E.2d at
847 (reaffirming that the method by which the court conducts proportionality review is
constitutionally sound); Crowe v. State, 458 S.E.2d 799, 813 (Ga. 1995); Mobley v. State,
455 S.E.2d 61, 71 (Ga. 1995); Drane v. State, 455 S.E.2d 27, 33 (Ca. 1995) (rejecting defendant's allegation of disproportionality); Hittson v. State, 449 S.E.2d 586, 596 (Ga. 1994);
Bennett v. State, 414 S.E.2d 218, 224 (Ga. 1992) (including and appendix of similar cases).
Intracase proportionality-the comparison of a defendant's death sentence with the
nondeath sentence of a codefendant-has on occasion received more attention. See Hittson, 449 S.E.2d at 594. But see Beck v. State, 340 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. 1986) (holding that defendant's death sentence is not disproportionate to codefendant's life sentence imposed only
because state did not have as strong a case against codefendant).
384 Prior to Pulley v. Harris 465 U.S. 37 (1984), the Eleventh Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to the state supreme court's method of conducting proportionality review.
See Moore v. Balkcom, 716 F.2d 1511, 1525 (11th Cir. 1983). However, it is not the role of
the federal courts to dictate to the state courts the methods of conducting proportionality
review so long as the state supreme court's review and results do not rise to the level of
unconstitutional action. Collins v. Francis, 728 F.2d 1322, 1343 (11th Cir. 1984).
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tal statute enacted in 1973, but was added by amendment in 1977.385
This proportionality review provision mandated that the court refer to
"similar cases that it took into consideration."38 6 In 1994 a statutory
amendment removed the statutory requirement to conduct propor38 7
tionality review.
Immediately prior to the statutory change, a death sentence had
been set aside on grounds of proportionality, perhaps precipitating
the legislative enactment.3 88 The Idaho Supreme Court no longer
conducts proportionality review.38 9 The Supreme Court of Idaho declared two death sentences disproportionate prior to 1994.390
Prior to the statutory change, proportionality review was a broad
based, de novo consideration of a variety of factors.3 9 ' In its first case
addressing proportionality issues the court went back fifty years and
385 IDAHO CODE

§ 19 -282 7 (g) (1977) (repealed 1994).

386 Id. The proportionality review provision requires the trial court to transmit the entire record and transcript to the Supreme Court of Idaho, including "a narrative statement
.... The report may be in the form of a standard questionnaire prepared and supplied by
the Supreme Court of Idaho." Id. § 29-2827(a). "The court shall include in its decision a
reference to those similar cases which it took into consideration." Id. § 29-2827(e). "The
supreme court shall collect and preserve the records of all cases in which the penalty of
death was imposed from and including the year 1975." Id. § 29-2827(g).
387 Act of March 21, 1994, ch. 127, 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 285. The former provision
required the court to determine whether the sentence of death was "disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant."
IDAHO CODE § 19-2827(c) (3) (1987). The amended version only requires the court to consider whether the sentence of death iras imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice
or other arbitrary factor, whether the evidence supports the judge's finding of a statutory
aggravating circumstance, and whether the death sentence is excessive. Id. § 19-2827(c)
(1994).
388 See State v. Pratt, 873 P.2d 800, 824 (Idaho 1993) ("We have compared the nature of
the crime and the nature of the defendant in this case with other similar cases, and we
hold that the death penalty in this case is disproportionate." (citation omitted)). The
court found the case similar to State v. Scroggins, 716 P.2d 1152 (Idaho 1985), the only prior
Idaho case that held a death sentence disproportionate. Pratt, 873 P.2d at 824-25.
389 See, e.g., State v. Sivak, 901 P.2d 494, 500 n.1 (Idaho 1994).
390 See Pratt 873 P.2d at 824; Scroggins, 716 P.2d at 1152. After Scroggins' sentence was
set aside, his codefendant petitioned for a reconsideration on grounds of proportionality.
The court rejected the codefendant's arguments, distinguishing Scroggins' case on the
grounds of that defendant's youth and lack of a prior criminal record. State v. Beam, 766
P.2d 678, 686 (Idaho 1988). There are no published empirical studies of the Idahorcapital
punishment system.
391 These included "(1) the nature of, and motive for, the crime committed; (2) the
heinous nature of the crime; and (3) the nature and character of the defendant," to determine whether the sentence was proportionate andjust. State v. Dunlap, 873 P.2d 784, 792
(Idaho 1993). The court also included lists of comparison cases. See, e.g., id. at 792 n.5;
Prat, 873 P.2d at 824 n.12; State v. Wells, 864 P.2d 1128, 1125 n.3 (Idaho 1993); State v.
Hoffman, 851 P.2d 934, 943-44 (Idaho 1993) (also comparing defendant's sentence with
that of codefendant). In considering similar cases, the court considered cases in which a
life sentence was handed down as well as other deatlksentences. E.g., Dunlap,873 P.2d at
793 (Johnson,J., concurring).
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examined every death sentence imposed in the state since 1921.392
The universe of cases had been "the sentence imposed in other capital
cases where the death penalty was imposed as well as cases in which
the death penalty was not imposed."3 93 The decision not to consider
cases in which the death penalty could have been sought was controversial within the court.3 94 Some members of the court criticized the
395
court's procedures as perfunctory.
The court has not addressed the question of whether removing
the defense of disproportionality from cases in which the offense occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment violates principles of ex post facto.3 96 The Supreme Court did not find itself
obligated to conduct proportionality review after the effective date of
the legislative amendment, even though the offense may have occurred prior to the date of repeal.3 97 The court has chosen not to
392 See State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463-475-76 (Idaho 1983).
393 Wells, 864 P.2d at 1125 (footnotes omitted). In Dunlap, 873 P.2d at 793-800 (John-

son, J., concurring) and Pratt, 873 P.2d at 829-35 (Johnson, J., concurring), Justice Johnson's opinions included appendices of comparison cases containing the case names and
citation, the characteristics of the defendant, the circumstances of the murder, the conviction, and sentence by the trial court, and the disposition by the Idaho Supreme Court or
Court of Appeals. JusticeJohnson described his approach to proportionality review in State
v. Card, 825 P.2d 1081, 1104-15 (Idaho 1991) (Johnson,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
394 "How there can ever be any real proportionality continues to escape me where prosecutors exercise a divine right to reduce the charge and to ask or not ask for the death
penalty, as may at the moment so move them." State v. Stuart, 715 P.2d 833, 872 (Idaho
1985) (Bistine, J., dissenting). See also State v. Aragon, 690 P.2d 293, 314 (Idaho 1984)
(Bistline, J., dissenting in part) ("[p]roportionality will never exist so long as prosecutors
have discretion in charging, and, worse yet, in assuming that it is in their prerogative to
also tell the judge which convicted first degree murderers should die and which should
live").
395

This summary and wholly conclusory disposition of an issue [proportionality review]
which the legislature itself by its mandate deemed highly important did not go unnoticed by counsel for [the defendant] ....[The] specific issue presented to us was: "(4)
Whether this Court's proportionality review was incomplete and constitutionally defective as the majority opinion contains no specific reference to particular cases it
examined." Of discussion there is none.
Sivak v. State, 731 P.2d 192, 227 (Idaho 1987) (Bistline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also State v. Bainbridge, 787 P.2d 231, 243 (Idaho 1990) (Bistline, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The majority's response to the statutory mandate was the simple expedient of declaring that 'our review of similar cases involving the
death penalty while necessarily limited by the lack of such cases ... does not reveal the
presence of any particular excessiveness or disproportionality in this particular case.'" (ellipses in original; citation omitted)).
396 This issue was addressed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. See State v. Marshall,
613 A.2d 1059, 1062-63 (N.J. 1992) (Marshall II) (declaring that all pending cases would
be reviewed under preamendment standards).
397 "Because this opinion was released afterJuly 1, 1994, we will not review whether the
sentence of death as applied to Sivak was disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases." State v. Sivak, 901 P.2d 494, 500 n.1 (Idaho 1995) (affirming death sentence).
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consider proportionality under excessiveness, instead holding that
"excessiveness" has no meaning absent proportionality.3 98
Illinois
Comparative proportionality review is no longer required in Illinois, and the capital sentencing scheme in Illinois has survived a constitutional challenge on that basis. The Illinois Supreme Court
discontinued proportionality review after Pulley.3 99 The Illinois high
court will consider issues of proportionality if they are raised in a particular case, and the court continues to conduct a limited intracase
proportionality review. 40 0 Recent cases suggest that such review is
40
generally perfunctory. '

Illinois is noteworthy because the issue of prosecutorial discretion
leading to discrepancies in sentencing arose early on in an unusual
posture and was the basis for a constitutional challenge to the application of the statute before the state high court.40 2 In 1989, a federal
district court vacated a death sentence upheld by the Illinois Supreme
Court on the ground of the system-wide arbitrariness of the applica403
tion of the death penalty without proportionality review.
398

IDAHO CODE § 19-2827(c) (3) [as amended] requires that this Court consider "whether

the sentence of death is excessive." Prior to this amendment, excessiveness was determined under that section by determining whether the penalty in the case before this
Court was "disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both
the crime and the defendant." The elimination of this language has rendered the
term "excessive"... meaningless. We therefore decline to undertake any consideration of "excessiveness" beyond our independent review to determine whether the district court's finding and weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors is supported
by the record.
State v. Fields, 908 P.2d 1211, 1225 (Idaho 1994) (citation omitted).
399 See People v. King, 488 N.E.2d 949 (I1. 1986).
400 See, e.g., People v. Byron, 647 N.E.2d 946, 957-58 (I1. 1995); People v. Palmer, 643
N.E.2d 797, 808 (Ill. 1994); People v. Thompkins, 641 N.E.2d 371, 388-89 (Ill. 1994); People v. Kitchen, 636 N.E.2d 433, 452 (Ill. 1994); People v. Strickland, 609 N.E.2d 1366, 1389
(il. 1992); People v. Pierre, 588 N.E.2d 1159, 1168-69 (ll. 1992). The death penalty was
upheld in all of these cases.
401 People v. Glecker, 411 N.E.2d 849, 856-61 (Ill. 1980). Glecker has been identified as a
case where a death sentence was set aside on the grounds of disproportionality. See Steven
M. Sprenger, Note, A CriticalEvaluation of State Supreme Court ProportionalityReview in Death
Sentence Cases, 73 IowA L. REv. 719, 728 n.82 (1988). Sprenger classifies Illinois as a state
which adopted proportionality review by judicial decree and then repealed it by judicial
decree after Pulley.
402 The argument was that the prosecutor's discretion to wait until sentencing to ask for
the death penalty encroached upon judicial perogatives and violated the doctrine of separation of powers. See People v. Lewis, 473 N.E.2d 901 (Ill. 1984); People v. Silagy, 461
N.E.2d 415 (Ill. 1984); People v. Lewis, 430 N.E.2d 1346 (Ill. 1981); People ex rel. Carey v.
Cousins, 397 N.E.2d 809 (Ill. 1979).
403 Silagy v. Peters, 713 F. Supp. 1246 (C.D. Ill. 1989). The Seventh Circuit reversed,
mentioning that although many death penalty statutes have proportionality review, the
Illinois capital statute has enough procedural safeguards without it. Silagy v. Peters, 643
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Indiana
The Indiana capital statute does not require proportionality review. 40 4 In the Indiana capital punishment scheme, the jury advises
the court on punishment, and the judge can override the jury's recommendation of a life sentence. 40 5 The Indiana capital statute has
been upheld under the federal and state constitutions. 406 For example, challenges based upon the unlimited discretion of the prosecutor
to charge capital murder were unsuccessful. 40 7 The statute was also
upheld against a challenge based upon the absence of proportionality
408
review.
Kansas
Kansas reenacted late, in April of 1994.409 The Kansas capital
statute does not require proportionality review. 410 There have not
been any death sentences imposed in Kansas to date, nor has the
41 1
supreme court considered any aspect of the capital statute.
F.2d 986, 1000-01 (7th Cir. 1990). Other recent cases also say that proportionality is not
required. See, e.g., People v. Mahaffey, 651 N.E.2d 1055, 1071 (Ill. 1995); Palmer, 643
N.E.2d at 808; Thompkins, 641 N.E.2d at 380; People v, Fair, 636 N.E.2d 455, 478 (Ill. 1994);
Kitchen, 636 N.E.2d at 452; People v. Childress, 633 N.E.2d 635, 654 (Ill. 1994); People v.

Tenner, 626 N.E.2d 138, 160 (Ill. 1993) (ruling that illinois has sufficient informationgathering techniques to insure sufficient appellate review); People v. Page, 620 N.E.2d 339,
355 (Ill. 1993); Strickland, 609 N.E.2d at 1389; People v. Johnson, 594 N.E.2d 253, 273 (Il1.
1992).
404 Rather, the statute has a provision stating that one of the grounds for the state high
court overturning a death sentence is if the sentence "is otherwise erroneous." IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-50-2-9(j) (West 1986 & Supp. 1996). A state constitutional provision requiring
that all penalties be proportionate to the nature of the offense has not been interpreted to
require proportionality review. See Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 948 (Ind. 1994). In
1995, the sentence of life without parole became the alternative to the death sentence. Act
of March 15, 1994, P.L. 158, 1994 Ind. Acts 1854. A 1995 amendment provides that execution of the defendant be carried out "not later than one (1) year and one (1) day after the
date the defendant was convicted," and gives the supreme court exclusive jurisdiction to
stay a capital sentence. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(h). This amendment requires the
supreme court to take into account all claims that the conviction or sentence was in violation of the state or federal constitution. Act of Apr. 25, 1995, P.L. 306, 1995 Ind. Acts 4171
(codified as IND. CODE ANN. § 10)(1)(A), (B)).
405 See, e.g., Roark v. State, 644 N.E.2d 565, 572-73 (Ind. 1995).
406 See, e.g., Dillon v. State, 454 N.E.2d 845, 852 (Ind. 1983); Brewer v. State, 417 N.E.2d
889, 901 (Ind.1981).
407 Williams v. State, 430 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ind. 1982).
408 Van Cleave v. State, 517 N.E.2d 356, 373 (Ind. 1987). See also Schiro v. State, 451
N.E.2d 1047, 1052 (Ind. 1983) ("[w]e are confident that through continuous and exclusive
review of [death] cases, no sentence of death will be freakishly or capriciously applied in
Indiana").
409 Act ofJuly 1, 1994, ch. 252, 1994 Kan Sess. Laws 2389.
410 The statute requires the supreme court to consider whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4627(c) (1) (1995).
411 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND, INC. DEATH Row U.SA. (1996).
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Kentucky
The Kentucky Supreme Court conducts proportionality review
pursuant to statute. 4 12 The court has limited its review to a consideration of post-1970 cases where the death penalty was both imposed and
affirmed. 41 3 The court has created special data collection procedures
for the compilation of a factual record on death sentences. 4 14 In
1990, the court rejected a challenge to its proportionality review procedures. 41 5 The court sometimes includes a provocative, conclusory
reference to race. 41 6 The Kentucky Supreme Court has not set aside
any death sentences as a result of proportionality review.4 17 There has
Ky REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.075 (Michie 1990).
See, e.g., Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d 542, 556-57 (Ky. 1994), et, denied,
116 S. Ct. 154 (1995) (incorporating Simmons v. Commonwealth, 746 S.W.2d 393 (Ky.
1988) (listing cases in which the death penalty was imposed after 1969)). The Sanborn
court "conducted an independent review of all the circumstances" and referred to four
additional cases. Id. at 556. See Bussel v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1729 (1995); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 872 (Ky. 1992); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1991); Epperson v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d
835 (Ky. 1990). In addition to looking at similar cases, the court considers the "circumstances" of the instant case to see if they "exceed any minimum justifying capital punishment." Sanborn, 892, S.W.2d at 557. In Perdue v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 148, 169 (Ky.
1995), the court reversed the death sentence, but did not reach the issue of proportionality, noting that nothing in the case itself would preclude Kentucky from again seeking the
death penalty.
414 The court is activley involved in the process of minority cases and establishing a
reliable factual predicate for proportionality review.
The chiefjustice shall assign to an administrative assistant who is an attorney the following duties: (a) To accumulate the records of all felony offenses in which the death
penalty was imposed afterJanuary 1, 1970, or such earlier date as the court may deem
appropriate. (b) To provide the court with whatever extracted information it desires
with respect thereto .... (c) To compile such data as are deemed by the chiefjustice
to be appropriate and relevant...
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.075(6).
415 Sanders v. Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1990). The appellant argued that
he was prejudiced by the inability to gain access to the data collected by the court for
proportionality review and that the court's method of conducting proportionality review
was unconstitutional because the court's restrictive universe did not allow for a determination of whether the death penalty was being applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
The appellant argued further that the proportionality review as conducted by the court
pursuant to the statute was unconstitutional for lack of articulated standards, and that proportionality review does not fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the court. Id. at 41-42.
The court rejected all of these arguments. Id.
416 See Bussel v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Ky. 1994) ("The sentence was not
fixed because he was black or because the victim was white."); Wilson v. Commonwealth,
836 S.W.2d 872, 892 (Ky. 1992) ("The sentence was not fixed because he was black..."). It
is unclear whether the court conducted some sort of analysis or systemwide review of
black/white capital murders and concluded that the death sentence was not imposed on
racial grounds or if the court is simply asserting its opinion as to that matter.
417 See cases annotated under Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 582.075(8) (Michie 1982 & Supp.
1996). The annotation lists eight death sentences which were upheld after proportionality
review and no cases which were reversed. See, e.g., Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d
407 (Ky. 1987) (conducting proportionality review and concluding that the sentence of
412
413
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been extensive empirical work done on the Kentucky capital punish4 18
ment system.
Louisiana
4 19
In Louisiana proportionality review is required by state statute.
The most noteworthy feature of proportionality review in Louisiana is
that this is the only state in which proportionality review is restricted
4 20
to a consideration of cases within the same trial court jurisdiction.
A death sentence will not be disproportionate if it comports with
other death sentences imposed in the particular parish. 42 ' This procedure was formulated by the state high court and is now incorpo-

rated within its rules. 42 2 This unusual feature of the Louisiana rules
death was neither excessive not disproportionate). But see Smith v. Commonwealth, 634
S.W.2d 411, 413-14 (Ky. 1982) (affirming the trial court's refusal to submit aggravating
circumstances to the penalty phase jury on grounds of proportionality). The trial court
apparently recognized the possibility that the death sentence was disproportionate.
418 See Gennaro F. Vito & Thomas J. Keil, Race, Homicide Severity and Application of the
Death Penalty: A Consideration of the Barnett Scale, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 511 (1989); Gennaro F.
Vito & Thomas J. Keil, Capital Sentencing in Kentucky: An Analysis of the Factors Influencing
Decision Making in the Post-GreggPeriod, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOG, 483 (1988); Gennaro
F. Vito & Thomas J. Keil, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: An Analysis of
Post-Gregg Outcomes, Jusr. Q. (forthcoming); Kentucky capital cases are the factual basis for
the analysis in Maria Sandys, Cross-Overs-CapitalJurors Who Change Their Minds about the
Punishment: A Litmus Test For Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. LJ. 1183 (1995).
419 L . CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905.9 (West 1995); State v. Welcome, 458 So. 2d
1235, 1252 (La. 1983) (stating that despite Pulley, proportionality review is still required by
state statute).
420 The State's appellate review procedures are described in Note, Capital Sentencing
Under Supreme Court Rule 28,42 La. L. REv. 1100, 1117-19 (1982). See alsoM. Dwayne Smith,
Patternsof Discrimination in Assessments of the DeathPenalty: The Case of Louisiana, 15J. CrM.
Jusr. 279 (1987);Jason DeParle, A Matter of Life or Death, TIMES PICAYUNE SPECIAL REPORT,
Apr. 7, 1985; M.F. Klemm, The Determinants of Capital Sentencing in Louisiana: 1979-84
(1986) (unpublished dissertation on file with the University of New Orleans).
421 The parish defines the limits of a prosecutor's jurisdiction and is equivalent to a
county. Recent cases indicate that if there is a lack of similar cases in a particularjurisdiction, the Louisiana Supreme Court will examine similar cases in other jurisdictions in order to conduct the proportionality review. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 637 So. 2d 1012, 1031
(La. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 450 (1994); State v. Code, 627 So. 2d 1373, 1387 (La.
1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2775 (1994).
422 LA. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.9 (West 1995). The Louisiana scheme was upheld by the Fifth Circuit in Prejeanv. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091, 1099 (5th Cir. 1984). The
defendant in this case also sought to overturn his death sentence on the ground that Louisiana applied the death sentence in a discriminatory manner with regard to the race of
both the defendant and victim. The court also rejected this contention. Id.
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure requires a proportionality review of all
first degree murder cases afterJanuary 1, 1976 within the district in which the sentence was
imposed .... Parishes, and the judicial districts they compose are individualistic. We
take judicial notice that the political and economic make-up, and educational background of citizens vary from one district to the next. Such characteristics identify a
parish with certain views, beliefs and practices .... Thus, to test whether discriminatory application of Louisiana's valid capital sentencing statutes has been shown... the
statistical base must, at least initially, deal with numbers within the boundaries of the
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eliminates challenges based upon county by county discrepancies and
most challenges based upon prosecutorial discretion at the charging
stage. 4 23 The Louisiana Supreme Court has been criticized for this
decision and may modify its process in the future. 424
Aside from referring to this unusual and controversial aspect of
proportionality review, the Louisiana Supreme Court does not set out
its procedures or precisely designate its universe of cases. In one case
the court seemed to define the set of 'similar case' as cases in which a
mentally retarded defendant had been sentenced to death. 4 25 The
Louisiana. Supreme court has not indicated in any opinion that it engages in systematic data collection or an independent preparation of a
factual record. 42 6 These limitations aside, proportionality review by
this court has not always been a cursory effort. The court makes explicit reference to the race of the defendant and victim in conducting
proportionality review.427 The Louisiana Supreme Court has overturned at least two death sentences on grounds of proportionality,
one in 197942 and one in 1987.429
Maryland
In 1992 the legislature removed the statutory requirement for
proportionality review. 430 Although the present standard requires the
district where the sentence was imposed.
Prejean,743 F.2d at 1101. In fact, the court looked at three cases from two districts outside
of the parish in Prejean's case. See id. at 1099.
423 One of the strongest arguments concerning disproportionality is the argument that a
common, particular kind of murder, for example robbery murder, is treated differently in
different trial courtjurisdictions within a single state. See, e.g., the data on county by county
disparities presented infra Appendix B. The disproportionality is created when the crime
of murder during the course of a robbery, for example, merits one penalty in an urban
jurisdiction and a different penalty in a rural or suburban jurisdiction.
424 See BALDus ar AL., supra note 376, at 299 n.25.
425 State v. Lindsey, 543 So. 2d 886, 907 (La. 1989). The Louisiana Supreme Court
affirmed the death sentence for the defendant who was mentally retarded, noting that it
had affirmed death sentences for retarded defendants several other times. Therefore in
the court's judgment the imposition of the death sentence in this case was not disproportionate. Id. at 907. "This court has affirmed the death sentence where evidence of comparable or more severe retardation was present in the record ..

. ."

Id. Almost as an

afterthought, the court noted that it had also consistently affirmed the death sentence in
other single shot armed robberies. Id.
426 Louisiana Sup. CT. R. 28 § 4(b) requires district attorneys to file a "list of each first
degree murder case tried afterJanuary 1, 1976 in the district in which [the] sentence was
imposed." State v. Scales, 655 So. 2d 1826, 1838 (La. 1995) (finding death sentence proportional to penalty imposed in other cases involving murders committed during perpetration or attempted perpetration of strong-armed robbery in the district since 1976).
427 See, e.g., State v. Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1340 n.15, 1342 n.17 (La. 1990).
428 State v. Sonnier, 380 So. 2d 1, 6-9 (La. 1979).
429 State v. Weiland, 505 So. 2d 702, 708 (La. 1987).
430 MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 414(e) (4) (Michie 1957) was deleted and proportionality
review is no longer mandated as part of the required appellate review. Act of October 1,
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sentence not to have been imposed "under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor," the Maryland courts no
longer conduct proportionality reviews. 43 1 However, in two recent
cases, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals addressed issues sub432
sumed under proportionality in Marshall1.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland formerly conducted proportionality review pursuant to a statute modeled after the statute upheld
in Gregg,433 and the court's first decision involving proportionality review, Tichnell v. State, remains a leading case. 43 4 The discussion in
Tichnell was prescient in identifying issues which were controversial in
other jurisdictions during the next decade. Tichnell held that the universe of cases for proportionality review would be all first degree murder cases in which the State sought the death penalty, whether it was
imposed or not.435 The court was open to considering cases outside
1992, ch. 331, 1992 Md. Laws. 2674. See also Oken v. State, 612 A.2d 258, 283 n.9 (Md.
1992).
431 See Thanos v. State, 622 A.2d 727, 737 (Md. 1993); Bruce v. State, 616 A-2d 392, 411
(Md. 1992). In its last proportionality review, the Maryland high court conducted an extensive analysis before finding the death sentence appealed to be proportionate. Oken, 612
A.2d at 283 (Md. 1992).
432 Brooks v. State, 655 A.2d 1311 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), considers whether "the
duplicate consideration of the underlying felony in both the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases of the appellant's trial does not genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible
defendants, and is contrary to the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment," id. at 1315-16, and "whether the capital sentencing scheme reasonably
justifies the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared with others
found guilty of murder." Id. at 1322.
County by county disparities in prosecutions for capital murder were considered in
Richardsonv. State, 598 A.2d I (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). "[A] defendant charged with first
degree or robbery-murder in Baltimore County is more likely than in other countries to
receive notice of the State's intention to seek the death penalty, [because] it is the 'policy'
of Baltimore County to seek the death penalty without any discretion." Id. at 5. "[T]he
Baltimore County prosecutor is more likely to seek the death penalty in a robbery murder
case than is a prosecutor in another county in Maryland." Id. at 6. Reference is also made
to a proportionality study being conducted by the Maryland Court of Appeals pursuant to
the repealed § 414(e) (4) of the Maryland Code. Id.
433 MD.ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 414(e) (Michie 1957).
434 "IT]he language of... the Maryland statute is virtually identical to, and was patterned after, the proportionality review provisions of the Georgia death penalty statute."
Tichnell v. State, 468 A.2d 1, 13 (Md. 1983) (citation omitted).
435

Considering the purpose of proportionality review in death sentence cases, the language of sec. 414(e) (4), the law in other jurisdictions with proportionality review provisions like our own, and the views expressed by legal commentators, we conclude that
the legislatively intended inventory of cases from which "similar cases" are to be culled
encompasses only those first degree murder cases in which the state sought the death
penalty under sec. 413, whether it was imposed or not.
Tichnell 468 A.2d at 17 (citation omitted). In addition to its extensive discussion of the
legal and constitutional issues, and the law in other jurisdictions, the court analyzed five
similar cases and reviewed all forty-eight capital proceedings between reenactment and the
time of the decision. See id at 13-23.
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of the pool when presented with the appropriate evidence. 436 Three
members of the Tichnell court argued that cases where the prosecutor
did not seek the death penalty must be included to ensure uniformity
of application of the statute.437 In a far sighted observation, one of
the concurring justices in Tichnell anticipated that the question of who
had the responsibility for collecting and presenting data on similar
cases also had constitutional dimensions. 438
There have not been any death sentences overturned in Maryland on grounds of disproportionality. Nor have there been any published empirical studies of the Maryland capital punishment system. 439
436 "In so concluding, we do not preclude any defendant whose death sentence is under
appellate review from presenting argument, with relevant facts, that designated non-capital
murder cases are similar to the case then under scrutiny and should be taken into account
in the exercise of our proportionality review function." Id. at 18.
437

In sum, in my view, under [the statute] the inventory of cases utilized for proportionality review must include not only those death-eligible cases in which the prosecutor
has sought the death penalty, whether it was imposed or not, but all those death eligible cases in which the prosecutor did not seek-the death penalty. Such a construction
is supported by the legislative history of [the statute], is consonant with the legislative
intent that the broadest possible inventory of similar cases be utilized in Maryland's
proportionality review procedure, avoids serious constitutional questions, and prevents the arbitrary imposition of an unjustified burden upon the defendant. Most
important, such an interpretation effectuates the purpose of proportionality reviewto assure consistent and fair application of the death penalty-and therefore is
favorable to the accused.
Id. at 86 (Davidson, J., dissenting). A concurringjustice stated:
Nothing in the language of the statute supports the view that our consideration should
be further limited to those cases in which the prosecutor has exercised his discretion
to seek the death penalty.
The crime and defendant in another case may be similar to the crime and defendant
in the case under review even though the prosecuting attorney in the former case
decided, for whatever reason, not to seek the death penalty ....
In Maryland, however, we now have facts demonstrating that prosecutors throughout the State do not
employ common standards in deciding to seek the death penalty.... [T]he Public
Defender's Office made a record which convincingly demonstrated that there are no
common standards guiding the prosecutors in this State .... In light of the known
facts concerning the policies of Maryland State's Attorneys, proportionality review limited to those cases in which the death penalty is sought presents serious constitutional
questions under the principles of Furman v. Georgia.
Id. at 23-24 (Eldridge,J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Finally, see the concurrence of
Justice Cole, who stated, "In my view, allowing the Court to review a pool of cases which
includes cases where the prosecutor chose not to seek the death penalty, because of plea
agreements or because of other tactical reasons, is essential to meaningful proportionality
review and fundamental to the constitutional application of the statute." Id. at 26 (Cole,J,
concurring).
438 "Whether the responsibility for marshalling this data imposes a constitutionally impermissible burden on the defendant is a question for another day. I am willing to assume
that the various prosecutors will maintain such a data bank which they will readily make
available to defense counsel, public or private." Id. at 26 (Cole, J., concurring).
439 But see Richardson v. State, 598 A.2d 1, 6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (referring to a
proportionality study being conducted by Maryland Court of Appeals prior to the repeal of
the proportionality review requirement).
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Mississippi
The Mississippi Supreme Court conducts proportionality review
pursuant to statute.4 40 A 1994 amendment required the court to include in its decision references to similar cases considered in proportionality review. 44 1 The court has defined the universe of cases as
other death sentences in Wiley v. State.44 2 This decision was criticized
by a concurring justice who considered that universe to be overly restrictive. 44 3 Wiley involved a murder during the course of a robbery,
440 Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(1) (1972). See e.g., Beckman, 556 So. 2d 342 (Miss.
1990). The statute requires the court to determine "whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant." Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(3) (c) (1972). The court usually
lists the number of death sentences affirmed, reversed and remanded at the end of the
opinion. The statute also requires the clerk of the trial court to transmit to the state
supreme court the record, a notice, and a report prepared by the trial judge for every
death sentence imposed. Id. The state high court rejected a challenge to a death sentence
on the grounds that the trial court filed an incomplete and inadequate report to the state
supreme court. See Culberson v. State, 580 So. 2d 1136, 1140 (Miss. 1990). See also Clemons
v. Missppi 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (discussing standards for appellate review).
441 Act of August 23, 1994, 1994 Miss. Ex. Sess. Laws 23. This amendment may have
been precipitated by Culberson v. State; 580 So. 2d 1136 (Miss. 1990), in which the court
considered whether blanks in the form filed by the CircuitJudge "for the benefit of the
Court to assure full awareness of all relevant facts and circumstances in performance of the
legislatively mandated proportionality review" merited reversal. Id. at 1140. This is another example of a state high court being unwilling or unable to monitor the compilation
of a reliable factual record. See discussion of Pennsylvania infra. The court found "no
basis for believing that any basis in the report deprived Culberson of any important right."
Id. Recent decisions have given perfunctory consideration to the issue. See, e.g., Davis v.
State, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1261 (Miss. 1995) (proportionality review consisted of the court
declaring that it found no disproportionality, and including a list of cases in appendix). See
also Simon v. State, No. 91-DP-00353-SCT, 1995 WL 49560 (Miss. Feb. 9, 1995) (listing in an
appendix all of the death cases affirmed by the court).
442 The Mississippi Supreme Court describes its proportionality review process as
follows:
[T] his court must determine whether the sentence imposed here is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases since Jackson v. State. This comparison is made from cases in which the death sentence was imposed and reviewed on
appeal by this court. In making this individualized comparison, this Court considers
the crime and the defendant .... In so doing, the comparison leads this Court to
conclude that the death sentence [sic] upon this defendant is not excessive or disproportionate. Our review reveals nothing that would justify treating this defendant differently from any other defendants given the death penalty since Jackson v. State, nor
leads this court to conclude that the defendant should receive a life sentence.
Wiley v. State, 484 So. 2d 339, 355 (Miss. 1986) (citations omitted).
443 In the opinion of this justice it was also irrelevant to list cases where the death penalty was reversed because of guilt phase issues and equally irrelevant to include for the
purposes of proportionality review those cases which have been remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 361-62 (Robertson, J., concurring).
Of greater concern [however] is our refusal to include in proportionality review those
capital murder cases which have resulted in affirmed life sentences. Such cases are to
my mind "similar cases" within [the statute]. Certainly the crime is legally the same:
capital murder. More important, the facts and circumstances of such cases may well
be quite similar with those wherein the death sentence has been imposed. A compari-
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and the concurrence was concerned that this common form of murder was being treated differently by different prosecutors in different
trial court jurisdictions.4 44
The Mississippi Supreme Court has discussed the issues raised by
proportionality review in detail and reversed two death sentences on
grounds of disproportionality. 45 In Reddix v. State the court found the
death sentence disproportionate upon reconsideration of proportionality.4 46 Among courts which consider only other death sentences in
conducting proportionality review, the Mississippi Supreme Court had
been unusual in its extensive consideration of the issues. 44 7
Missouri
The Supreme Court of Missouri is required by statute to conduct
son or contrast of such cases with a given death penalty surely would reveal valuable
information regarding the proportionality of the sentence under review ....
Id. (citation omitted).
444

And what are we to make of the other capital murder/life results in other convenience
store robbery/killings not qualitatively less reprehensible than that here?... Where
we confront such situations it is no longer sufficient to give the shop worn answer that
differentjuries have the prerogative of deciding comparable cases differently. Proportionality review has been instituted among men as a mandate that we do more than
wring our hands and mutter something about luck of the draw. If it has any purpose,
[the Mississippi proportionality review provision] has been fashioned to ameliorate
the arbitrary result necessarily attendant upon individualized verdicts returned by separate juries.
Id. at 361-62 (citation omitted).
445 Coleman v. State, 378 So. 2d 640 (Miss. 1979); Reddix v. State, 547 So. 2d 792 (Miss.
1989). In a third case, a defendant's death sentence was reversed with three of the five
member majority voting for life imprisonment on the basis that the appellant's death sentence was disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar capital cases. Bullock v. State,
525 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 1987). In a fourth case the Supreme Court of Mississippi remanded
to allow the trial court to justify the disparity between the defendant's sentence and the
accomplice's sentence. See McGilvery v. State, 540 So. 2d 41, 42 (1989).
446

We performed... [proportionality] review and affirmed [the death sentence] in Reddix !f, 381 So. 2d at 1011-13. However, the passage of time and subsequent developments convince us that the proportionality of Reddix's sentence must be reconsidered
.... Our proportionality decision in Bullock, rested on the fact that, with only two
exceptions, "no capital defendant has had a death sentence affirmed in this state
where the sole finding was that he contemplated that lethal force would be used."
Bullock, 525 So. 2d at 770. We also noted that Bullock's accomplice, the actual killer,
had received a life sentence, a point reinforcing our determination that justice required fixing Bullock's sentence at life imprisonment. Id. The same is true here ....
Accordingly, we hold that Reddix' death sentence is disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar capital cases, considering both the crime and the appellant.
Reddix 547 So. 2d at 793-94 (Miss. 1989).
447 Mississippi data are analyzed in Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro, Patternsof Death:
An Analysis of Racial Disparities in CapitalSentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L
RE. 27 (1984). That study found that race of the victim had a strong and statistically
significant effect on the odds of receiving a death sentence in Mississippi. Id. at 92-98.
This study concluded that the odds of receiving a death sentence in Mississippi were about
five times greater for defendants linked to white victims, relative to black victims. Id.
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proportionality -review as a check upon arbitrariness. 448 In Missouri
intermediate appellate courts may also conduct proportionality review. 449 Proportionality review is not constitutionally required in Missouri.4 50 In Missouri, a judge can impose the death sentence if the
jury cannot agree upon the sentence. 45 1 The court defines the universe of cases as all penalty phase cases. 452 The court has refused to
consider cases in which the death sentence was not sought. The type
of proportionality review conducted by the Missouri Supreme Court
has been characterized as standardless by the Chief Justice of that
Court. 45 3 The court generally lists the cases used for comparison and
448 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035 (West 1996).

449 See State v. Shinn, 874 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 371 (1994).
The appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of a motion "to preclude the State from
seeking the death penalty... due to disproportionality in sentencing based on the defendant's age and the circumstances of this case" because "proper review of proportionality in
sentencing.., is not concerned with whether... [a particular] individual should receive
the death penalty" but whether "any defendant in circumstances similar to... [the defendant's] should receive the death penalty." Id. at 406. Defendant was ajuvenile at the time of
the offense. Id.
450 See State v. Chambers, 891 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1994); State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320,
328 (Mo. 1993) (proportionality review is not constitutionally required and that "the statutory review merely provides a backstop against the freakish and wanton application of the
death penalty").
451 "I find it easier to vote to mitigate the death sentence because the jury was unwilling
to impose the death penalty, and left sentencing to thejudge." See, e.g., State v. Powell, 798
S.W.2d 709, 719 (Mo. 1990) (Blackmar, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
452 A constitutional challenge to this definition of the universe was recently rejected by
the court:
Appellant seems to contend that proportionality review is of constitutional dimension
and that this Court must consider all cases in which a sentence of death was available,
not simply cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, in conducting proportionality review. This claim is also without merit. Proportionality review need not include cases such as those in which the state chose not to charge a defendant with
capital murder, in which the state agreed to a plea bargain whereby a defendant pled
guilty to a lesser charge, where the conviction was for an offense less that capital murder, or where the state waived the death penalty.
State v. McMillan, 783 S.W.2d 82,102 (Mo. 1990) (citations omitted). Accord State v. Smith,
756 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1988). But see State v. LaRette, 648 S.W.2d 96, 110 (Mo. 1983) (SeilerJ., dissenting in part) (criticizing the restriction of the universe to penalty phase cases).
453 In a recent case the ChiefJustice complained that the court lacks any
articulated standards for the exercise of our responsibility for proportionality review
....
The Court has never rested easy with its responsibility for proportionality review.
The early cases regularly affirmed death sentences on the basis that there was nothing
to compare. The later cases are prone to search the books for cases presenting one or
more comparable circumstances, following which there is a routine affirmance. I do
not believe that this is what was contemplated by the legislature when it mandated
proportionality review as a means of selecting the cases in which the ultimate penalty
is to be exacted. The Court has proceeded by hunch. My hunch is that the death
sentence in this case is out of line with other cases in which death has been decreed
Powell 798 S.W.2d 709, 719 (Mo. 1990) (Blackmar, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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states the rationale for comparison. 45 4

Since the reimposition of the death penalty in Missouri, the court
has found only one death sentence disproportionate. 455 The finding
under
of disproportionality in that case might not have been reached
45 6
the Missouri high court's present capital jurisprudence.
In State v. Parker,457 the court considered the Defendant's "Experts' Analysis of the Court's Proportionality Data," data consisting of
three statistical studies of Missouri's death penalty cases. There is a
1994 empirical study of the Missouri capital punishment system.4 58
454 See, e.g., Chambers, 891 S.W.2d at 114 (defendants with similar histories of convictions,
where the "nature of the crime" was similar); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1994)
(cases where murders committed to avoid arrest or detection; defendant was oldest in
group and appeared to have taken on the role of a leader; multiple attempts at homicide
although no evidence defendant was present at the homicide); State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d
908 (Mo. 1994) (cases where the defendant murdered the victim because of the victim's
status as a wimess), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 757 (1995); State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494 (Mo.
1994) (cases where defendant had a prior conviction for first degree murder, murdered
the victim for pecuniary gain, murdered the victim in the course of a robbery, or possessed
a combination of these three aggravating circumstances), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 757 (1995);
State v. Harris, 870 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1994) (cases which involve defendants who have committed numerous other offenses, and cases in which the death penalty was imposed because the defendant committed the murder for the purpose of obtaining something of
monetary value from the victim, and cases in which the court has failed to find as a mitigating factor the presence of a mental disease or defect), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 371 (1994);
State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. 1993) (cases where defendant killed for monetary
gain or there was victim helplessness or there were multiple murders or there was a murder
of wimesses, and cases where victims were murdered during the course of a robbery); State
v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. 1992) (cases where there are multiple homicides, the killing
of a person who is disabled, or an intricate, well thought out plan of how the killing is to be
committed); State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850 (Mo. 1992) (cases where overwhelming evidence shows a planned killing during the course of a robbery, and cases where a defendant
has previously been convicted of murder); State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. 1992) (cases
where the defendant has carried out a planned killing for his own purposes).
455 See State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. 1982).
456 In the opinion of at least one justice, "it is questionable whether a present majority of
this Court would follow State v. Mlvoy in a proportionality review situation." State v. Bibb,
702 S.W.2d 462, 466-67 (Mo. 1985) (Billings, J., concurring). Two members of the court
found the death sentence upheld in Bibb to be indistinguishable from the death sentence
in McIlvoy which was overturned on grounds of disproportionality. Id. at 466 (Blackmar,
J., concurring); Id. at 471 (Welliver, J., dissenting). In Bibb the death sentence was overturned for other reasons, and the prosecutor did not choose to retry the case as a capital
case. Telephone interview with John M. Morris, Missouri Assistant Attorney General.
457 886 S.W.2d 908, 933 (Mo. 1994). In later cases, defendants have requested the court
to consider the proportionality data submitted in Parkeralong with a supplemental affidavit. See State v. Chambers, 891 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1994). Recent cases include State v. Brown,
902 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1995) and State v. Storey, 901 S.W. 2d 886 (Mo. 1995). In none of
these cases, however, did the court find the death sentences disproportionate based upon
the data submitted.
458 See Donald H. Wallace & Jonathan R. Sorenson, Missouri ProportionalityReview: An
Assessment of a State Supreme Court's Proceduresin Capital Cases, 8 NoTm DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. Pot'v 281 (1994).
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Montana
The Montana capital punishment system is unusual. The judge

alone considers statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 45 9
The Montana Supreme Court is under a statutory obligation to conduct proportionality review. 46 0 The court has held that similar cases
would be drawn only from a universe of appealed penalty phase
cases. 4 6 ' However, prior to State v. Smith, members of the court did
not always agree that the universe should be limited in such a manner. 462 Typically the court lists the universe of death penalty cases,

and then selects one or two that resemble the case on appeal for comparison purposes. 463 There are very few death sentences imposed in
Montana. None have been found to be disproportionate.
Nebraska

The Nebraska cases present a dramatic illustration of a court attempting to sidestep controversial substantive issues by making procedural decisions. Nebraska is atypical in that the provision enacted by
the legislature envisioned a more comprehensive form of proportionality review than what was eventually institutionalized by the state
supreme court.46 4 The internal debate within the court produced the
most complete judicial discussion of proportionality review prior to
459 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-310 (1996). The same section requires the Montana
Supreme Court to consider whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant,
including in its decision a reference to the similar cases considered.
460 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-307 (1996). The history of the application of capital punishment in Montana is summarized in State v. Kills on Top, 787 P.2d 336, 355-56 (Mont.
1990) (Sheehy,J., dissenting). Justice Sheehy notes: "The Montana experience since 1977
indicates that judges are far more likely than juries to impose the death sentence." Id.
461

[We need not examine every similar case whether appealed or not, rather we need
only examine those cases where after conviction the death penalty could have been or
was imposed that has reached our attention through the appellate process. We are
obligated to define the scope of our review when considering similar cases. We will
thus consider cases where the defendant has been charged with kidnapping and murder ....

State v. Smith, 705 P.2d 1087, 1108 (Mont. 1985). In Smith, the court reached back to
compare the facts and circumstances of the case under review with a case decided in 1947.
Id. at 1109.
462 See State v. Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000, 1044 (Mont 1979) (Shea, J. dissenting) (arguing that review cannot be effective without a comparison of the cases where the death
penalty could have been imposed).
463 See, e.g., State v. Turner, 864 P.2d 235, 247 (Mont. 1993) ("[T]his Court reviews the
gravity of the offense, the brutality with which it was committed, and the factors, if any,
which led to a call for leniency, with the purpose of making certain that there has been no
discriminatory action on the part of the sentencing judge").
464 NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2521 (1996). Cf New Jersey, where the opposite dynamic occurred, see supra Parts IV.B, IV.C.
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Marshall 11, with the Chief Justice in sharp disagreement with the
46
other members of the court.

5

Nebraska requires proportionality review by statute, but it may
not be raised in post conviction proceedings. 46 6 The Nebraska
Supreme Court has not overturned any death sentences for reasons of
46 7
disproportionality.
Nevada

Nevada's proportionality review provision was repealed in 1985,
although the legislature let stand a similar and more general statutory
section which requires the court to consider whether the sentence of
death is excessive, "considering both the crime and the defendant."46

Prior to the statutory repeal of proportionality review Nevada had a
standard proportionality review provision with the language from
Gregg which required the court to consider whether the sentence of

death was disproportionate in comparison to the sentence imposed in
46 9

similar cases.
When Nevada had mandatory proportionality review the court
compared the death sentence under review with "all capital cases, as
well as appealed murder cases in which the death penalty was sought
but not imposed ....
-47o In other words, the universe of cases was all
penalty phase cases. When it was conducting proportionality review,
465 State v. Palmer, 399 N.W.2d 706, 738 (Neb. 1986) (Krivosha, CJ., concurring and
dissenting). See supra Part IV.B.
466 Nebraska's present proportionality review procedures are set out in State v. Rust 528
N.W.2d 320, 326-27 (Neb. 1995). Proportionality cannot be raised a second time for post
conviction relief. See State v. Ryan, 534 N.W.2d 766, 799 (Neb. 1995); State v. Victor, 494
N.W.2d 565, 569 (Neb. 1993). State v. Otey, 464 N.W.2d 352, 359 (Neb. 1991) (performing a second proportionality review).
467 There are no published empirical studies of the Nebraska capital punishment
scheme in spite of the lively debate on these issues before the court.
468 NEV. REv. STAT. § 177.055(2) (D)(Michie 1995). See also Paine v. State, 877 P.2d
1025, 1032 (Nev. 1994) (interpreting statutory language). In 1989, the court conducted
proportionality review for ex post facto reasons in Lopez v. State, 769 P.2d 1276 (Nev. 1989).
The court did not express an opinion as to whether the amendment abolishing the proportionality review requirement "accomplished its intended purpose". Id. at 1289 n.14. In
Lane v. State; 881 P.2d 1358 (Nev. 1994), the defendant claimed, under principles of equal
protection, that the prosecutor's office, as a general practice, unconstitutionally discriminated in seeking the death penalty more frequently when the defendant was black. The
defendant provided data indicating that the county district attorney sought the death penalty in "eighty percent of the cases involving a black defendant with no prior felony conviction whereas it has not sought the death penalty in eighty percent of the cases involving a
white defendant with a prior felony conviction." Id. at 1362. Relief was denied. Id. at
1367.
469 The 1985 amendment repealing proportionality review became effective in June of
1985. NEv. REv. STAT. § 177.055 (1985).
470 Harvey v. State, 682 P.2d 1384 (Nev. 1984); Rogers v. State, 705 P.2d 664 (Nev. 1985),
cert. denied 106 S.Ct. 1999 (1986).

LEIGH B. BIENT

[Vol. 87

the Nevada Supreme court upheld 17 death sentences as not being
disproportionate and overturned five death sentences-a relativley
large number of reversals-as disproportionate. 47 1
New Hampshire
The New Hampshire legislature reenacted in 1990, modifying the
former statute which had been declared unconstitutional. This statute
can not be applied retroactively. 4 72 The New Hampshire capital statute provides for proportionality review, adopting the language of
Gregg-473 The New Hampshire Supreme Court has not yet reviewed
any death sentences or conducted proportionality review.
New Jersey
Proportionality review in New Jersey is discussed in detail in Marshall 1474 and in the text of the main article. 475
New Mexico
The New Mexico Supreme court set out its guidelines and standards for proportionality review in State v. Garcia.47 6 Under the au471 In Harvey, 682 P.2d at 1384, the court reviewed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of this case, including the defendant's lack of a significant criminal history and
that the defendant suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time
of the killing, and concluded the death sentence was disproportionate to the penalty imposed in this state in similar cases. In Biondi v. State, 699 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Nev. 1985), the
court found the death sentence disproportionate because (1) a codefendant was sentenced
to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the same crime, (2) the crime took
place in a barroom among intoxicated strangers, and (3) there was no evidence that the
murder was premeditated. In Jones v. State, 707 P.2d 1128, 1134 (Nev. 1985), the court
found that in Nevada the death sentence was reserved for cases that exhibit a high degree
of premeditation coupled with aggravating circumstances such as brutality, torture or depravity. The court thus held it inappropriate to impose a death sentence where the victim
died almost immediately from a single shot to the head and the defendant had not entered
the situs of the murder (a bar) intending to kill. The court also found that the jury may
have imposed the death sentence arbitrarily under the influence of the passion incited by
the prosecutor's statements. Id. at 1134. Finally, in Moran v. State; 734 P.2d 712, 714 ( Nev.
1987), the court reversed a defendant's death sentence because there were no aggravating
circumstances in his murder of his wife. The Nevada court also set aside a death sentence
as disproportionate in Haynes v. State, 739 P.2d 497, 509 (1987).
472 State v. Johnson, 595 A.2d 498, 500 (N.H. 1991). As of 1996 the constitutionality of
the statute has not yet been addressed by the court, nor has a death sentence been imposed and upheld on appeal.
473 "The supreme court shall determine... [w] hether the sentence of death is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime
and the defendant." N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(XI) (1995).
474 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992).
475 See supraPart 1V.C.
476 664 P.2d 969 (N.M. 1983).
We assume that the Legislature means that in similar cases, considering both the
crime and defendant, a defendant convicted of first degree murder under a specific
aggravating circumstance should not be put to death if another defendant or other
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477
thority of its statutory mandate to conduct proportionality review,
the Court established proportionality review procedures in which the

court will consider as similar penalty phase cases which have the same

aggravating circumstances and that sentenced the defendant to either
life imprisonment or death. 478 This is a more limited pool than the
universe of all penalty phase cases or all convictions for circumstantially similar death eligible murders. The court selects among penalty
phase cases and places the burden upon the defense to provide information on similar cases. The New Mexico Supreme Court has not
overturned any death sentences for reasons of disproportionality.47 9
New York

The recently reenacted New York capital statute includes detailed
and innovative statutory requirements for proportionality review
480
which are discussed in the main text of the article.
North Carolina
The Supreme Court of North Carolina conducts proportionality
review pursuant to statute. 481 The universe of cases is all capital cases
48 2
since reenactment in 1977 which have been affirmed on appeal.
The court considers a range of issues during its proportionality redefendants, convicted of murder under the same aggravating circumstance is given
life imprisonment, unless there is some justification.
Id. at 978.
477 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(C) (Michie 1978).
478 "In reviewing a sentence under these guidelines we will compare other New Mexico
cases in which a capital defendant has been convicted of capital murder under the same
aggravating circumstances, and then received eitherthe sentence of death or life imprisonment." State v. Clark, 772 P.2d 322, 345 (N.M. 1989). In Clark, the court refused to address a challenge to these restrictions on the court's proportionality review, in the absence
of the defendant producing evidence that his sentence would be disproportionate to a
broader pool of cases. Id. There have not been any recent changes to this standard.
479 Proportionality review has received very little attention from the New Mexico
Supreme Court. See Clark v. Tansy, 882 P.2d 527, 535 (N.M. 1994); State v. Wyrostek, 873
P.2d 260 (N.M. 1994).
480 See N.Y. CoRRtEcr. I.Aw CH. 43 ART. 22-B (McKinney 1995). The proportionality review provisions of this statute are discussed in Part V, supra.
481 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15 A-2000(D) (2) (1988). The court conducts proportionality review even if neither the defense nor prosecution raise the issue. State v. Rose, 451 S.E.2d
211, 230 (N.C. 1994).
482

In comparing 'similar cases' for purposes of proportionality review, we use as a pool
for comparison purposes all cases arising since the effective date of our capital punishment statute, 1 June 1977, which have been tried as capital cases and reviewed on
direct appeal by the Court and in which thejuryrecommended death or life imprisonment or in which the trial court imposed life imprisonment after the jury's failure to
agree upon a sentencing recommendation within a reasonable period of time.
State v. Williams, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355 (N.C. 1983).
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view.483 The North Carolina high court has categorically rejected a
statistical approach to proportionality review. 48 4 The court relies
upon its own case reports, records and the briefs. 48 5 North Carolina
has vacated seven death sentences as disproportionate, 486 again a relatively large number. The state's capital punishment system has been
48 7
studied in considerable detail by several independent researchers.
Ohio
Ohio conducts proportionality review pursuant to a statutory
mandate. 488 The universe of cases in Ohio is limited to cases in which
the death penalty has been imposed. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected an argument to include "cases where the death penalty could
have been sought but was not .... -489 In the same case the Court
rejected statistical arguments regarding racial bias in the administration of the death penalty, finding that the defendant must show that
racial considerations affected the sentencing process in his individual
case, although the court acknowledged that it had accepted analogous
statistical proof of discrimination in the area of employment discrimiProportionality review:
includes not only a reappraisal of the relative weight of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances of the case, but also a scrutiny of the entire records for all the circumstances of the case, including the manner of the mission of the crime and the defendant's character, background, and mental and physical condition.
State v.Price, 388 S.E.2d 84, 106 (N.C. 1990) (citations omitted). See also State v. Williams,
483

452 S.E.2d 245, 276 (N.C. 1994).

State v. Quesinberry, 381 S.E.2d 681, 693 (N.C. 1989); Williams, 301 S.E.2d at 355.
The court does not include an appendix listing the cases considered. "We do not feel
compelled to cite every case consulted." Price, 388 S.E.2d at 106. Price discusses the proportionality review process in some detail. Id. at 106-09. See also State v. Davis, 455 S.E.2d 627,
641-43 (N.C. 1995); State v. Miller, 455 S.E.2d 137, 153-55 (N.C. 1995); State v. Bacon, 446
S.E.2d 542, 562-70 (N.C. 1994).
486 See State v. Benson, 372 S.E.2d 517, 523 (N.C. 1988); State v. Stokes, 352 S.E.2d 653,
668 (N.C. 1987); State v. Rogers, 341 S.E.2d 713, 733 (N.C. 1986), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Vandiver, 364 S.E.2d 373, 375 (N.C. 1988); State v. Young, 325 S.E.2d 181, 195
(N.C. 1985); State v. Hill, 319 S.E.2d 163, 172 (N.C. 1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 S.E.2d
170, 183 (N.C. 1983); State v.Jackson, 305 S.E.2d 703, 718 (N.C. 1983).
487 The most comprehensive study on the death penalty in North Carolina is BARRY
N.AKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBTANSS OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1987). The
study analyzed 489 homicide cases arising during the first year after the state reenacted its
capital punishment statute. This work is discussed in Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of CapitalPunishment: The Role of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 41 RuTGERS L. REv. 27, 142-47
(1988).
488 OHIO Rav. CODE ANN.§ 2929.05(A) (Anderson 1981) (repealed 1993).
484
485

489

[W]e are persuaded that the proportionality review contemplated by [the statute]
should be limited to cases already decided by the reviewing court in which the death
penalty has been imposed ....No reviewing court need consider any case where the
death penalty was sought but not obtained or where the death sentence could have
been sought but was not.
State v. Steffen, 509 N.E.2d 383, 395 (Ohio 1987) (citations omitted).

19961

PROPORTIONALITY REVEW

nation and jury selection. 4 90 The Ohio Supreme court has not over4 91
turned any death sentences on grounds of disproportionality.
Prior to 1994, both the intermediate appellate court and the state
supreme court were required to consider whether the sentence imposed was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases. 492 Unlike the Supreme Court, when the intermediate
appellate court conducted proportionality review, the case on appeal
was compared with other cases where the death sentence had been
imposed from the same trialcourtjurisdiction.4 93 The intermediate appellate court would not consider the sentence imposed upon a codefendant for the purpose of proportionality review.4 94
Oklahoma
Oklahoma repealed' its statutory proportionality review provision
in 1985. 4 95 Before that section was repealed, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court overturned one death sentence for reasons of disproportionality.4 96 Oklahoma's highest criminal court of appeal has affirmed that
490 Id. This is a clear example of the influence of McCeskey. The claim that these limits
on proportionality review are unconstitutional has been summarily rejected by the court.
State v. Loza, 641 N.E.2d 1082, 1106-07 (Ohio 1994).
491 There has not been a systematic, empirical study of the operation of the Ohio capital
punishment system since reenactment. Data on 2,193 Ohio homicides, which occurred
during the first five years after Furman, were analyzed in WilliamJ. Bowers and Glenn L.
Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discriminationunder Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 Crvm & DEUiNQ. 563 (1980). This study is discussed in detail in Bienen et al, supranote 487, at 122-25.
492 OHio REv. CODE. ANN § 2929.05 (A). In November of 1994 the Ohio voters approved
an amendment to the Ohio Constitution which removed the jurisdiction of the Ohio Court
of Appeals to hear direct appeals in death penalty cases. Omo CoNsr. art. IV, § 2.
493 See, e.g., State v. Grant, No. 83-CA-144, 1990 WL 176825, at *38 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov.
9, 1990); State v. Iampkin, No. C-890273, 1990 WL 143466, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 3,
1990); State v. Combs, No. C-880156, 1990 WL 135000, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 19,
1990). As the Lampkin court wrote:
[r]eview is restricted to those capital prosecutions in Hamilton County where the
death penalty has, in fact, been imposed. The defendant points to other domestic- or
spousal- murder cases, where, regardless of motive, either the State did not seek to
indict for a capital offense or the defendant entered a negotiated plea to a lesser,
noncapital offense. However, a reviewing court cannot consider in its proportionality
review any case where the charge did not include a death eligible specification under
R.C. 2929.04 (A), or where the death penalty was sought but not obtained.
Lampkin, 1990 WL 143466 at *5 (citations omitted).
494
Likewise, defendant's claim of disproportionality, on the ground that her accomplice,
the gunman, received only a life sentence with parole eligibility after thirty years, is
outside consideration in this phase of our review.
Id. at *5. This position was criticized in State v. Green, 609 N.E.2d 1253, 1264 (Ohio 1993)
(Pfeifer,J., dissenting) and State v. Burke, No. 90AP-1344, 1993 WL 541653, at *5 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 28, 1993) (Deshler, J., dissenting).
495 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.13(c) (3) (West 1983) (repealed 1985). See also Hawkins v. State, 891 P.2d 586, 598 (Okla. 1995).
496 Munn v. State, 658 P.2d 482, 487-88 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). The court also con-
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extensive proportionality review is not constitutionally required.4 97
Oregon
Oregon does not require proportionality review, either under its
statute 49 8 or by court rule.49 9 However, Oregon's capital punishment
statute has several distinctive features including requiring the jury to
answer questions rather than weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. 50 0
Pennsylvania
Proportionality review is mandated by statute. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ordered a comprehensive data collection project to be
established by the Administrative Office of the Court.50 1 There have
been numerous problems with the accuracy of these data, however,
and this has hampered analysis.
The court does not include an appendix of cases considered or
state what factors were considered in the review. 502 As of 1996, the
ducted a proportionality review under principles of ex post facto in Fisher v. State, 736
P.2d 1003, 1015 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). See also Snow v. State, 876 P.2d 291, 300 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1994).
497 See Battenfield v. Oklahoma, 816 P.2d 555, 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); Maxwell v.
State, 775 P.2d 818, 820 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). Both these cases state that extensive
proportionality review is not required by the state or federal constitution. Recently, however, the Oklahoma court nonetheless conducted its own proportionality review before
affirming an appealed death sentence. "Two [dissenting] members of this Court hold that
proportionality review is no longer necessary. I have compared the sentence imposed
herein to previous cases, ... and find the sentence to be proper." Moore v. State, 788 P.2d
387, 403 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (citations omitted).
498 OR. Ray. STAT. § 163.150 (1995).

499 State v. Cunningham, 880 P.2d 431, 441-42 (Or. 1994) (en banc).
500 The statutory sentencing scheme requires the jury to answer yes to three questions
before deciding whether to sentence the defendant to death: (A) whether the defendant
caused the death "deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death of the deceased or another would result;" (B) whether there is "a probability" the defendant would
constitute a "continuing threat to society;" (C) whether the conduct of the defendant "in
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation;" and (D) whether
the defendant should be sentenced to death. OR. REv. STAT. § 163.150(1) (b) (A)-(D)
(1995). The jury can consider any mitigating circumstances offered. If the jury unanimously answers "yes" to all questions, the trial judge shall sentence the defendant to death.
The jury answers no if one or more jurors find there is any mitigating circumstance that
would justify a sentence of less than death. Id.
501 These data are described in John F. Kairns & Lee S. Weinberg, The Death Sentence in
Pennsylvania: 1978-1990: A PreliminaryAnalysis of the Effects of Statutory and Nonstatutory Factors, 95 DicK L. Rxv. 691 (1991). Data are collected on all first degree murder cases by the
trial courtjudge on a standardized form. The form has been changed since its publication
in Commonwealth v. Frey, 475 A.2d 700, 711 (Pa. 1984). Data include race, sex, and age of
defendant and victim, the dates of sentence and of the offense, and whether or not the
death penalty was sought. Id. The court does not release or publish these reports. Id.
502 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hughes, 639 A.2d 763 (Pa. 1994) (rejecting defendant's
proportionality arguments); Commonwealth v. Williams, 615 A.2d 716 (Pa. 1992) (holding
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court has not articulated standards or principles for proportionality
review, nor has the court systematically analyzed the data it collects. 503
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet overturned any death
sentence as disproportionate.
South Carolina
Proportionality review is required by statute in South Carolina.50 4
The issue of the universe of cases was addressed in an early opinion.505
The court rejected the idea of comparing the death sentence under
review with cases which did not result in a death sentence.
Since its inception the proportionality review conducted by the
South Carolina Supreme Court has been perfunctory. 506 In the first
capital appeal where proportionality was raised, the court simply
stated that it had conducted proportionality review and then upheld
the first death sentence imposed since reenactment.50 7 The South
Carolina Supreme Court has been criticized for its unsystematic and
death sentence to be proportional when the defendant intended to kill a different person
than the one whom he killed); Commonwealth v. Banks, 656 A.2d 467, 474 (Pa. 1995)
(denying a defendant the opportunity to challenge data used for proportionality review is
not a denial of due process).
503 Rhonda G. Hartman, Citiquing Pennsylvania's Comparative Proportionality Review in
Capital Cases, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 871 (1991).
504 S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-25 (Law Co-op. 1985).
505

We recognize that in some jurisdictions and commentaries it is felt that the reviewing
court should compare a given death sentence with a "universe" of cases which includes
sentences of life imprisonment, acquittal, reversals and even mere indictments and
arrests. Under such a regime, the reviewing court could only determine the size of its
sample or "universe" by some arbitrary device.
State v. Copeland, 300 S.E.2d 63, 74 (S.C. 1983).
506 See, e.g., State v. Holmes, 464 S.E.2d 334, 339 (S.C. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2507
(1996). In another case, the court purported to summarize the proportionality review
exercise as follows: "We have conducted the review mandated by S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25
(1985) and conclude that the sentence is not arbitrary, excessive, or disproportionate and
that the evidence supports the jury's finding of the statutory aggravating circumstance."
State v. Green, 392 S.E.2d 157, 164 (S.C. 1990). Typically the report consists of a single
sentence declaring that the death penalty is proportionate followed by citations. Se e.g.,
State v. Hall, 439 S.E.2d 278, 281 (S.C. 1994); State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d 175, 179 (S.C.
1993), rev'd, 512 U.S. 154 (1993); State v. Davis, 422 S.E.2d 133, 148 (S.C. 1992). Proportionality in terms of mitigating circumstances was discussed in State v. Wson, 413 S.E.2d 19,
28 (S.C. 1992).
507

It is of no consequence that the South Carolina universe has consisted of only five
cases to this date. State v. Shaw, presented the first occasion for proportionality review
under our current statute. We noted then that no similar cases existed, but the sentence imposed was none the less [sic] appropriate and neither "excessive" nor "disproportionate" considering the crime and the defendants.
Copeland,300 S.E.2d at 75 (citation omitted) (discussing State v. Shaw, 255 S.E.2d 799, 807
(S.C. 1979)). The category of comparison cases was apparently robbery-murder cases
which had resulted in the imposition of the death sentence.
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cursory approach to a legislatively mandated task. 50 8 In a 1985 case,
the court reported that it conducted proportionality review and considered all death sentences imposed, a total of 12 at the time of the
decision, and none were similar. 50 9 Proportionality review has resulted in no death sentences being overturned on grounds of proportionality in South Carolina.
South Dakota
The South Dakota capital statute provides for proportionality review, as part of its capital statute which was enacted in 1979.510 No
cases interpret or describe how the court conducts proportionality re5 11
view or what the court uses for a universe of cases.
Tennessee
Tennessee has done something no other state has done: instituted relatively extensive proportionality review; repealed the statutory requirement for proportionality review; and then reenacted it.
Prior to the repeal of its proportionality review provision on November 1, 1989, Tennessee had for eleven years a relatively comprehensive
program for data collection and system wide review.5 12 The Supreme
Court of Tennessee under the authority of its rule making power commissioned a broad based data collection effort in response to a statutory requirement to conduct proportionality review. 515 In its
508 There has been extensive empirical work on the South Carolina capital punishment
system. In a comprehensive study Paternoster and his co-authors examined all of the death
sentences appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, with the cooperation of the
court, and showed how various types of proportionality review could have been conducted
more rigorously given the detailed information on cases available to the court. SeeJoseph
E. Jacoby & Raymond Paternoster, SentencingDisparity andJury Packing:FurtherChallenges to
the DeathPenalty, 73J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982); Raymond Paternoster, Race of
Vctim and Location of Crime: The Decisionto Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina,74J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983); Raymond Paternoster & Anne Marie Kazyaka, The Administrationof the Death Penalty in South Carolina:Experiences Over the FirstFew Years, 39 S.C. L. Rav.
245 (1988); Raymond Paternoster, ProsecutorialDiscretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A
Case of Victim-Based RacialDiscrimination, 18 L & Soc'y Rav. 437 (1984). This work is discussed in Bienen et al., supra note 487, at 133-37.
509 State v. Koon, 328 S.E.2d 625, 627 (S.C. 1985) ("None of these cases presents facts
comparable to this case; [nonetheless, w]e find the death penalty neither excessive nor
inappropriate in light of the circumstances of the crime and the character of [the
defendant].").
510 "[T]he Supreme Court shall determine: ... whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant." S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23A-27A-12(3) (Michie 1996).
511 South Dakota has two people sentenced to death and has executed none. See supra
tbl.1.
512 See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-2-205 (Michie 1977) (repealed 1989).
513 The court described its Proportionality Review Project as follows:
On Feb. 24, 1978, this Court, pursuant to Chapter 51, Public Acts of 1977, promulgated Supreme Court Rule 47 (now Rule 12) requiring trial judges to complete and
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proportonaltiy review, the Tennessee Supreme Court considered all
first degree murder convictions, which includes premeditated
murders and felony murder, whether or not the death sentence had
5 14
been imposed.
Tennessee reinstated proportionality review in 1992, effective
May 1, 1992.515 Presumably principles of equal protection would require that defendants whose crimes were committed during the period between repeal and reenactment must also now be eligible to
raise the issue of proportionality review.5 1 6 And, presumably, principles of equal prosecution would require that the proportionality review now conducted by the court be as extensive as the former
procedures.
The Tennessee Supreme Court in 1993 addressed a number of
submit to this Court a "report of trial judge" in all first degree murder cases in which
life imprisonment or a sentence of death is imposed. The nine page report was
adopted to enable this Court properly to review whether the sentence of death was
imposed in an arbitrary fashion and whether it was excessive or disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases. The reportprepared by the trialjudge consists of data
concerning the defendant, the trial, the victim, the aggravatingand mitigating circumstances,
the representationof the defendant, and othergeneral considerationswhich we have found helpful in our review offirst degree murder cases. The report is submitted to defense counsel and the
attorneyfor the State, who may attach comments to the report. The trialjudge is asked to comment upon the appropriatenessof the sentence .... We have reviewed Rule 12 reports from
trial judges sitting throughout this State submitted over the past ten years in all criminal trialsfor first degree murder in which life imprisonment or a sentence of death have been
imposed .... A comparative review, with the aid of the Rule 12 report of the trial judge,
has been conducted in all first degree murder cases in which life imprisonment or a
sentence of death has been imposed.
State v. Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659, 663-66 (Tenn. 1988) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).
514 In other words, the universe was all cases which resulted in a conviction of first degree murder, irrespective of whether death was sought or the facts or circumstances were
death eligible.
515 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-206, 39-2406. The reinstated proportionality review statute provides that the court shall consider whether
death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant... The Tennessee Supreme
Court may promulgate rules as it deems appropriate to establish such procedures as
are necessary to enable the reviewing courts to properly review the death sentence
.... The Court of Criminal Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court... are authorized to affirm the sentence of death or modify the punishment to life imprisonment.
Id. § 39-13-206.
516 But see, State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 78 n.2 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that the proportionality review of a death sentence is not constitutionally required in every case where the
defendant requests it. It is not clear whether the standards and procedures for data collection instituted after reenactment are identical to those in place prior to the repeal). See
also State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 265
(Tenn. 1993) (Reid, CJ., concurring) (criticizing proportionality review procedures)
("First, the sentence of death is compared with the offense committed; then, the defendant
is compared with other death-eligible offenders; and, last, the defendant and the criminal
acts on which the sentence is based are compared with other similar [ones]").
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constitutional issues in capital cases. 5 17 The court rejected a defend5 18
ant's racial discrimination arguments, citing the McCleskey standard.
In 1992 and 1993, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court overturned
two death sentences on grounds of disproportionality. 5 19
Texas
The Texas capital statute has several unusual features, including
having the jury answer questions instead of weighing aggravating factors. Early in the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence the
statute was upheld. 520 Because of the unusual structure of the statute
and also because Texas has executed more people than any other
state by a large margin, the Texas statute and the state's capital punishment system have both been the subject of extensive litigation, research and comment. 52 1 Constitutional challenges to the Texas
517 In a 1992 case the court raised the question of the constitutionality of the death
penalty as a punishment for felony murder, although the parties did not directly raise that
issue. The majority concluded that the felony murder statute did not sufficiently narrow
the population of death eligibles under the Eighth Amendment to the federal and state
constitutional principles. See State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tenn. 1993); State v.
Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn. 1993). See also, State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317,
335-41 (Tenn. 1992). The constitutionality of the death penalty under the federal and
state constitution had previously been discussed at length in State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166,
187-91 (Tenn. 1991).
518 State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 196 (Tenn. 1992) ("In order to establish that the
discriminatory application of the death penalty violates the Equal Protection Clause, a defendant must show that the legislature enacting the statute, or the jury sentencing the
defendant, acted with a discriminatory intent") (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987)).
519 State v. Hale, 840 S.W.2d 307, 315 (Tenn. 1992) and State v. Branam, 855 S.W.2d
563, 573 (Tenn. 1993). The Branam court stated,
In order to prevent the execution of all but the most deserving of murderers and to
avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing, the Court reviews all felony-murder cases to
assure that a sentence of death has not been arbitrarily imposed, that the evidence
supports the jury's findings, and that the sentence of death is not disproportionate.
For purposes of the death penalty, a distinction must be drawn in felony-murders between cold-blooded, execution style murders and accidental, unforeseen killings or
accomplice killings ....
Branam, 855 S.W.2d at 573 (Drowata, J., concurring). The court also stated, "Because,
therefore, the death penalty would be disproportionate to the offense committed by Branam, its imposition under these facts would, in ourjudgment, constitute a violation of the
Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment." Id at 571.
Neither Baldus nor Sprenger identified any prior cases in which the Tennessee
Supreme Court overturned a death sentence on grounds of disproportionality. See B mus
Er AL.., supra note 376, at 281; Steven M. Sprenger, Note, A Critical Evaluation of State
Supreme CourtProportionalityReview in Death Sentence Cases, 73 IowA. L. REv. 719, 738 n.161
(1988).
520 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 906
(1983).
521 Texas has executed 106 people, almost three times as many as the number of people
executed by the next state, Florida, which has executed 36. See supratbl.1. After California
(444), Texas has the second largest death row population, with 401 people on death row.
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statute and to the Texas capital case processing system have been the
occasion for a number of far reaching interpretations of federal constitutional law. 522 The Texas statute and capital sentencing system
generates extensive critical commentary. 523 There is no statutory requirement for proportionality review in Texas capital jurisprudence.
Few death sentences are overturned by the Texas Court of Criminal
52 4
Appeals for any reason.
Utah
The Utah legislature has not mandated proportionality review.
The Utah Supreme Court, however, took upon itself the task of conducting proportionality review. 525 Initially the court did not specify
whether proportionality review would be on the initiative of the court
or in response to a defense request, or how the court would conduct
proportionality review. The Utah Supreme Court describes its procedures as an individual "crime-to-sentence" proportionality review, inId. See Stephen B. Bright & PatrickJ. Keenan,Judges and the Politics ofDeath:DecidingBetween
the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L.REv.759, 763 (1995). See
Texas County in Forefrontin Executions, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 7, 1994, at 31. As of February, 1995,
37 persons sentenced to death in Harris county alone had been executed, more than the
total number executed in Florida.
522 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318-19 (1989) (holding that death penalty
had been unconstitutionally applied because the trial court gave the jury no instructions
on mental mitigating evidence). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied restrictive
evidentiary standards regarding Pensy evidence in response. See, e.g., Ex ParteLucas, 877
S.W.2d 315, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Trevino v. State, 815 S.W.2d 592, 621 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991). See also Deborah W. Denno, Testing Penry and Its Progeny, 22 Am.J. CGUM. L. 1
(1994). Recently, the United States Supreme Court further narrowed the Penry holding.
SeeJohnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 365 (1993); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 473-77
(1993).
523 See, e.g., Daniel H. Benson, Texas CapitalSentencingProceduresAfter Eddings: Some Questions Regarding ConstitutionalValidity, 23 S.TEx. L. REV.315 (1982); Michael L Radelet &
James W. Marquart, AssessingNondangerousnessDuringPenalty Phases of Capital Trials,54 ALB.
L. REV. 845 (1990); Mary K. Sicola & Richard R. Shreves, Jury Considerationsof Mitigating
Evidence: A Renewed Challenge to the Constitutionalityof the Texas DeathPenalty Statute, 15 Am.J.
C~iM. L. 55 (1988);Jonathan R.Sorensen &James W. Marquart, ProsecutorialandJury Decision Making in Post-FurmanTexas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Rv.L. & Soc. CHANGE 743, 746-51
(1990-91).
524 For a caustic description of the-relationship between the level of executions and
judicial elections, see Bright & Keenan, supra note 521, at 961-63.
525

[T]his Court has indicated that it will review sentences for proportionality.... [O]ver
time, as this Court becomes aware of a general pattern in the imposition of the death
penalty in this state, the Court may set aside death sentences that falH
outside of the
general pattern and thus reflect an anomaly in the imposition of the death penalty
....With few exceptions,juries in this state have not opted for death penalties when
a defendant has committed only a single murder, for the most part death penalties
have been imposed when the defendant was involved in multiple murders, either at
the time of the particular homicide charged or at some other time.
State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1025-26 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).
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stead of a 'case by case' or 'comparison' proportionality review.526 As
of 1996, no death sentences have been set aside as disproportionate in
Utah.
Virginia

The Supreme Court of Virginia conducts proportionality review
pursuant to statute. 5 27 Typically the court will affirm a death sentence
and simply cite to other death sentences affirmed. 528 The Virginia
Supreme Court even consolidates capital appeals and conducts proportionality review for several defendants at the same time.5 29 The
Virginia Supreme Court has not overturned any death sentence on
grounds of proportionality. 530 The court does little more than list the
cases it has considered. 5 3 1 The court does, however, explicitly consider the nondeath sentence imposed upon the codefendant in the
same case. 53 2 The parameters for comparison cases are not explicitly
526 See State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 656-57 (Utah 1995); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d

1232, 1249 (Utah 1993). Although it is not clear what 'crime-to-sentence' review means, it
does not require specifying the aggravating circumstances found. The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict in determining proportionality. State
v. Andrews, 843 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 1992). See also State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 403-11
(Utah 1994) (discussing why Utah's capital system does not adequately limit the class of
death eligibles, and including an Appendix comparing Utah and other states).
527 VA. CODE ANN. § 17-110.1(E) (Michie 1996).

528 See, e.g., Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 815, 838 (Va. 1985).
529 The court affirmed five death sentences in three cases in a consolidated, single proceeding, which included a consolidated proportionality review of all five death sentences
consisting of a list of citations and no analysis. Id.
530 See Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patternsof Death:An Analysis of RacialDisparities
in CapitalSentencingand Homicide ictimization, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27, 54-92 (1984) (discussing
empirical data from Virginia and other states).
531

In a proportionality review, we inquire whether "juries in this jurisdiction generally
approve the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes."... Considering both
"the crime and the defendant," . . . we can say with confidence that juries in this
jurisdiction generally approve the supreme penalty for offenses comparable to the
murder committed by Turner. Indeed, recently, we cited TurnerI in demonstrating
that a death sentence imposed upon a different defendant was not "excessive or disproportionate to sentences generally imposed byjuries in Virginia for similar crimes."
Turner v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 483, 491 (Va. 1988) (citations omitted). The reference to "jurisdiction" is ambiguous. Is the reference to the local prosecutorial jurisdiction
or to the state as a whole? The court's suggestion that the death sentence now under
review is not disproportionate because this court itself previously cited it as support for
upholding the death sentence in another case is bootstrapping.
532 As to the fact that an "equally culpable" codefendant received a life sentence in exchange for testifying for the State, the court said: "Their cooperation puts them in a different category from [the other defendants] ... and diminishes the similarity of the cases ....
Moreover, we do not believe that a codefendant is necessarily entitled to commutation of a
death sentence because an equally culpable confederate, on substantially the same evidence, has been sentenced to life imprisonment." Coppola v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d
797, 807 (Va. 1979). Although the court considers the sentences imposed on codefendants in the same case, the court has not addressed the issue of whether the plea bargaining
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defined. 53 3 The court has not addressed the issues raised by racial
disparities in the application of capital punishment in the jurisdiction.
Washington
In Washington proportionality review is required by statute. 5 34
The Washington statute defining proportionality review specifically
provides that the pool of similar cases shall be all cases of aggravated
first degree murder since January 1, 1965. 535 It is noteworthy that this
provision explicitly requires the court to compare post-Furman cases
with cases in which the death sentence was reversed under Furman.53 6
The standard for proportionality is defined in State v. Harris.5 37 The
policies of the State could result in a practice which encouraged more culpable defendants
into pleading guilty to avoid the death penalty, or whether the threat of the death penalty
spurred a race to the bargaining table.
533 See, e.g., Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 146, 156 (Va, 1994) (consulting a
compilation of all capital murder cases reviewed by the court); Murphy v. Commonwealth,
431 S.E.2d 48, 54 (Va. 1993) (referring to a record of capital murder cases, which implies
that the court systematically maintains a database for its own review); Chabrol v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 374, 378-79 (Va. 1993).
The court has conducted cursory comparisons with similarly situated defendants not
sentenced to death, although the discussion of proportionality in general is relatively extensive. See, e.g.,Joseph v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 862, 871 (Va. 1995); Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 391 (Va. 1994); Chichester v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 638,
651-52 (Va. 1994). Sometimes the court makes comparisons with nondeath sentences imposed upon codefendants or defendants. See, e.g., Thomas v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d
606, 620-21 (Va. 1992); King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d 669, 679 (Va. 1992). In other
cases a comparison to nondeath sentences is not mentioned. See, e.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 669, 676 (Va. 1995).
534 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130 (West 1996).
535

For the purposes of this subsection, 'similar cases' means cases reported
ington Reports or Washington Appellate Reports sinceJanuary 1, 1965,
judge orjury considered the imposition of capital punishment regardless
was imposed or executed, and cases in which reports have been filed with

in the Washin which the
of whether it
the supreme

court under RCW 10.95.120; ...

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.1301(2)(b) (West 1996).
556

[The court's] review is not intended to ensure that there can be no variation on a
case-by-case basis, nor to guarantee that the death penalty is always imposed in superficially similar circumstances ....
Our approach, perhaps, can instead best be explained as a search for "family resemblances".... Although the cases where death was
imposed do not necessarily have one characteristic or set of attributes in common, we
nonetheless recognize that they are somehow related. This relation cannot easily be
described; it consists of a complicated network of overlapping similarities-much like
members of the same family, who can be recognized as relatives, even though they do
not all share any one set of features. Thus, we examine prior cases for those which
belong together because they resemble each other.
State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177, 223 (Wash. 1991).
The court begins by comparing cases which have the same array of aggravating factors.
Then the court compares the mitigating factors and other specific circumstances. State v.
Rupe, 743 P.2d 210, 228-30 (Wash. 1987) (summarizing the history of proportionality review and the procedures followed by the court).
537 725 P.2d 975, 982 (Wash. 1986) ("[W]e view it to be our duty under the similarity
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Washington Supreme Court will examine cases in which the death
538
penalty was not sought in the context of proportionality review.

A federal district court in 1994 held that Washington's proportionality review process violated a defendant's procedural due process
rights, because it "does not establish adequate standards or guidelines
on which the Court or the parties can rely."53 9 The Washington
Supreme Court's response was: that "The court has taken an increasingly broad approach to its definition of similar cases, replacing the
comparison of aggravating factors with the search for family resemblances, . . ." Finding its proportionality review procedures constitutional, the court commented that the purpose of Washington's
proportionality review is not to ensure proportionality but to deter540
mine whether disproportionality exists.
standard to assure that no death sentence is affirmed unless in similar cases throughout

the state the death penalty has been imposed generally and not 'wantonly and freakishly.'
.. ") (citations omitted). In Harris, the pool of similar cases was contract killings, and the
court identified three such cases in the jurisdiction. Id. at 982.
538

"Similar cases" include cases reported in the Washington Reports or the Washington
Appellate Reports since January 1965, where imposition of capital punishment was
considered, and cases in which reports have been filed with this court pursuant to RCW
10.95.120. Under RGW 10.95.120, "[iln all cases in which a person is convicted of
aggravated first degree murder, the trial court shall" submit a report with details about
the defendant and the crime. Thus, "similarcases" include cases where the defendant was
convicted offirst degree aggravated murder regardless of whether the death penalty was sought.
Rupe, 743 P.2d at 229 (Wash. 1987) (emphasis added).
539 Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239, 1288 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (citing five specific
problems with the way the Washington Supreme Court conducts proportionality review,
distinguishing between comparative [intercase] review and traditional [intracase] review,
and concluding that the Washington statute required comparative review), affid, 64 F.3d
1432 (9th Cir. 1995). See also W. Ward Morrison Jr., Comment, Washington's Comparative
ProportionalityReview: Toward Effective Appellate Review of Death Penalty Cases Under the Washington State Constitution, 64 WASH. L. REv. 111 (1989).

540 "Since the proportionality requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in
the decision to inflict the penalty, the isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy does not
render unconstitutional death sentences imposed on defendants who were sentenced
under a system that does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice." State v.
Brett, 892 P.2d 29, 69 (Wash. 1986). But see Durham, C.J., concurring: "In virtually every
recent death penalty case decided by this court, a differing definition of proportionality
has been promulgated. The resulting confusion is unacceptable." Id. at 70. And, "The
concern in proportionality review is in avoiding two systemic problems in death sentences:
random arbitrariness and imposition of the death sentence based on race." State v. Gentry, 888 P.2d 1105 (Wash. 1995) (foomote omitted), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 131 (1995). The
court reviews other cases to determine whether race is a motivating factor in sentencing in
Washington before concluding that it is not.
Our review is not intended to ensure that there can be no variation on a case-by-case
basis, nor to guarantee that the death penalty is always imposed in superficially similar
circumstances ... Requiring precise uniformity would not only be unworkable, it
would effectively eliminate the death penalty. Indeed, the jury is directed to tailor its
decision to the individual circumstances of the crime.
Id. at 1155 (citing Lord, 822 P.2d at 223).
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Initially, the court had difficulty identifying similar cases because
of the small number of people sentenced to death in the jurisdic-

tion.541 The court has subsequently considered several unusual issues
in capital appeals generally, and in the context of proportionality. 542
In an unusual case, the court was asked to reconsider the proportionality of a death sentence previously upheld, on the grounds that subsequently decided cases retroactively rendered the judgment
disproportionate. 5 43 In another case, a defendant who presented evidence of mental mitigating factors argued that his death sentence was
disproportionate in comparison to other defendants who were men544
tally ill.
As of 1996, the Washington Supreme Court has not overturned
any death sentences for reasons of disproporionality.4 5 There have
not been any systematic empirical studies of the entire Washington
541 In one case, the court commented that there were no cases reported which considered the imposition of capital punishment for a contract killing. "Therefore there is no
evidence to be considered whether the present case is disproportionate to previous cases.
There have been only three capital cases involving a contract as the aggravating factor
since 1981 . . . In each case, no death penalty was sought by the prosecutor." State v.
Harris, 725 P.2d 975, 982-83 (Wash. 1986) (citations omitted). The court nonetheless
found the death sentence imposed was not disproportionate. Id.
542 See, e.g., Brett, 892 P.2d at 66 (Wash. 1995) (considering the claim that the universe of
similar cases is not reliable because it includes cases from two now invalid death penalty
statutes as well as pre-Lockett cases where sympathy instructions were not allowed, cases
where proportionality reviews were not conducted, and cases where proportionality review
was conducted but the universe was smaller), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 931 (1996).
543 In reJefflies, 789 P.2d 731, 735 (Wash. 1990). The petitioner's original appeal was
the second case in which the Supreme Court of Washington conducted proportionality
review. The petitioner subsequently argued that intervening cases gave the court a larger
universe of potentially similar cases and the opportunity to reconsider its original conclusion that the death sentence was proportionate. Id. at 734-35.
544 State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889, 915-17 (Wash. 1988). The defendant argued that the
appropriate group of comparison categories was other cases, including cases in which the
defendant was not sentenced to death, in which there was "credible evidence of a mental
disorder or diminished mental capacity." Id. at 916. The court found four such cases in
which the death sentence was not imposed at penalty phase. Id. The court, however,
found other mitigating factors in two of the cases and found that a third defendant had a
mental illness "more severe" than that of Rice. Id. The question of whether mentally ill
defendants should be defined as a comparison category has arisen in other states as well.
See, e.g., State v. Koedatich, 564 A.2d 873 (NJ. 1989).
545 Cf State v. Benn, 845 P.2d 289, 326-32 (Wash. 1993) (Utter, J., dissenting). The
dissent concluded the death sentence under review was disproportionate, and the dissenting opinion includes a review of the history of proportionality analysis in Washington, the
purpose of proportionality review, and a comparison of proportionality review in North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Georgia. Id. The concurring opinion argues that the analysis
adopted by the majority is too precise, and that the court should be searching for family
resemblances, not individual matches. Id. at 325 (Durham, C.J., concurring). The majority's proportionality analysis compared the nature of the defendant's crime and aggravating factor, his prior convictions, and his personal history to the statutorily required pool of
similar cases and found the death sentence not disproportionate. Id. at 316-324.
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capital punishment system. 546
Wyoming
In 1989, Wyoming repealed its statutory proportionality review requirement, which had been enacted in 1983. 54 7 Prior to the repeal,
the Wyoming Supreme Court looked at a wider range of cases than it
has in recently imposed death sentences in Wyoming. In its prportionaltiy analysis, the court formerly examined cases in which the defendants were not sentenced to death, cases in which the prosecutor
made a discretionary decision not to seek the death penalty, the nondeath sentences of codefendants, and similar cases from out of state
jurisdictions. 548 In conducting proportionality review of a death sentence imposed for murder during the course of a robbery, the Wyoming Supreme Court defined similar cases as felony murder-robbery
cases and examined 18 cases from other jurisdictions, including federal cases. While proportionality review was in effect, the Wyoming
Supreme Court never overturned a death sentence on grounds of
disproportionality.

546 But see Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Wash. 1994), affd, 64 F.3d 1432
(9th Cir. 1995). See alsoJames E. Lobsenz, UnbridledProsecutorialDiscretionand Standardless
Death Penalty Policies: The Unconstitutionality of the Washington CapitalPunishment Statutory
Scheme, 7 U. PUGEr SOUND L. REv. 299 (1984).
547 Act of March 6, 1989, ch. 171, 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws 293 (repealed the former subsection (d) (iii) of Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-103 (1977)). The former provision read: "[T]he
court shall determine if:... whether [t]he sentence of death is excessive or disproportion-

ate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-103 (Michie 1977) (repealed 1989).

retains a provision requiring the court to "determine if: ...

The statute currently

(i) the sentence of death was

imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; ... " Wyo
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-103 (Michie 1996).

548 The court addressed issues concerning proportionality prior to repeal. See Engberg
v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 555-56 (Wyo. 1984); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 88-91 (Wyo.
1983).
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PREPARING A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE SYsTEmATic EXAMINATION OF
RAACIAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISPARITIES: THE COURT'S RESPONSIBILITY

For the better part of a decade an interdisciplinary team created
a comprehensive research project to study homicide cases and their
disposition after the reenactment of capital punishment in New
Jersey.5 49 This Project began at the Department of the Public Advocate as part of an early systematic challenge by the Office of the Public
Defender to the reimposition of capital punishment in the state in
1982.550 The Public Defender Homicide Project was eventually subsumed into the more comprehensive Proportionality Review Project
of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
This appendix reports some previously unpublished data and
analyses arising from that work. 551 This supplemental research note
sets out a few of the methodological issues which must be addressed in
such an investigation and suggests possible directions for further research on the relationship between race and geographic variables in
homicide cases and capital case processing. These discrepancies go to
the heart of proportionality review. This research demonstrates the
importance of precise and reliable data collection as a predicate to
any analysis of a capital case processing system.
In Marshall f,552 the court expressed concern about the findings
of racial and geographic disparities in capital case processing in the
Proportionality Review Project (PRP) Final Report, but concluded
that the offer of proof of racial discrimination was weaker than in Mc* An earlier version of these data and analyses were presented at the 1992 Annual
Meeting of the Law and Society Association in Philadelphia, as L. Bienen and D. Mills,
"Race and County Disparities in Capital Case Processing in NewJersey," May 29, 1992.
549 David C. Baldus, Death Penalty Proportionality Review Project Final Report to the
NewJersey Supreme Court (Sept. 24, 1991) (unpublished report on file with State Documents Collection of Northwestern University School of Law Library) [hereinafter PRP Final Report].
550 The evidence of race effects in other states suggested that such effects were pervasive
and not confined to a single jurisdiction. See Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of
CapitalPunishment in NewJersey: The Role of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 41 Rurans L. REv. 27,
118-67 (1988); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PEALUTv SENTENcriNr: RESEARCH
INDIcATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DisPAIUFs (1990) [hereinafter 1990 GAO REPORT].
551 The analysis presented here is of the screened data set of 1372 homicides analyzed in
the PRP Final Report and of 264 cases comprising the Marshall data set. The 264 cases are
compiled from a subset of the 1372 plus 35 cases added by the Attorney General. See
Herbert I. Weisberg, Proportionality Review of Death Sentences in New Jersey- An Independent Analysis of Data on Capital Charging and Sentencing (Nov. 26, 1991) (unpublished report on file with the State Documents Collection of Northwestern University
University School of Law Library).
552 State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992) (Marshall II).
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Cleskey. 5 53 The court's view was that the analytic results did not justify
declaring the capital case processing system in the state unconstitutional. 55 4 Since MarshallII, further analysis on an expanded database
has resulted in significant findings of prejudice based upon the race
of the victim and defendant as well as the social status of the victim.555
The PRP Final Report and the Attorney General's Report both analyzed differences in capital case processing between urban and
nonurban jurisdictions, but found no significant effects at that
time. 556 The analysis presented here found that the victim's race had
a small effect and whether the homicide was processed in an urban
557
jurisdiction also had a small effect.
Proportionality review in capital cases has been the primary but
not the exclusive avenue for the introduction of statistical arguments
based upon racial disparities to challenge the operation of capital
punishment systems. The data presented here were developed in connection with capital appeals and other proceedings before the New
Jersey Supreme Court regarding proportionality review. They provide
a factual context for the discussion of the legal issues surrounding
proportionality review. These are the kinds of data and relationships
courts address as part of proportionality review. The issues of definition and methodological choice presented in New Jersey are typical.
The difference between New Jersey and other states was in the comprehensiveness of the data and analyses presented to the court, the
professional caliber of the social science research, and the court's will553 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
554 Marshall 1, 613 A.2d at 1110-12. The court discussed the race-of-victim and race-ofdefendent effects, and their attribution tojury decision making and prosecutorial decision
making, while specifically rejecting the holding in McCleskey v. Kemp. For a detailed discussion of how the court treated these statistical findings and a detailed comparison between
statistics on race effects presented to the United States Supreme Court in McCeskey v. Kemp
and the statistics on race effects presented to the NewJersey Supreme Court in MarshallII,
see David C. Baldus, Reflections on the "Inevitability"of RacialDiscriminationin CapitalSentencing and "Impossibility" of Its PreventionDetection, and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359,
405-13 (1994).
555 See infra Appendix C.
556 See sources cited supra note 551. Other studies directed to these and related variables include JOHN M. DAWSON & BARBARA BOLAND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MURDER IN
LARGE URBAN CourIES, 1988 (1993) [hereinafter BJS REPORT] [This data set is archived at
University of Michigan and available upon request], and Brandon S. Centerwall, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Domestic Homicide, 273 JAMA 1755-58 (1995) (citing earlier similar
studies in other jurisdictions).

557 Urban cases are defined in this analysis as cases from the New Jersey counties of
Camden, Essex, Hudson, Mercer, Passaic and Union. These six counties were the location
of the six largest cities identified as cities in economic distress by the New Jersey State
Planning Commission in 1988. See NEWJERSEy STATE PLANNInG COMM'N, COMMUNITIES OF
PLACE: THE PRELIMINARY STATE DEVELOPMENT AND REDEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE STATE OF
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ingness to address constitutional issues in the context of this
information.
In State v. Marshall11, and the cases preceding it, the court incorporated into its interpretation of the law an expert analysis of data
concerning racial disparities in capital case processing. Proportionality review in New Jersey was a live experiment in the use of social science data by a court. The court was criticized, often inaccurately, for
attempting to be as precise as possible in its adjudications regarding
facts and quantitative relationships. The data and analysis presented
here offer an additional perspective on the quantitative and methodological issues raised in these proceedings. Locating all the cases in
the jurisdiction during the time period is the first task. It requires
verification, tracking down information sources, and educated judgements about classifying cases.
I.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOMICIDE CASES AND DEATH
ELIGIBLE CASES

Where do murder cases arise in New Jersey? The distribution of
potentially death eligible homicide cases by county and year from
1982-90 is reported in Table 1.558 These 1372 homicide cases comprise only cases which had the potential of being designated death
eligible. An indictment for murder and an adjudication of that indictment qualifies a case for entry into the database. Excluded from this
data set are cases involving juveniles, indictments for death by auto,
acquittals in a murder trial, and non-penalty trial cases that involved
indictments for less than murder and homicides that resulted in convictions for crimes less serious than aggravated manslaughter.
The 1372 cases include all murder indictments, including cases
which were disposed of by a plea to murder, felony murder or aggravated manslaughter when the original charge was a form of murder, a
jury conviction for murder or for felony murder, and a capital murder
conviction. This data set is based upon final adjudications at the trial
court stage, irrespective of the result upon appeal. 55 9
558 The PRP Master File is an unusually comprehensive and complete data set on potentially capital murder cases for the period since reenactment. It was compiled and cross
checked on the basis of multiple sources, including trial court judgments, indictments,
state police arrest files, department of corrections records of persons serving a sentence for
murder, United States Department ofJustice Promis/Gavel prosecutorial case processing
files and other sources. See PRP Final Report, supra note 549, at 2-15 (describing methodology used in compiling the file of 1372 homicide cases).
559 The PRP Final Report discusses how instances of retrials and reversals on appeal
were classified. Since the NewJersey Supreme Court was interpreting the NewJersey capital punishment statute during the pendency of the compilation of this data base the PRP
Final Report retrospectively incorporated evolving rules restricting application of the capi-
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Not surprisingly, the counties with large urban centers accounted
for the majority of homicides. Essex County, which includes Newark,
is represented by 393 cases, 28.6% of the entire data set; Hudson,
11.5%; Camden, 10.2%; Passaic, 7.7%; and Union, 5.3%. All other
counties combined accounted for another 34.8% of the entire data
set. The top five counties in terms of incidence, all counties with a
large urban center, account for 63.4% of all murders during the period. More than half of the potentially capital murders occurred in
the urban counties. Mercer County, which includes the state capital,
Trenton, accounted for an additional 65 cases (4.7%). Altogether,
these six counties, which include the older urban centers, accounted
for 68.1% of all potentially death eligible cases. Cases from the six
counties with a large urban center are the urban cases.
II.

COUNTING THE DEAD: WHERE ARE THE BRIGHT LINES?

Homicide is an appealing research topic both because it is the
most serious of crimes against the person and because there are some
bright line distinctions. 5 60 Although race was not a razor sharp definition, being dead or alive was. These cases rarely involved circumstances in which victims lingered on life support, raising
philosophical, medical and ethical questions about the definition of
"dead."5 61 In few of these cases was cause of death an issue. Similarly,
time of death and the effective date of the statute, August 6, 1992, was
a bright line distinction. Only homicides which occurred after the
effective date of the reenactment of capital punishment in NewJersey
were eligible for capital prosecution, and only if the other criteria defining death eligibility were met.
Entry into the data base was triggered by a homicidal event and
the filing of an indictment or a formal accusation for a homicide oftalstatute. Id. at 15-18.
In the BJS Report, "The murder data were collected from the prosecutors' offices in
the 33 sampled counties .... The criterion for including a case on a roster from which
cases would be sampled was that (a) one or more defendants must have been charged with
murder, and (b) the matter must have been adjudicated during 1988 ....Only 6 of the 33
counties had more than 200 cases." BJS REPORT, supra note 556, at 10. Note that three of
the states, Michigan, New York, and Massachusetts, including 6 counties, did not have capital statutes in 1988. Note also that New Jersey, and consequently Essex County was not
included in the sample.
560 Homicide is an area of great interest for researchers and policy makers, perhaps
because the threat of homicide brings out a primordial fear.
561 The likelihood of death in an automobile accident is far higher than the likelihood
of being a victim of homicide, although people are much more apprehensive about being
the victim of a homicide. When populations are divided by race, sex, and age, the likelihood of death from homicide drops dramatically for all groups except young adult black
men.
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fense. A bright line distinction existed for the definition of homicide,
if not for murder-which requires a pretrial judgment as to the intent
or motive of the defendant. The definitions of other circumstances
relevant to capital charging also involved judgments as to the presence of a factual basis for a statutory aggravating factor.
III.

SOURCE OF DATA

The tables and analyses presented here are based upon 1372
murder cases presented to the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.
MarshallI and upon a modified and slightly expanded subset of that
data base consisting of 246 potentially death eligible ("death possible") homicide cases which was developed in 1991 as part of the proportionality review in State v. Marshall1.562 The 264 case database was
compiled by the NewJersey Office of the Attorney General within the
context of litigation concerning proportionality review. 568 The larger
data set of 1372 cases does not include data on race of the victim. It is,
however, a very accurate description of the incidence of murder and
5 64
the distribution of murders across counties.
The Proportionality Review Project addressed the issue of aggravating circumstances when it divided the PRP Master File into three
categories: cases which were presumptively death eligible (clearly in);
cases which were not death eligible under New Jersey law (clearly
out), and cases where it was undetermined whether or not the case
could have supported a capital case prosecution. 565 In this paper the
terminology "death possible" is used instead of "clearly in."
The data base of 264 cases form the principal basis for the analysis and discussion here. There is no regression analysis subsequent to
562 State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (1992) (Marshall II). The data set of 1372 murder
cases includes all homicide cases during the period 1982-1990 which were verified as mur-

der cases and hence potentially eligible for capital prosecution after the effective date of
the NewJersey capital statute. The subset of 264 cases were those cases determined to be
eligible for prosecution as capital cases by both the Attorney General and the Office of the
Public Defender. The technical aspects of the data collection and analysis, and the methodological disputes between the Attorney General's expert, Herbert I. Weisberg, and the
Special Master, Professor David Baldus, are set out in detail in "The Proportionality Review
of New Jersey Death Sentences," Chance, Oct. 1993 at 8.
563 The 35 cases in which a notice of factors was served, but the case did not reach
penalty phase, are identified in Weisberg, supranote 551, at app. A. The Weisberg analysis
was presented to the NewJersey Supreme Court by the Office of the Attorney General on

November 26, 1991, during the course of the litigation of the proportionality review case in
Marshall ff. See Weisberg, supra note 551, at app. A. A different data set of 703 cases, see
Bienen et al., supra note 550, at 288-326, identifies other cases in which a notice of factors
was served but the case did not reach penalty phase. These files have not been merged.
564 See infra tables B1, B2, B5, B6a, and B6b.

565 This screening procedure is described in detail in PRP Final Report, supra note 549,

at 4-12.
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that included in the PRP Final Report. These tables are a set of preliminary screens of the data set of 1372 potentially death eligible murder cases superimposed against external variables. The hypothesis was
that these variables might explain variances in the more comprehensive and detailed data set of 264 murder cases which were determined
to have the potential of being death eligible after a rigorous analysis of
their facts in an adversarial context. 56 6 This analysis compares the distribution of murder cases across the counties, the distribution of cases
chosen for capital case processing across counties and the distribution
of capital case
of death sentences. This paper continues the analysis
56 7
processing by stages, reported in prior research.
This investigation verifies the observation that counties have
vastly different rates of capital prosecution and conviction. The anecdotal explanations for these differences range from the aggressive
character of individual county prosecutors to the observation that capital prosecutions cost a great deal of money-therefore certain identifiable counties cannot afford to prosecute all eligible cases capitallyto the suggestion that the different rates of capital prosecution and
conviction are the result of changing prosecutorial policies over
time.568

Given the history of capital punishment in New Jersey and other
states, all parties involved, including the New Jersey Supreme Court
have been extremely sensitive to allegations that race, socioeconomic
status, gender or other impermissible extra-legal criteria were influencing the capital charging and sentencing decision. The PRP Final
Report reported a significant race effect for Black defendants at penalty phase and a significant race effect for White victim cases at the
stage of advancing to penalty phase. 5 69 In 1995, the Administrative
566 One issue in Marshallconcerned the classification of cases involving deadlocked juries, the treatment and definition of relative and comparative culpability for the purpose of
proportionality review, and the classification of particular cases. None of these adversarial
issues is relevant to the discussion here. Figure 1 describes case flow through the New
Jersey capital charging and sentencing system and was presented to the New Jersey
Supreme Court by the Attorney General. See Weisberg, supranote 551. The classification
of a case as death possible was made on the basis of submissions of fact by prosecutors and
defense attorneys, in an adversarial setting where attention was paid to the legal
implications.
567 See Bienen et al., supra note 550. The stages to a death verdict at trial are: Death

Possible Case, Notice of Factors served, Capital Trial, Penalty Phase, and Death Verdict
imposed. Id. at 332 Fig.2.
568 The PRP Final Report offers another hypothesis: that the county prosecutors
changed their charging practices in response to the evolving capital jurisprudence of the
New Jersey Supreme Court. See PRP Final Report, supra note 549, at 20-22. Some regression analysis in the report is directed towards testing that proposition. See id-at 18-24.
569

Our analysis of the penalty-trial sentencing decision suggests that black offenders may
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Office of the Courts released new statistically significant findings of
discrimination based upon race 5in70 the proportionality review of the
death sentence of Joseph Harris.
IV.

THE IDENTIFICATION OF URBAN CASES

The initial screening of murder cases included, where the data
were available, a screen on the basis of defendant and victim race.
Data on race of defendant were available for the 1372 murder cases,
and data on defendant and victim race were available for the 264
death possible murder cases.
The purpose of this analysis is to explore whether or not the urban character of an individual county was predictive of whether or not
a case was prosecuted as a capital trial and/or resulted in a death sentence.571 This is a preliminary exploration of some relationships between the distribution of murder cases across NewJersey counties and
the distribution of capital case prosecutions across these counties. It
asks whether differing rates seem to be correlated with aggregate variables related to the character of counties themselves, such as economic or demographic indicators. It goes beyond what was included
in the PRP Final Report. These basic data provide important background for the understanding of statistically significant findings which
occur in subsequent regression analyses.
V.

THE MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS OF RACE IN THE PUBLIC.
DEFENDER HOMICIDE STUDY

Murder occurs among all social and economic groups. What we

did not know was: why some murders are treated more seriously than
others, and why some murders threaten the communities' concern for
safety and security, while others do not. Who decides what small
number of murders will be treated as capital cases and consequently
be subject to intense scrutiny by the public and the criminal justice
system and the media? Prosecutors designate crimes as capital accordbe at greater risk of receiving a death sentence than similarly situated white and His-

panic defendants.... [FN. these same data showed no race-of-victim effects in the
penalty-trial decisions.] ... The model we developed to explain which cases advanced
to a penalty trial showed no race of defendant effects. It did suggest, however, that
cases with white victims may be at greater risk of advancing to penalty trial than cases
involving black or hispanic victims.
Id. at 101, 103.
570 See infraAppendix C.
571 In New Jersey, cases are designated capital by the procedure of serving a notice of
factors. The decision to serve a notice of factors is made unilaterally by each individual
county prosecutor. While county prosecutors in New Jersey are not elected, they are selected and appointed in a process which is politically controlled at the county level.
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ing to criteria which are as objective as the statutory aggravating factors. The criminal justice system apparently designates crimes as
capital according to other circumstances as well. Police and other record keepers play a role in these decisions, as well as prosecutors. If
race is a factor in this equation, how would we measure its influence
and effects? And do racial disparities imply constitutionally impermissible racial discrimination?
One challenging aspect of this study, and indeed of all quantitative research, has been to measure and estimate with accuracy the relationships and influences observed during the initial data collection,
as well as to test opinions formed during several years of practice in
the criminal justice system. The Public Defender Research Team and
many others who did not believe that race was a neutral or insignificant variable, although the experienced researchers were aware that
the precise delineation or identification of a race effect would never
572
be simple or straightforward.
The first decisions were practical ones. How was race to be measured? What were valid racial categories? What should be used as indications of racial identity? This seemingly simple task of data
collection was not straightforward. At times, the presentence reports
classified defendants, and less frequently victims, as Black, White or
Hispanic, but these classifications were not consistent or always present. Official documents also used other racial or ethnic categories,
such as Asian, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Negro, Mixed, Indian, Polish or Greek. In this data set, the number of individuals identified as "other" was so small that this designation was negligible. The
defendant's race in the data set of 1372 cases was independently verified from several sources. Similarly the race of the defendant and victim in the data set of 264 cases was based on multiple sources.
The methodological design of the Public Defender Homicide
Study, the source of data on a large number of these cases, included,
among other things, interviews with defense attorneys. The defense
attorney was asked to verify the race of the defendant, whom she met
in a face to face client interview, and the race of the victim, based
upon her knowledge of the circumstances of the offense. In cases
where the defendant and victim were of mixed race, race was identified as the race of the mother of the defendant or victim. These theoretical problems were not large practical problems in this study, with
one exception: how to classify Hispanic victims and defendants.
Separately identifying Hispanics as a racial category was necessary, although problematic. Hispanic is not a racial category of the
572 See infra table B2.
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573 Hispanics
U.S. Census, and definitional problems are plentiful.
were, at the time of this research, a growing ethnic group within the
state, concentrated in principal metropolitan areas. Hispanics were
disproportionately represented in both low income areas and as defendants and victims in the criminal justice system and in homicide
cases. For example, the trial jurisdiction of Hudson County (which
encompasses Jersey City) and Camden County both include a large
number of Hispanics. Hispanics as a group were separately identified
in the data base because Hispanics were perceived as a distinct group
by decision makers in the criminal justice system. 5 74 Hispanic was defined as a separate racial category for both victims and defendants in
spite of the definitional and methodological problems, because it was
an additional piece of information which might be relevant to some
aspects of decision making in the capital case processing system.5 7 5 It
might affect prosecutorial charging decisions for a variety of reasons,
including differences in the availability of a reliable factual foundation
for cases involving Whites, Blacks and Hispanics.
There are definitional and methodological problems with all racial and ethnic categorizations, ranging from classifying a person of
mixed race to the reliability and consistency of the judgment of the
persons making the classification. The Public Defender Homicide
Study used the identification of race provided by the defense attorney
in the case, and this identification was based upon both the self-identification of the defendant and the personal observation of the defense
attorney. 576
Initially, Asian was identified as a separate racial category, and
Asians do comprise a significant fraction of the population in New
573 The threshold issue was whether to adopt the U.S. Census definition of race. The
U.S. Census categories were adopted by the Public Defender Homicide Study, with the
exception of separately coding for Hispanics. Should the identification "Hispanic" be by
name, by self identification, or by the designation by a third party, such as the defense
attorney? Should all Spanish surnamed victims and defendants be included in the category? What about long time resident Puerto Ricans who might in fact be citizens? Was
citizenship a significant indicator, perhaps measuring integration within the culture of the
majority? Citizenship was often included on the presentence report, as was whether or not
the defendant was proficient in English.
574 There was anecdotal evidence that at least one county prosecutor believed that "poor
Hispanics shouldn't get the death penalty." The ethnic category Hispanic might be relevant to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In the final analysis the total number of
Hispanics in the data set of death possible cases was small, less than 8% of the 264 cases.
See Bienen et al., supra note 550, at 184 tbl.8.
575 The Proportionality Review Project did not retain the separate identification of Hispanics for either defendants or victims. See Baldus, supra note 554, 410 tbl.4.
576 At least the person providing the data had met the defendant and the defendant had
seen or knew the victim. The racial classifications were verified by the Proportionality Review Project. See Bienen et al., supra note 550, at 371 (Order ofJuly 29, 1988).
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Jersey. The Asian category was eventually collapsed into "Other."5 77
When there were insufficient numbers of Hispanics to support regression analysis, Hispanic was dropped as a category, and Hispanics were
characterized a Whites. 5 78 From the outset researchers were aware
that one of the critical variables in the study, the race of the defendant
and victim, was measured in a manner which could lead to analytical
difficulties. As a practical matter, there were very few cases in which
the racial categorization was in doubt, and they were all removed from
5 79
the database.
VI.

THE IDENTIFICATION OF CoUNTY AS A VARIABLE OF INTEREST

By contrast, the identification of county of jurisdiction for the offense was straightforward. County of jurisdiction was the county in
which the homicide occurred, except in those very few cases where a
change of venue was authorized because of pretrial publicity.5 0 Because county was the jurisdictional boundary delineating the authority
of judges, prosecutors, jurors, defense attorneys and other legal personnel, this was a bright line distinction for almost all relevant purposes. County is a very important variable for the measurement of
prosecutorial discretion, since prosecutors have the sole authority to
declare a case capital within their county.
If a county was declining economically relative to the state as a
whole or to other counties, for example, might that have an effect
upon whether or not cases would be likely to be declared capital, on
the theory that the judicial and prosecutorial institutions in such
counties would be particularly stressed? The hypothesized relationship might be that relatively poor counties could not "afford" capital
prosecutions, or conversely that counties which were declining economically were more likely to be more "punitive" in their prosecutions. Or, that counties which were rising economically might be
577 There were four victims identified as having a race of"Other" in the data base of 703
cases. See Bienen et al., supra note 550, at 170-71 tbl.2. Asians had an insignificant pres-

ence throughout this study, in spite of their number in the population.
578 Putting Hispanics with Whites was a methodological decision which made it less
likely that discrimination would be found. If the decision had been made to put Hispanics
with Blacks, a finding of discrimination against Blacks would have been subject to the criticism that the result was confounded by including Hispanics in the category, because it
would be impossible to tell how much of the effect was due to putting Hispanics in the
same category with Blacks. If such decisions are not documented, findings of racial discrimination may be subject to criticism.
579 There were no unknowns for race of defendant in the database of 703 cases; there
were four cases-which were removed-where the race of the victim was "Other." See
Bienen et al., supra note 550, 170-71.
580 See infra tables B1 and B2.
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relatively more likely to "invest" in capital prosecutions. 58 '
Large differences were apparent in the treatment of murder cases
in counties without a large urban center in comparison to murder
prosecutions in counties with a large urban center. The New Jersey
State Planning Commission in 1988 identified six large cities in New
Jersey in economic distress. These cities were: Camden, Elizabeth,
Jersey City, Newark, Patterson, and Trenton.
From 1970 to 1985, the population of the state grew by almost 5.5 per
cent. But... our six largest cities lost over 13 per cent of their population and now house the poorest segments of the NewJersey population.
From 1960 to 1985, employment in the State increased by over 70 per
cent, but our 6 largest cities lost over 35 per cent of their employment
the repositories of under-used human and public capital
and are now
5 82
resources.

There are large variations in basic demographics between counties. The picture which emerges is of vastly different circumstances
for individual counties, differences of more than 100 per cent in income and unemployment between individual counties. The general
precept is that the older cities are associated with bleak economic in-

dicators, a high crime rate, and overcrowded courts and criminal justice agencies under the pressure of significant case backlogs. This
latter factor seems to dominate the character of the county in terms of

55
capital case processing.
The most superficial observation of homicide cases and case
processing in different counties suggested that each county had its
own legal culture. The office of the county prosecutor had different
traditions in each county. Prosecutors had their own individual style
and different attitudes towards the death penalty. For example, at the
time of reenactment, not all county prosecutors and judges were in
favor of reenactment. 5 84 It was expected that the prosecutors who en581 See infra tables B3 and B4.
582 NawJmEsa STATE PLANNING COMM'N, supra note 557, at 7. In the 1990 cases, these
six cities were no longer the six largest cities in the state. The characterization of these
cities as economically distressed has not changed, however. The majority of cases in this
data set came from the mid-1980's. See infra table B1.
585 The bureaucratic pressures placed upon the courts and county budgets are another
manifestation of economic differences between counties, differences which come to be
expressed in the quality of state and local administrative services which the county is able
to provide. The courts in the distressed cities are clogged with cases. Backlogs and delays
are commonplace. In Essex County in the late 1980s, several court rooms were regularly
set aside just to handle cases which were more than five years old.
584 This discrepancy in attitudes towards capital punishment among county prosecutors
is not unique to NewJersey. Compare the reported sharp difference in prosecutorial policies between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh District Attorneys. Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest
D.A., N.Y. TIMES MAC., July 16, 1995, at 20. According to the author,
In mostjurisdictions, prosecutors file such notice [declaring a case capital] in a small
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thusiastically welcomed reenactment might be more likely to aggressively pursue capital prosecutions. However, at the time of this study
there was no urban jurisdiction with a prosecutor whose policy was to
pursue all eligible cases as capital prosecutions. Moreover, the character of a county was subtly defined by intangible factors such as the
county's sense of community, as well as by relatively measurable factors such as per capita income, degree of urbanization, and other
demographics. 58 5 The distribution of cases by race had an important
58 6
relationship to county.
Importantly, all statistics and case records were kept on the basis
of county. Data collection and preservation were handled differently
by different counties, and court administrators had different policies
regarding the release of information regarding homicide cases and
the maintenance of records. Because the county defined both the
prosecutor's and the court's authority, the county was a key variable
for recording legal decision making.
The capability to break the county down into separate variables
would have been helpful in some instances: e.g., to distinguish between cases that occurred in urban environments from cases originating in the same jurisdiction that occurred in rural or suburban
environments. For example, Mercer County includes Princeton township and borough, the wealthy suburbs surrounding Princeton, relatively wealthy farms and county estates and the urban center of
Trenton, a city in economic and social decline during the period of
the study.58 7 A murder in Princeton would occupy the front pages of
the local newspapers for weeks, or months, while murders in Trenton
of Blacks or Whites of low socio-economic status were only reported
once or twice when the circumstances were sensational, and then
dropped from public view.58 8
Trenton cases would often be resolved as pleas, although occasionally such murders might be prosecuted as capital cases and result
percentage of eligible homicides: in Pittsburgh, for example, W. Christopher Conrad,
Allegheny County's deputy district attorney for homicide, estimates that his office files
a Rule 352 [the equivalent of serving a Notice of Factors in New Jersey] in about a
quarter of the cases where aggravators are present. Philadelphia files one in virtually
every case.
Id at 42. See supra main article Part V. For a description of the character of the county in
which Robert Marshall was prosecuted see JoE McGINNIs, BLIND FArrH (1989).
585 See infra table B3.
586 See infra table B4.
587 See infra table B3.
588 For example, there was an extraordinary amount of media attention given to the
murder of Emily C. Stuart, age 74, in Princeton on March 4, 1989, including an editorial in
the New York Times. The homicide occurred in the middle of the day in a prosperous
neighborhood and remains unsolved. Charles C. Staurt, Nightmare in Princeton, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 1989, at A31.
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in a death sentence. Plea/trial was a critical case processing decision.5 8 9 The cases involving middle class White victims were more
likely to be prosecuted as capital cases, but on occasion, if the defendant was sympathetic or middle class, other idiosyncratic circumstances
of the case might also be influential. The character of the homicide
itself, its location, the manner of the killing, in addition to the race
and class identifications of the victim and defendant could also effect
the perception of the offense and perhaps influence the prosecutor's
decision to charge capital murder.5 9 0
Researchers questioned whether what was observed as an interaction of race, class and character of county could be sharpened. First,
we looked at frequencies and cross tabulations of race and county.5 91
The elusive variable of "county character" might not be precisely captured by county of jurisdiction. For example, Essex County includes
the city of Newark, but it also contains some relatively prosperous suburbs. Yet, the overwhelming number of homicides in the jurisdiction
are from the City of Newark and the legal culture of the county is
dominated by the atmosphere and dynamics of the Newark County
5 92
Courthouse, and not the middle class suburbs.
The distribution of unclassified or ambiguous cases is particularly
interesting.5 93 These cases were almost entirely in the high volume
counties, with Essex accounting for 31.6% of all ambiguous cases by
itself, and Camden, Hudson, Passaic and Union accounting for almost
exactly two thirds (59.1%) of all ambiguous cases. In terms of county
disparities this may be one part of the explanation for differing rates
of capital prosecution. The high volume urban counties do not have
the resources to investigate whether there is a factual basis for capital
murder in all potentially capital cases. Rather, they operate a triage
system.
This led us to conceptualize a variable which we labeled urban/
nonurban in an attempt to capture characteristics of some homicide
cases which might be related to the interaction of race and class,
thereby pointing the direction for further research. The 1995 regressions for proportionality review, which found significant race effects in
the Harris case, took the same approach. 5 94 A study of intra-racial
See Bienen et al., supra note 550, at 196-219 tbl.16.
590 See Leigh B. Bienen, A Good Murder 20 FORDHAM UR. LJ. 585 (1993).
591 See infra tables BI to B5.
589

592
593

See infra tables B2 to B5.
Questionable cases were cases where there was insufficient information to conclude

death eligibility. Those cases are termed "ambiguous" in the Tables included in this
appendix.
594

In Harrisboth race and the revised high status factor achieved statistical significance,

and the increased sample size allowed for the convergence of models including the preju-
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homicides in New Orleans, for example, found that different rates of
homicide for Blacks and Whites are entirely accounted for by differences in socioeconomic status between the Black and White populations, replicating results from an earlier study of Atlanta homicides. 5 95
We chose the dichotomous variable of urban/nonurban rather than
suburban/nonsuburban. 59 6 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has
consistently said that discrimination based upon socio/economic sta59 7
tus was impermissible.
While the county of jurisdiction was not always a definition for
location or associated with a type of homicide, it was a clear boundary
for all jurisdictional variables. Even though not all homicides in Essex
County occurred in urban Newark, they were nevertheless all adjudicated by the same bureaucratic and administrative court and
prosecutorial system in the Essex County Courthouse and were subject
to similar delays due to docket overcrowding. 5 98 Our research explored whether the urban character of these homicides seemed to be
associated with the reasons why they were treated the way they were in
the system, and particularly why they were not likely to be declared
capital. 59 9 Some urban homicides seemed to be unworthy of capital
prosecution even when there were statutory aggravating factors. Urban crime, like the health problems of the urban poor, the collapse of
urban school systems and the decline of urban housing stock, were
perhaps issues the relatively wealthy and secure in the suburbs choose
to avoid. If urban crime was not a threat to the suburbs, perhaps
there was little public pressure to prosecute those cases capitally.600
dicial factors. See Memorandum from David Weisburd to John P. McCarthy (Dec. 20,
1995), Appendix C infra.
595 See Centerwall, supra note 556, at 1755-58.
596 See infra table B6.
597 See State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 293-94 (N.J. 1987).
598 Whether or not the Newark County Courthouse is or should be a symbol of the sorry
state of urban justice was the subject of litigation in Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d. 742 (3d Cir.
1991), vacating as moot 753 F. Supp. 543 (D. NJ. 1990). The ChiefJustice of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey refused to allow the Newark County Courthouse to be used as the
setting for the filming of the movie Bonfire of the Vanities. "The Chief Justice based his
decision on the grounds that the scene [to be filmed] (which depicted African-Americans
rioting in a courtroom against a perceived judicial injustice) offensively stereotyped blacks
and might undermine 'their already vulnerable' confidence in the state judiciary." Id at
743.
599 See infra tables B5 and B6.
600 The BJS Report analyzed the disposition of approximately half (52%) of all murder
convictions during 1988. This study reported that less than 10% of all defendants were
charged with a capital offense, although over 80% were charged with first-degree murder.
Half of the murder defendants charged with capital murder received a life sentence and an
eighth were sentenced to death. In the total sample, 1% of the urban homicides resulted
in a death sentence being imposed. BJS Report, supranote 556, at tbls.9, 10. "Th[e] study
chose 33 counties to represent the 75 largest counties. These 75 counties, out of the Na-
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The county prosecutors were probably accurately reflecting the
most vocal part of the electorate when they chose not to delegate the
full range of prosecutorial resources to urban cases. If the defendant
and victim were both low income or low social visibility and/or of minority status, then the prosecution was more likely to be decided by a
plea, rather than prosecuted as a capital case, and to be disposed of
without public attention. Could such a proposition be measured?
The data show that while homicides originate in the urban areas,
the homicides in urban areas are much less likely to be prosecuted as
capital cases. Table BI shows the distribution of cases by year and
county of origin, for the larger data set of 1372 cases. Table B5 shows
the distribution of death possible cases and ambiguous cases for the
same 1372 cases. Table B2 shows the number and per cent of Black
defendant cases by county. The urban counties have a small proportion of death possible cases, and a larger number of ambiguous
cases. 60 1 These are also the counties with large numbers of Black defendants. 60 2 Only 13.49% of Essex County cases are death possible,
and 20.10% are ambiguous. 60 3 This discrepancy existed in the county
which accounted for the largest number of felony murders, at a time
when the presence of an underlying felony was the basis for declaring
a case capital for the slayer. 60 4 A similar pattern can be seen for Cam60 5
den and Hudson counties.
The pattern in the suburban counties was in the opposite direction. For example, Monmouth and Ocean counties both had a
greater proportion of death possible cases than ambiguous cases. The
proportion of death possible cases to ambiguous cases is especially important. The latter are the cases no one cared enough about to create
a factual foundation for death eligibility. Yet they were murder
indictments.
Across all counties there is much less discrepancy between the
tional 3,100 total, accounted for 37 per cent of the U.S. population but 63 per cent of the
22,680 murders reported to the police and 52 per cent of all murder convictions during
1988." Id. at 2. "A total of 2,539 murder cases were studied, which yielded data on 3,119
defendants and 2,655 victims .... Case weights were applied to statistics on the sampled
cases to expand them to estimates for the universe of the 75 largest counties .... Statistically weighted, the 3,119 defendants in the sample cases represented 9,576 murder defendants in the nation's 75 largest counties. The 2,655 victims represented 8,063 victims in the
75 largest counties." Id. at 10.
601 See infra table B5.
602 See infra table B4.
603 See infra table B5.
604 Essex County accounted for 24% of all felony murders reported in Leigh B. Beinen
et al., The Reimpositionof CapitalPunishment in NewJersey:Felony MurderCases, 54 ALB. L. Rv.
709, 797 (1990).
605 See infra table B5.

LEIGH B. BIENEN

278

[Vol. 87

cases that are clearly not death eligible. 60 6 The highest percentages
are Warren and Gloucester counties with over 77%, which may or may
not reflect those prosecutors lack of enthusiasm for capital cases. The
rest of the counties are around the same level. These relationships
are further evidence of how important it is to have reliable data on
noncapital cases to understand the capital case processing system as a
whole.
Table B6 confirms that 60.17% of all death eligible cases are Urban in comparison with 38.53% being from nonurban counties. The
seeming contradiction between the majority of death eligible cases being urban while urban cases seem to be downgraded is resolved by the
information in the rest of Table B6 and the figures in Table B6. Urban cases are the largest proportion of all categories, and especially
they are a disproportionately large percentage of the ambiguous
cases, 72.0%.
Table B7 points out why there is no contradiction. Only 14.85%
of all urban cases are death possible, although this is still a large
number of cases (139) and a large proportion of all death possible
cases. Urban and nonurban cases have very similar proportions of not
death eligible cases, 65.92% and 63.28%, respectively.
The examination of capital case progression analyzes the 264
cases which the Attorney General and the Special Master agreed had a
factual basis for statutory aggravating factors. Table B9 shows that of
the 158 death possible urban cases, only 48.73% were designated capital by the county prosecutor serving a notice of factors. This is in contrast to 72.64% of all nonurban cases being declared death eligible by
the county prosecutor. This is a more than 20% difference. Similarly,
a larger per cent of nonurban cases went to penalty phase, 81.82% as
opposed to 72.72%.
Table B8 shows the relationships differently. Half of all cases
which were declared capital, or death eligible, were urban seeming to
contradict the allegation that urban cases were being treated less seriously. When those numbers are put along side the difference of over
20% between urban and nonurban cases in terms of the likelihood of
being declared capital, there is no contradiction. The comparable
levels between urban and nonurban cases at subsequent stages is not
surprising, nor does it contradict the hypothesis that urban cases are
more likely to be downgraded.
Table B10 shows the ratio of death possible cases to death eligible
cases, by individual county. The lows of 42.62% for Essex and 46.15%
for Camden are expected, and do not involve small numbers. Hudson
606

Id.
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county at 52.63% is somewhat higher than expected. The large discrepancies are between Essex county (42.62%) and Monmouth
(78.95%) Middlesex (90.91%) and Mercer (61.11%) all on substantial
numbers of cases. Table 10 verifies that although the proportion of
cases declared capital in Essex is low (42.62%) Essex county nonetheless accounts for the largest per cent of all cases declared capital,
16.88%. Again, this is no contradiction. Essex county simply has lots
of homicides, enough for many to be prosecuted capitally while a
large proportion are not. Similarly, Table Bl confirms that Essex
county has the largest share of death verdicts, 20%. The death sentencing rate by county shows large variation, but juries in the urban
counties are more likely to return death verdicts, Camden at 54.55%
and Essex at 43.75%, in comparison to Middlesex at 28.57% and Monmouth at 27.27%. This calls into question the belief that urban juries
will not sentence to death. The suburban counties have a lower death
sentencing rate. Experience with a longer time period and a larger
number of cases should clarify these relationships.
An alternative, which can be explored in the future, is to create a
composite variable, consisting of a constellation of factors which together categorize the prototypical urban case. This variable could be
built around circumstances such as the following: age of defendant
and victim (if the defendant and the victim were teenagers, or both
between the ages of 16 and 21), if drugs or alcohol were involved in
the offense; whether the victim and offender were acquaintances, and
if there was a sexual relationship, including marriage; whether the
homicide occurred in the street and was accompanied by a minor robbery, and whether the victim and/or defendant were nonwhite. The
hypothesis would be that the combination of these factors made it less
likely that the prosecutor would seek the death penalty. Ideally, these
factors should be built into the construction of a variable, for they may
be relevant to decision making in the criminal justice system. The
judgments which would have to be made regarding the relative weight
of various factors would be no more complicated than the decisions
prosecutors make every time a capital prosecution is initiated.
Race and county analyzed together might capture some of this
effect. Adding the urban character of the county to the other variables might isolate the circumstances under which the race effect occurs. Race is a variable of interest because race effects have
traditionally triggered special interest, or in technical terms, a higher
level of scrutiny by reviewing courts in capital cases. If race analyzed
in conjunction with the urban character of a county identified a statistically significant effect, at least that would be a beginning for identifying a possible source of race related bias in the system. Whether the
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defendant was Black and from an urban jurisdiction is expected to
point in the direction of making the case less likely to go to trial, less
likely to be designated capital, and less likely to result in a death sentence. A small statistically significant effect in that direction was
observed.
VII.

DISTRIBUTION OF RACE OF DEFENDANT AND VIcTIM ACROSS ALL
POTENTIALLY DEATH POSSIBLE AND DEATH
ELIGIBLE HOMICIDES

The data set of 1372 cases only distinguishes between White defendants, Black defendants and all others. It does not include data on
race of victim, except for the subset of death eligible cases. The majority of murders are intra-racial in this data set, which is consistent
with research in other jurisdictions and with prior work in New
60 7
Jersey.
Slightly more than half of all murder cases statewide (709 cases,
51.7%) are reported as Black defendant cases. White defendants
comprise 33.2% of all cases and all others or missing make up a total
15.1%.608 Five of the six counties with urban centers (Essex, Camden,

Hudson, Passaic and Union) accounted for 73.6% of all cases involving Black defendants, with Essex County alone accounting for over
40% of all Black defendant cases. Mercer County accounted for an
additional 6.2% of all Black defendant cases. Black defendant cases
6 09
were overwhelmingly urban cases.
White defendant cases were more evenly distributed across the
state. No single county accounted for more than 15% of all White
defendant homicides. The urban counties of Essex and Hudson together accounted for 25.7% of all White defendant murders (12.5%
and 13.2%, respectively). Passaic and Camden (9.7% and 6.8%, respectively) were followed by Atlantic, Bergen, and Monmouth, which
were the only other counties with more than 5% of all White defendant cases.
The difference between the distribution of Black defendant murder cases and the White defendant murder cases is that the Black defendant, and presumably the Black victim murder cases, are
overwhelmingly located in the five counties with the economically depressed large urban centers.6 10 The White defendant, and presumably White victim murders, are spread throughout the state as a whole;
607 See infra table B2; see also Bienen et al., supra note 550, at 176-77 tbl.6.

608 See infra table B2.
609 Id.
610 Id.
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counties with a large number of murders have a large number of cases
with both Black and White defendants. These are the counties which
would be expected to have high rates of capital prosecution.
Looking at the proportion of murder cases which have Black or
White defendants by county, the following trend emerges: the six
counties with urban centers have a large proportion of their murders
being Black defendant cases: Essex County, 72.5% of all cases being
Black defendant cases; Camden, 61.4%; and Union, 52.0%; and Mercer, 67.7%. But other counties have a large proportion of Black defendant cases as well: Atlantic has 57.8% of all murders involving
Black defendants; and Burlington, Cape May, and Passaic counties all
61
have over 40% of all of their cases involving Black defendants. '
The counties which have more than half of their murder cases
involving White defendants are: Bergen, Cumberland, Gloucester,
Hunterdon, Morris, Ocean, Sussex, and Warren, with both Middlesex
and Somerset being at exactly 50%. The largest numbers of White
defendants are Essex, Camden and Hudson counties, although these
counties have the smallest proportion of White defendants. 612 Again,
there is no contradiction here.
These racial juxtapositions must be placed in a context in which
613 If
murder cases are screened for seriousness and death eligibility.
the majority of murders in Essex County, for example, are unintentional murders, or felony murder charges involving non-slayer participants-neither of which are eligible for capital prosecution in New
Jersey-then the fact that so many Black defendant murders occur in
Essex county or in urban counties is irrelevant to the capital prosecution rate. If that were the case, then no legally relevant implication
could be drawn from the seemingly large racial discrepancy. 614
VIII.

CAPITAL CASE PROGRESSION BY RACE OF DEFENDANT
AND VICTIM

The distribution of cases by race of defendant and victim for 264
death possible cases is set out in Table B13. Death possible cases are
almost equally divided between White victim cases and Black victim
cases.

6 15

White victim cases are much more likely to progress to the next
capital case processing stage. Almost three quarters of the White vic611 Id.
612 Id.
613
614
615

See infra table B5.
See infra table B6.
See infra table B13.
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tim cases were declared capital, 70.94%, in comparison to about half
of the Black victim cases, 49.07%.616 A similar but smaller discrepancy

exists for the next stage, but not for the final stage. The same sets of
relationships are set out for race of defendant in Table B15. The discrepancies are generally smaller than for race of victim. A similar discrepancy for the likelihood of a case progressing through the system is
observed in Table B16. White defendant cases have a 71.76% chance
of being declared capital, while Black defendant cases have only a
50.69% chance. Similar, but smaller discrepancies exist for the likelihood of being sentenced to death, once a case reaches penalty phase.
Few cases result in a capital prosecution and fewer still in a death verdict. The question is, what are the selection criteria?
These simple progressions and proportions suggest that the capital case processing system is not neutral with regard to race of the
defendant or victim, or the geographic location of the homicide. All
these discrepancies raise the possibility of constitutional issues.
CONCLUSION

Whether or not a potentially death eligible capital case was selected to be prosecuted as a capital case is likely to be influenced by
the economic health and viability of the county and its judicial system,
as well as by the seriousness or aggravation level of the offense. These
factors may influence prosecutorial decision making, especially if
prosecutors must select cases for capital prosection on basis of a triage
system.
The racial implications of this analysis are not trivial. Those urban centers identified as distressed in the 1988 NewJersey Master Plan
are disproportionately Black and Hispanic, while the relatively more
prosperous, nonurban counties are overwhelmingly White and upper
income. The nonurban counties can prosecute every death possible
case capitally.
This research offers support for the hypothesis that there are two
criminal justice systems within the state. One criminal justice system
operates within the distressed urban centers and that criminal justice
system is characterized by a crowded docket, a large number of homicides, and other familiar characteristics of social stress. These systems
have courts with large backlogs, prosecutors and defense attorneys
with extremely high caseloads, and bureaucratic and budgetary constraints upon the police and prosecutorial agencies. 617 The concenSee infra table B14.
During the period in question an important distinction existed between the manner
in which public defenders and prosecutors funded capital cases. The county prosecutors'
616
617
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tration of questionable or ambiguous cases in the urban jurisdictions
supports this hypothesis. These counties do not have the resources to
find out whether a substantial number of their cases are death eligible. They necessarily prosecute a small proportion of their capital
cases. The other criminal justice system is characterized by greater
resources, the availability of investigators, budgets that allow the staff
to investigate a large proportion of potentially capital prosecutions,
and the support and encouragement of the community to do so. If
the existence of such different norms in decision making were to be
documented, it would be relevant to constitutional arguments concerning geographical and racial disparities in capital case processing.
As a matter of passive public policy, homicides in the urban jurisdictions are downgraded. Or, to express the matter differently, the loss
of lives in these communities is not treated as if it has the same social
value as the loss of the life of a victim from a relatively more prosperous community.
This analysis suggests a methodological approach to this issue
and outlines how a factual basis would be established to prepare for a
legal analysis of such data. This and any more elaborate and rigorous
analysis is dependent first upon an accurate and comprehensive data
collection effort identifying all of the cases and their relevant characteristics. The initial investigation of the facts of cases is probably the
most important part of the enterprise, the one without which any sort
of systematic legal analysis is impossible. Any attempt to understand
race and socio-economic influences upon capital case processing cannot proceed without a firm factual foundation. Once such a factual
basis is established, many hypotheses can be investigated.
The Proportionality Review Project of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey demonstrated that a motivated court could responsibly institutionalize such data collection. The reward for such an effort will be
the court's confidence that its constitutional rulings rest on a solid
factual basis.

budgets were set by the county. The public defender budget for capital cases was funded
by the central administration, and that central administration did not put a cap on the
amount of money which could be expended on any capital defense. Indeed, it was the
position of the Office of the Public Defender that it would have been unconstitutional to
do so. Another important institutional difference between the prosecution and defense is
that the defense is always in the position of responding to the county prosecutor's unilateral decision to declare a case capital in almost all instances.
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Bi

CASE FLOW THROUGH NEWJERSEYS CAPITAL CHARGING AND
SENTENCING SYSTEM

Source: H. Weisberg "Proportionality Review of Death Sentences in NewJersey" (Attorney General's Report 1991, on file with State Data Collection, Northwestern University School of Law
Library).
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TABLE B1
DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BY YEAR AND
Year of
Offense
County'
Atlantic
Bergen
Burlington
Camden
Cape May
Cumberland
Essex
Gloucester
Hudson
Hunterdon
Mercer
Middlesex
Monmouth
Morris
Ocean
Passaic
Salem
Somerset
Sussex
Union
Warren
Column Total

285

COUNT'a

1982 c

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

14
4
2
15
0
5
21
4
14
0
2
2
6
7
2
7
2
1
0
6
1

4
7
3
20
3
2
65
4
35
2
13
6
13
5
10
16
0
2
4
11
1

13
9
7
21
2
8
55
3
35
3
11
6
10
4
8
25
1
4
0
8
0

7
6
7
17
1
4
56
8
17
0
7
12
7
2
3
16
2
1
1
14
0

8
7
3
23
1
8
54
2
17
4
9
7
6
2
0
13
0
2
2
14
4

9
6
9
14
1
0
39
5
19
0
13
8
11
4
0
14
0
2
0
5
1

116

226

223

189

187

160

Row
Total

1989

19 9 0d

4
7
7
22
2
2
47
0
14
1
7
5
3
4
0
8
3
0
1
8
2

4
2
2
5
1
0
32
1
6
0
1
3
1
2
2
6
1
0
0
5
0

1
0
0
3
0
2
24
1
2
0
2
1
1
0
2
1
1
0
0
2
0

64
48
40
140
11
31
393
28
159
10
65
50
58
30
27
106
10
12
8
73
9

147

74

40

1372

Source: New Jersey Proportionality Review Project Screened Data File (1992).
b Three cases were initially listed with an unknown county of conviction in the data base. In all
these cases county was identified: Biegenwald I (1982) (Monmouth); Manfredonia (1985)
(Morris); and Pennington (Bergen) (1986). These three cases were then placed in the
appropriate cells.
'Figures for 1982 include only those cases where the homicide occurred after August 6, 1982,
the effective date of reimposition of capital punishment.
d Figures for 1990 include two cases listed as 78 and 80, which are presumably coding errors, and
12 cases where the exact date of offense was missing. These cases were combined with the
available data for 1990. The figures for 1990 are necessarily incomplete, as are the figures for
1988 and 1989 for some counties. Homicide cases typically take two years to final disposition.
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B2

RACE OF DEFENDANT BY COUNTY

Race of
Defendant
County

White
Defendants
N

Atlantic
Bergen
Burlington
Camden
Cape May
Cumberland
Essex
Gloucester
Hudson
Hunterdon
Mercer
Middlesex
Monmouth
Morris
Ocean
Passaic
Salem
Somerset
Sussex
Union
Warren
Total
Defendants

25
26
18
31
4
21
57
19
60
6
12
25
24
20
18
44
4
6
7
19
9
456

Per cent
of all
White
Defendants
Col.

(%)
(5.48)
(5.7)
(3.95)
(6.80)
(0.88)
(4.61)
(12.5)
(4.17)
(4.37)
(1.32)
(2.63)
(5.48)
(5.26)
(4.39)
(3.95)
(9.65)
(0.88)
(1.32)
(1.54)
(4.17)
(1.97)
(100.00)

Per cent
of all
Defendants
in County
Row

(%)

Black
Defendants
N

(39.06)
(55.32)
(45.00)
(22.14)
(36.36)
(67.74)
(14.50)
(67.86)
(37.74)
(60.00)
(18.46)
(50.00)
(42.11)
(68.97)
(66.67)
(41.51)
(40.00)
(50.00)
(87.50)
(26.03)
(100)

37
16
18
86
5
3
285
7
70
2
44
18
22
5
4
43
3
3
0
38
0
709

Per cent
of all Black
Defendants
Col.

Per cent
of all
Defendants
in County
Row

(%)

(%)

(5.22)
(2.26)
(2.54)
(12.13)
(0.71)
(0.42)
(40.2)
(0.99)
(9.87)
(0.28)
(6.21)
(2.54)
(3.10)
(0.71)
(0.56)
(6.06)
(0.42)
(0.42)
(0.00)
(5.36)
(0.00)
(100.00)

All
Defendants
in County
N

(57.81)
(34.04)
(45.00)
(61.43)
(45.45)
(9.68)
(72.52)
(25.00)
(44.03)
(20.00)
(67.69)
(36.00)
(38.60)
(17.24)
(14.81)
(40.57)
(30.00)
(25.00)
(0.00)
(52.05)
(0.00)
[13721"

' Of the 1372 defendants, a total of 108 were categorized as "other" race, and the data on Race of Defendant
was missing for another 99 defendants. Essex County and Hudson County included the largest number of
,
defendants classified as "other" 26 and 23 respectively; Passaic and Camden followed with 14 and 13 other,
respectively. These were probably all Hispanic defendants. Essex and Camden had the largest number of
"missing", 25 and 10, respectively. Both Monmouth and Union listed 9 as "missing."
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TABLE

B3

COUNTY DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

County
Atlantic
Bergen
Burlington
Camden
Cape May
Cumberland
Essex
Gloucester
Hudson
Hunterdon
Mercer
Middlesex
Monmouth
Morris
Ocean
Passaic
Salem
Somerset
Sussex
Union
Warren
All NewJersey

Population
(1990)
224,327
825,380
395,066
502,824
95,089
138,053
778,206
230,082
553,099
107,776
325,824
671,780
553,124
421,353
433,203
453,060
65,294
240,279
130,943
493,819
91,607
7,730,188

Population
Density
(pers/sq mi)
400
3,525
491
2,262
373
282
6,164
708
11,858
251
1,442
2,163
1,173
898
681
2,449
193
789
251
4,782
256
1,042

Unemployment
Rate (1989-90)
5.1
2.9
3.4
4.4
6.7
7.2
5.2
4.4
6.4
2.0
3.2
3.3
3.4
2.7
4.2
5.3
5.2
2.2
3.5
4.4
4.3
4.1

Source: U.S. Census: General Population Characteristics, NewJersey, 1990.

Per Capita
Income
(1989)
$23,723
$30,967
$21,270
$19,180
$21,406
$15,869
$21,873
$18,187
$18,440
$30,301
$23,913
$23,139
$25,393
$29,961
$20,844
$20,977
$16,933
$32,469
$23,782
$25,328
$21,327
$23,671
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TABLE

B4

POPULATION CHANGES BY COUNTY AND RACE,

1980-90

Black Population,
Black
Black
Per cent
Total
Total
Population Population change Population Population Per cent change
1980-1990
1990
1980
1980-1990
1990
1980

(%)

(%)
Atlantic
Bergen
Burlington
Camden
Cape May
Cumberland
Essex
Gloucester
Hudson
Hunterdon
Mercer
Middlesex
Monmouth
Morris
Ocean
Passaic
Salem
Somerset
Sussex
Union
Warren
All NewJersey

194,119
845,385
362,542
471,650
82,266
132,866
851,304
199,917
556,972
87,361
307,863
595,893
503,173
407,630
346,038
447,585
64,676
203,129
116,119
504,094
84,429
7,365,011

224,327
825,380
395,066
502,824
95,089
138,053
778,206
230,082
553,099
107,776
325,824
671,780
553,124
421,353
433,203
453,060
65,294
240,279
130,943
493,819
91,607
7,730,188

(15.56)
(-2.37)
(8.97)
(6.61)
(15.59)
(3.90)
(-8.59)
(15.09)
(-0.70)
(23.37)
(5.83)
(12.74)
(9.93)
(3.37)
(25.19)
(1.22)
(0.96)
(18.29)
(12.77)
(-2.04)
(8.50)
(4.96)

34,134
33,043
45,471
67,232
5,157
19,868
316,440
16,936
70,050
1,123
55,545
35,768
42,985
10,017
9,439
59,171
9,744
10,123
680
81,207
933
925,066

39,064
40,031
56,545
81,665
5,334
23,318
316,262
19,935
79,770
2,217
61,481
53,629
47,229
12,491
12,035
66,077
9,567
14,824
1,242
92,807
1,302
1,035,386

(14.44)
(21.15)
(24.35)
(21.47)
(3.43)
(17.36)
(-0.06)
(17.71)
(13.88)
(97.42)
(10.69)
(49.94)
(9.87)
(24.70)
(27.50)
(11.67)
(-1.82)
(46.44)
(82.65)
(14.28)
(39.55)
(11.93)

Source: NJ. Dept. of Labor, State Data Center, 1989, NewJersey County Data Summary 1991b.
New Jersey Population Trends 1790-1990.
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TABLE B5
CAPrrAL CASE STATUS By COUNTY

County
Atlantic
Bergen
Burlington
Camden
Cape May
Cumberland
Essex
Gloucester
Hudson
Hunterdon
Mercer
Middlesex
Monmouth
Morris
Ocean
Passaic
Salem
Somerset
Sussex
Union
Warren
Total

(N = 1372)

Per cent
Per cent
Per cent
Deathof total
of total
of total
Possible in County Ambiguous in County Not Death in County Total Cases
b
Cases'
Row
Cases
Row
Eligible'
Row
in County
N
(%)
N
(%)
N
(%)
N
16
10
8
25
3
0
53
6
15
1
16
8
14
7
7
14
1
3
3
16
2
231

(25.00)
(21.28)
(20.00)
(17.86)
(27.27)
(0.00)
(13.49)
(21.43)
(9.43)
(10.00)
(24.62)
(16.00)
(24.56)
(24.14)
(25.93)
(13.21)
(10.00)
(25.00)
(37.50)
(21.92)
(22.22)

5
11
6
34
1
10
79
4
21
3
11
9
8
7
2
21
2
1
1
14
0
250

(7.81)
(23.40)
(15.00)
(24.29)
(9.09)
(32.26)
(20.10)
(14.29)
(13.21)
(30.00)
(16.92)
(18.00)
(14.04)
(24.14)
(7.41)
(19.81)
(20.00)
(8.33)
(12.50)
(19.18)
0.00

43
26
26
81
7
21
261
18
123
6
38
33
35
15
18
71
7
8
4
43
7
891

(67.19)
(55.32)
(65.00)
(57.86)
(63.64)
(67.74)
(66.41)
(64.29)
(77.36)
(60.00)
(58.46)
(66.00)
(61.40)
(51.72)
(66.67)
(66.98)
(70.00)
(66.67)
(50.00)
(58.90)
(77.78)

64
47
40
140
11
31
393
28
159
10
65
50
57
29
27
106
10
12
8
73
9
1372

Possible cases have a factual basis for capital prosecution. In the Proportionality
Review Project Final Report these are the cases labelled "clearly in".
aDeath

bAmbiguous cases are those designated as Category 2 by the Proportionality Review
Project. These are cases in which there is not enough information to determine whether
or not there is a factual basis for capital prosecution.
C Not Death Eligible cases are those termed "dearly out" by the Proportionality Review
Project. These are cases where there was no factual basis for capital prosecution. These
included cases by non-slayer participants in felony murders.
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TABLE
URBAN/NONURBAN

B6

STATUS OF CAPITAL CASES

BY CASE CATEGORYa
Death Possible Casesb
Urbanc
NonUrban
Total
Ambiguous Cases'
Urban
NonUrban
Total
Not Death Eligiblee
Urban
NonUrban
Total
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(N
N
139
89

=

1372)
(%)
(60.17)
(38.53)

231

(100.0)

180
70

(72.0)
(28.0)

250

(100.0)

617
274
891

(69.25)
(30.75)
(100.0)

aThree cases were missing data on Urban/Nonurban.
bDeath Possible cases have a factual basis for capital prosecution. In the Proportionality
Review Project Final Report these are the cases labelled "clearly in".
'Urban cases are from Camden, Essex, Hudson, Mercer, Passaic and Union counties.
dAmbiguous cases are those designated as Category 2 by the Proportionality Review
Project. These are cases in which there is not enough information to determine whether
or not there is a factual basis for capital prosecution.
'Not Death Eligible cases are those termed "clearly out" by the Proportionality Review
Project. These are cases where there was no factual basis for capital prosecution. These
included cases by non-slayer participants in felony murders.
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TABLE B7
CAPITAL CASE STATUS, PER CENT OF ALL

URBAN/NONURBAN

(N

1372)'

Capital Case Status

Urbanb
Col. %
(N)

NonUrban
Col. %
(N)

Death Possiblec

14.85
(139)

20.55
(89)

Ambiguousd

19.23
(180)

16.17
(70)

Not Death Eligible'

65.92
(617)

63.28
(274)

100.0
(936)

100.0
(433)

Total

'Three cases are missing data on Urban/Nonurban status.
b Urban cases are from Camden, Essex, Hudson, Mercer, Passaic and Union counties.
'Death Possible cases have a factual basis for capital prosecution. In the Proportionality
Review Project Final Report these are the cases labelled "clearly in".
dAmbiguous cases are those designated as Category 2 by the Proportionality Review
Project. These are cases in which there is not enough information to determine whether
or not there is a factual basis for capital prosecution.
e Not Death Eligible cases are those termed "clearly out" by the Proportionality Review
Project. These are cases where there was no factual basis for capital prosecution. These
included cases by non-slayer participants in felony murders.
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B8

CAPITAL CASE STATUS, By URBAN/NONURBAN,

COLUMN PERCENTAGES
Death Possible'

Death Eligibleb

(N = 264)
Penalty Phase'

Death Verdict °

(N)

(N)

(N)

(N)

Urban

59.85
(158)

50.0
(77)

52.94
(56)

45.71
(16)

NonUrban

40.15
(106)

50.0
(77)

47.06
(63)

54.29
(19)

Total

100.0
(264)

100.0
(154)

100.0
(119)

100.0
(35)

a Death Possible cases have a factual basis for capital prosecution.

Death Eligible cases are those prosecuted as capital cases (Notice of Factors served).
'Penalty phase cases reached the second stage of a capital trial, the penalty phase.
d Death verdict cases had a death sentence imposed at the penalty phase.
b
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TALE B9
CAPITAL CASE PROGRESSION, By U AN/NoNURBAN,
PERCENTAGES

Row

(N = 264)

Death Possible

Death Eligibleb

Penalty Phasec

Death Verdict"

(N)

(N)

(N)

(N)

Urban

100.0
(158)

48.73
(77)

72.72
(56)

28.57
(16)

NonUrban

100.0
(106)

72.64
(77)

81.82
(63)

30.16
(19)

Total

100.0
(264)

58.33
(154)

77.27
(119)

29.41
(35)

aDeath Possible cases have a factual basis for capital prosecution.

Death Eligible cases are those prosecuted as capital cases (Notice of Factors served).
c Penalty phase cases reached the second stage of a capital trial, the penalty phase.
d Death verdict cases are those where a death sentence was imposed at the penalty phase.
b
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TABLE B10

DEATH

ELIGIBILITY STATUS,
AND PERCENTAGES

By COUNTY,
(N = 264)

NUMBER

Death Eligible

Atlantic
Bergan
Burlington
Camden
Cape May
Essex
Gloucester
Hudson
Hunterdon
Mercer
Middlesex
Monmouth
Morris
Ocean
Passaic
Salem
Somerset
Sussex
Union
Warren
Total New Jersey

Death Possible
Cases'
N

Death Eligible
Cases
N

Death Possible
Col. I/Col. 2

Per cent
of total
Death Eligible
Col.

(%)

(%)

16
13
9
26
3
61
6
19
1
18
11
19
9
8
14
1
4
3
20
3
264

9
9
5
12
1
26
4
10
1
11
10
15
7
8
7
1
3
1
11
3
154

(56.25)
(69.23)
(55.56)
(46.15)
(33.33)
(42.62)
(66.67)
(52.63)
(100.00)
(61.11)
(90.91)
(78.95)
(77.78)
(100.00)
(50.00)
(100.00)
(75.00)
(33.33)
(55.00)
(100.00)
(58.33)

(5.84)
(5.84)
(3.25)
(7.79)
(0.65)
(16.88)
(2.60)
(6.49)
(0.65)
(7.14)
(6.49)
(9.74)
(4.55)
(5.19)
(4.55)
(0.65)
(1.95)
(0.65)
(7.14)
(1.95)
(100.0)

' Death Possible cases have a factual basis for capital prosecution.
bDeath Eligible cases are those prosecuted as capital cases (Notice of Factors served).
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TABLE

Bl

PENALTY TRIALs AND DEATH VERDIcTS, By COUNTY, NUMBER AND
PERCENTAGES

(N

=119)

Death Verdicts
State
Atlantic
Bergan
Burlington
Camden
Cape May
Essex
Gloucester
Hudson
Hunterdon
Mercer
Middlesex
Monmouth
Morris
Ocean
Passaic
Salem
Somerset
Sussex
Union
Warren
Total

Penalty Trials
N
8
7
4
11
1
16
4
7
1
8
7
11
6
7
7
1
2
1
7
3
119

Death Verdicts
N
3
2
2
6
0
7
2
0
0
2
2
3
1
3
1
0
0
0
0
1
35

Penalty Trials
Col. 2/Col. 1
(37.50)
(28.57)
(50.00)
(54.55)
(0.00)
(43.75)
(50.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(25.00)
(28.57)
(27.27)
(16.67)
(42.86)
(14.29)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(33.33)
(29.41)

Death Verdicts,
% of Total
Death Verdicts
Col. %
(8.57)
(5.71)
(5.71)
(17.14)
(0.00)
(20.00)
(5.71)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(5.71)
(5.71)
(8.57)
(2.86)
(8.57)
(2.86)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(2.86)
(100.0)

' 119 cases of the 264 Death Possible cases went to penalty trial, with 35 death sentences
imposed.
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B12

RACE OF VICTIM, BY RACE OF DEFENDANT DEATH POSSIBLE
CASESa (N = 2 6 4 )b

Victim Race White
Victim Race Black
Victim Race
Hispanic and Other
Total Cases
Per cent of Total
Cases

Defendant Race
White
N

Defendant Race
Black
N

Defendant Race
Hispanic and
Other'
N

(%)

(%)

(%)

75
(28.41)
2
(0.76)
8
(3.03)

33
(12.50)
101
(38.26)
10
(3.79)

9
(3.41)
5
(1.89)
21
(7.96)

117
(44.32)
108
(40.91)
39
(14.77)

85

144

35

264

(32.20)

(54.55)

(12.50)

(100.00)

a Death Possible cases have a factual basis for capital prosecution.
b Data

on race of victim not available for N = 1372.
'Eight cases were coded "other" on either race of defendant or victim.

Total Percent
of Total Cases
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TABLE B13
CAPITAL CASE STATUS, BY RACE OF VICTIM,
COLUMN PERCENTAGES
Death Possibleb

White Victim
Black Victim
Hispanic & Otherr
Total

(N = 264) a

Death Eligiblec

Penalty Phased

Death Verdicte

(N)

(N)

(N)

(N)

44.32
(117)
40.91
(108)
13.26
(39)
100.0
(264)

53.90
(83)
34.42
(53)
11.69
(18)
100.0
(154)

57.98
(69)
30.25
(36)
11.76
(14)
100.0
(119)

57.14
(20)
37.14
(13)
5.76
(2)
100.0
(35)

on race of victim not available for N = 1372.
cases have a factual basis for capital prosecution.
c Death Eligible cases are those prosecuted as capital cases (Notice of Factors served).
d Penalty phase cases reached the second stage of a capital trial, the penalty phase.
'Death verdict cases had a death sentence imposed at the penalty phase.
fEight cases were coded "other".
aData
b
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TABLE

B14

CAPITAL CASE PROGRESSION, BY RACE OF VICTIM, Row
PERCENTAGES (N = 264)
Death Possiblea

Death Eligible'

Penalty Phasec

Death Verdict d

(N)

(N)

(N)

(N)

100.0
(117)

70.94
(83)

83.13
(69)

28.99
(20)

Hispanic & Other'

100.0
(108)
100.0
(39)

49.07
(53)
46.15
(18)

67.92
(36)
77.78
(14)

36.11
(13)
14.29
(2)

Total

100.0
(264)

58.33
(154)

77.27
(119)

29.41
(35)

White Victim
Black Victim

' Death Possible cases have a factual basis for capital prosecution.
'Death Eligible cases are those prosecuted as capital cases (Notice of Factors served).
cPenalty phase cases reached the second stage of a capital trial, the penalty phase.
d Death Verdict cases had a death sentence imposed at the penalty phase.
' Includes eight cases coded "other" race.

1996]

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
TABLE
CAPITAL CASE STATUS,

B15

By RACE

OF DEFENDANT,

COLUMN PERCENTAGES
All Cases Death Possible'

Race of Defendant
White
Black
Hispanic & Other"
Total

Death Eligibleb Penalty Phasec Death Verdicte

(N)

(N)

(N)

(N)

(N)

33.24
(456)
51.68
(709)
15.08
(207)
100.00
(1372)

32.20
(85)
54.55
(144)
12.50
(33)
100.00
(264)

39.61
(61)
47.40
(73)
12.99
(20)
100.00
(154)

42.02
(50)
46.22
(55)
11.76
(14)
100.00
(119)

45.71
(16)
51.43
(18)
2.86
(1)
100.00
(35)

'Death Possible cases have a factual basis for capital prosecution.
b Death Eligible cases are those prosecuted as capital cases (Notice of Factors served).
Penalty phase cases reached the second stage of a capital trial, the penalty phase.
d Death Verdict cases had a death sentence imposed at the penalty phase.
e Includes two cases coded "other" race.
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TABLE
CAPITAL CASE PROGRESSION,

Row

B16
By RACE

OF DEFENDANT,

PERCENTAGES

All Cases Death Possiblea Death Eligibleb Penalty Phase' Death Verdictd
Race of Defendantl
White
Black
Hispanic & Other t
Total

(N)

(N)

(N)

(N)

(N)

100.0
(456)
100.0
(709)
100.0
(207)
100.0
(1372)

18.64
(85)
20.31
(144)
15.94
(33)
19.24
(264)

71.76
(61)
50.69
(73)
60.61
(20)
58.33
(154)

81.97
(50)
74.34
(55)
70.00
(14)
77.27
(119)

32.00
(16)
32.73
(18)
7.14
(1)
29.41
(35)

Death Possible cases have a factual basis for capital prosecution.
Death Eligible cases are those prosecuted as capital cases (Notice of Factors served).
c Penalty phase cases reached the second stage of a capital trial, the penalty phase.
d Death Verdict cases had a death sentence imposed at the penalty phase.
' Includes two cases coded "other" race.
b
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TABLE

B17

DEATH SENTENCES IN NEw JERSEY BY DATE IMPOSED, COUNTY OF
DISPOSITION, RACE OF DEFENDANT AND VICTIM, AND STATUS
ON APPEAL
Date Death
Sentance
Imposed
5/17/83
12/8/83
12/15/83
2/11/84
2/21/84
5/19/84
6/6/84
7/13/84
9/28/84
10/30/84
11/19/84
1/28/85
2/22/85
3/19/85
5/10/85
6/12/85
8/16/85
10/24/85
3/5/86
3/18/86
4/4/86
4/21/86
10/17/86
11/10/86
2/3/87
2/7/87
3/13/87
5/22/87
5/28/87
6/15/87
6/30/87
10/21/87
1/25/88
9/11/90
12/12/90
1/14/93
2/5/93
5/25/93
5/28/93
11/2/94
12/6/94
12/16/94
5/17/95
6/22/95
3/1/96
3/27/96
5/24/96
6/26/96
on Proportionality Review as

Date Death
Race of
Sentance
Defendant
Reversed
and Victim
3/15/87
B/B
3/5/87
W/W
8/2/88
B/B
12/8/88
B/B
6/9/89
B/B
10/25/88
B/W
W/W
10/7/88
4/15/87
W/W
B/B
8/2/88
8/3/88
W/O(code W)
WAV
10/26/88
B/B
7/19/90
W/W
6/21/89
W/VW
6/11/90
W/W
8/3/89
W/W
10/22/88
W/W
7/19/90
B/W
6/2/90
WAV
[7/28/921*
B/B
1/25/91
B/B
7/12/90
8/30/90
B/B
B/W
10/18/90
B/W
7/12/90
B/B
7/25/91
B/W
4/18/90
W/W
4/15/87
B/B
5/20/91
W/W
5/2/89
W/VW
6/21/90
B/B
1/23/91
H/H
8/8/91
W/W
3/12/90
B/B
[6/30/941*
W/W
[12/21/941*
B/W
12/21/94
W/W
[7/26/951*
H/H
7/12/95
B/W
PPR
B/W
8/8/96
B/W
PPR
B/W
PDA
B/B
PDA
W/W
PDA
B/W
PDA
W/W
PDA
B/W
PDA
B/W
PDA
Pending decision on direct appeal as of

County
Name of Defendant
Essex
Thomas Ramseur
Monmouth
Richard Biegenwald
Monmouth
Marko Bey
Mercer
James Williams
Camden
James Hunt
Atlantic
Walter Gerald
James Zola
Mercer
Ocean
Benjamin Lodato
Marko Bey
Monmouth
Morris
Tames Koedatich
Passaic
Marie Moore
Essex
Roy Savage
Darryl Pius
Camden
Bryan Coyle
Middlesex
Steven Davis
Atlantic
Teddy Rose
Essex
Walter Johnson
Gloucester
Ronald Long
Atlantic
Robert Marshall
Ocean
Walter Oglesby
Camden
Anthony McDougald
Essex
Burlington
,James Clausell
Nathaniel Harvey
Middlesex
Tacinto Hightower
Burlington
Phillip Dixon
Camden
Kevin Jackson
Ocean
Raymond Kise
Warren
Arthur Perry
Camden
Dominic Sehiavo
Gloucester
Frank Pennington
Bergen
Samuel Moore
Essex
Samuel Erazo
Essex
Anthony Diftisco
Essex
Marko Bev
Monmouth
John Martini
Bergen
Bobby Lee Brown
Warren
Anthony DiFrisco
Essex
Rigoberto Mejia
Monmouth
Joseph Harris
Morris
Jacinto Hightower
Burlington
Donald Loftin
Mercer
Nathaniel Harvey
Middlesex
David Cooper
Monmouth
Tohn Chew
Middlesex
Ambrose Harris
Mercer
Richard Feaster
Gloucester
Joseph Harris
Bergen
Robert Morton
Burlington
PPR = Pending decision
of 9/1/96. PDA
9/1/96.
* = [sentence affirmed]
As of 9/1/96 48 death sentences have been imposed and 35 have been vacated. Four death sentences have been
affirmed after proportionality review:. Robert Marshall, Marko Bey, John Martini, and Anthony DiFrisco.
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APPENDIX C

MEMO: PREJuDICIAL FACTORS DEATH IN SENTENCING
ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSE.
LOFTIN

STATE v.DONALD

The following are two recent New Jersey Supreme Court documents relating to proportionality review. The first is an internal
memo produced for the Harriscase, and the second is an Order of the
Court in the Loftin case.
MEMO
618
To: John P. McCarthy, Jr.
6 19
From: David Weisburd
Re: Prejudicial Factors Death in Sentencing
Date: December 20, 1995
The issue of prejudicial factors has been raised from the outset in
proportionality review in New Jersey. In particular, the possibility of
race bias in death sentencing has been discussed and analyzed in work
conducted by David Baldus and his colleagues acting as Special Master
for the court. While early results suggested some race bias, they did
not hold stable across later analyses (see Martini, Difrisco). Moreover,
the overall instability of the models developed by the Special Master
(as evidenced in the failure of these analyses to converge in logistic
regression and 'Jumbo" coefficients for specific measures-see Appendix 9, Marshall), raised doubt as to the level of confidence that
could be placed in specific outcomes of their analysis.
With the Harris case, a new set of circumstances has arisen which
raises renewed questions regarding prejudicial factors in death sentencing in New Jersey. First, the increased sample size available for
the prejudicial factors. Second, both race and the revised high status
factor (see Memo, "Revisions in Social Status Measures") achieve statistical significance in specific schedules provided to the court (for
race, see schedules 2, 5; for status, see schedule 2,8).
Because of the special sensitivity of these questions, the Assistant
Director of the AOC (Criminal Practice) John McCarthy, Jr., requested a preliminary review of the nature and impact of four specific
prejudicial factors: race of defendant, race of victim, status of victim
and status of defendant. Below, the impacts of these factors are ex618 John P. McCarthy is the Assistant Director, Criminal Practice Division of the Admin-

istrative Office of the Courts. Requests for the analyses and models in other proportionality reviews should be directed to the Administrative Office of the Courts, Trenton, N.J.
619 David Weisburd is an associate professor at the Institute of Criminology, Hebrew
University, Jerussalem, and is a consultant to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

1996]

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

303

amined individually and in a simple additive prejudicial measure.
THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL FACTORS

1.

Race of Defendant

Race of defendant achieves statistical significance at the .05 level
in two (schedules 2 and 5) of the three schedules that include race
that achieve convergence in the Harris case (schedule 11 did not converge). In schedule 8 the impact of race is in the prejudicial direction, but does not achieve statistical significance (p=.112). The
coefficients and significance levels of the race measure for models 2
and 5 are listed below. To gain an overall sense of the magnitude of
the effect of race, the probability of receiving a death sentence (based
on the logistic models) for blacks is calculated assuming that the defendant would otherwise have a 50/50 chance of being sentenced to
death:
model 2: b=1.3725 p=.0314 prob. for whites=.50 for blacks=.80
model 5: b=2.3015 p=.0083 prob. for whites=.50 for blacks=.91
Because of questions that have been raised about the overall stability of the schedules developed by the Special Master, as well as the
sensitivity of this factor, the underlying effect or race in the models
was examined.
Examination of the bivariate relationship between race and death
penalty does not provide strong support for a solid race effect. While
blacks are more likely to receive the death penalty than whites (36%
of blacks receive death, as compared with 30% of whites), the difference between them is not statistically significant (p=.437). The question is: why is there a significant and strong race effect in the
multivariate analyses and not in the bivariate case? A simple response
would be that the race effect is an artifact of the instability of the models estimated. However, there is reason to believe that the multivariate models are correcting for a bias that develops from
differences among whites and blacks in regard to other circumstances
of their crimes.
The most straightforward method of illustrating this point, is to
examine significant statutory aggravating circumstances in model 2 (a
reduced model as compared with 5, and thus easier to use as an example). In all four of the statutory categories-4A 4C 4D 4H-that
achieve statistical significance at the .05 level whites are more culpable
than blacks. The difference is small for 4C, the wanton/vile factor,
where 42% of whites evidence this factor versus 40% of blacks. In case
of 4D and 4H the proportional differences are larger in the same direction, but the absolute number of cases is small. Four of the six
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pecuniary gain cases involved whites (while whites and blacks are
about equally distributed in the sample), and three of the four police
officer victims cases involve whites (4H). In the case of 4A, however,
the difference is both proportionally and in absolute numbers much
larger. Fifteen percent of whites (N=11) are defined as prior murderers and only 7% of blacks (N=5).
The impact of these relationships on the model is illustrated
when we compare reduced models that build in the significant aggravating circumstances. While there is little relationship between race
and the death penalty in the case of the logistic regression model including only the extra-legal factors in the model (p=.281), there is an
increase in the p level when each of the four significant aggravating
circumstances are added. With only 4A, p for blackd=.14. With 4A,
4C, 4D and 4H, the p level goes below .05. Similarly, in terms of the
strength of the coefficients, the b where aggravating circumstances are
not included is only .46 with 4A it goes to .66, 4A and 4C to .70, with
4A, 4C and 4D to .94, and finally with the four aggravating circumstances to .99.
Accordingly, a statistical explanation for why the effect of race
grows in the multivariate case, is that the inclusion of these aggravating circumstances "cleans away" biases that develop from the fact that
whites are "more culpable" on these significant aggravators than
blacks. In effect, the model is suggesting that whites should receive
the penalty of death at a higher rate than blacks given their scores on
these (and other) variables. In fact they are sentenced to death at a
slightly lower rate. 620
2.

Race of Victim

White victim does not achieve statistical signigicance at the .10
level in any of the three converged models. In the bivariate case,
there is virtually no relationship between race of victim and death sentence, with about a third of those cases with and without a white victim
gaining a death sentence. In all three models the effect of whitvic is in
the prejudicial direction. In the case of model 2 the p value approaches statistical significance (p <.12). However, in model 5 the p
value is .49., and in model 8.20. While there is not strong evidence to
suggest an independent race of victim effect, as is illustrated later,
whitvic does contribute to the stability of an overall prejudicial index.
620 It should be noted that whites on average are also somewhat more likely to evidence
significant mitigating factors. Overall the differences here are not large. However, in the

case of 5G (cooperation with state) 5 of the 6 cooperating defendants were white.
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3. Status Measures
For the Harris case, the status measures were reexamined and
revised (see memo "Revisions in Social Status Measures"). Most importantly, offenders of middling status were excluded from the high
status category, which now represents primarily individuals of professional or managerial position. A status impact is found for the high
status victim measure (SESFI). Reconstructed, it now shows a statistically significant impact in schedules 2 (p <.05) and 8 (p <.10).
Though its effect is not significant in schedule 5, the coefficient size is
relatively similar (b=1.43). None of the other status measures yield
significant results in the models examined.
The coefficients of SESF1 in schedules 2 and 8, significance
levels, and probability estimates for receiving a death penalty based on
a 50/50 probability split before inclusion of the victim status variable
are:
model 2, SESF1 b=1.5514 p=.0431 prob for not high/not low status=.50,
High Status Victim=.83
model 8, SESF1 b=1.1869 p=.050 7 prob for not high/not low status=.50,
High Status Victim=.77.
The SESF1 effect is also strong in the bivariate case. While fifty
two percent of the defendants (11 of 21) who killed someone of high
status received the death penalty, this was true in only twenty nine
percent of the cases not involving a high status victim. The relationship here is statistically significant at the five percent level (p=.036).
TIE IMPACT OF A PREJuDIcIAL FACTOR OVERALL

One issue raised in prior research, as well as in discussions with
AOC staff, is whether one can measure a prejudicial factor overall,
and whether this factor would provide a stronger and more stable indicator of disparity in death sentencing. As an initial test of this proposition, three prejudicial measures (blackd, whitvic, and SESFI) were
combined into a simple additive score. Thus in a case with a black
defendant, and a white victim of high status, the case would gain a
prejudicial factor score of 3. When none of these characteristics applied the case would gain a score of 0. If the defendant was black and
killed a white victim (not of high status) the case would gain a score of

2.
This measure assumes that it is not a specific combination of defendant and victim characteristics that creates the prejudicial factor,
but rather the simple addition of these factors. It scores a case with
only a white victim, or only a black defendant, or only a defendant of
high status similarly. In essence, each trait acts cumulatively against
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the defendant.
The prejudicial factor is a strong and highly significant factor in
each of the three models examined:
model 2: b=1.348 p=.0038
model 5: b=1.418 p=.0140
model 8: b=0.864 p=.0119
It should be noted that the strength of the effect here is larger
than it seems from the coefficients themselves. This because the measure can have four possible scores (as opposed to only two possible
scores for the individual measures). Accordingly, the probability estimates for receiving the death penalty developed below are associated
with a range of "prejudice" scores of from 0 through 3 (i.e. someone
who is not black and did not kill a high status white victim, to a black
defendant who killed a high status white victim). They are developed
setting the probability estimate at .50 for all other measures:

model 2
model 5
model 8

0

1

2

3

.50
.50
.50

.79
.81
.70

.94
.94
.85

.98
.99
.93

This simple prejudicial measure has a strong and significant impact in each of the models examined. Importantly, however, other
prejudicial factors could be developed based on other assumptions
about the nature of death penalty sentencing. The issue here is theoretical rather than analytic. For example, a prejudicial factor could be
defined that included only black defendants who kill white victims (as
has been suggested in other death penalty research). For these data,
the additive measure appears more stable than this possibility as well
as other simple combinations of the prejudicial factors. The additive
measure is also more stable across the models than any of the individual factors (though individual factors are strong in specific models;
e.g. see blackd for model 5).621

621 Taken together, these analyses suggest strong and consistent biases in the applicadon of death sentencing in NewJersey. Nonetheless, they are based on an initial analysis of
prejudicial factors in the context of schedules developed for defining culpability for individual defendants for proportionality review. A full examination of these issues, which
would begin with the goal of identifying the impacts of prejudicial factors per se, is warranted given these findings.
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SCHEDULE 2, LoGisTC VERSION

Variable

DF

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

Wald
Chi-Square

Pr >
Chi-Square

Standardized
Estimate

Odds
Ratio

INTERGPT
V4APTY
V4BPTY
V4CPTY
V4DPIY
V4EPTY
V4FPIY
V4GPIY
V4HPTY
V5APTY
V5BPTY
V5CPTY
VSDPTY
V5EPTY
V5Fp1Y
V5GPTY
V5HPTIY
SESFI
SESF2
SESF3
SESF4
VSESMIS
WH1TVIC
BLACKD
MALEDEF

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.4978
2.2817
-0.4640
1.9201
5.1605
2.8470
0.5881
0.9718
3.4700
0.0339
0.8963
-0.5476
-2.6410
-0.6415
0.1381
-2.9775
-2.5180
1.5514
0.6568
-0.2938
-0.4280
0.2787
1.0702
1.3725
-1.9607

1.9837
1.1176
1.3810
0.6965
1.6699
2.4151
0.6748
0.7332
1.6185
0.6576
1.4901
0.6412
0.7318
1.2099
0.6237
1.9451
0.8369
0.7670
1.4139
0.6701
1.4973
1.3697
0.6803
0.6376
1.5214

0.0630
4.1682
0.1129
7.6003
9.5505
1.3897
0.7595
1.7568
4.5964
0.0027
0.3618
0.7293
13.0249
0.2811
0.0490
2.3434
9.0526
4.0914
0.2158
0.1923
0.0817
0.0414
2.4752
4.6336
1.6609

0.8019
0.0412
0.7369
0.0058
0.0020
0.2385
0.3825
0.1850
0.0320
0.9589
0.5475
0.3931
0.0003
0.5960
0.8248
0.1258
0.0026
0.0431
0.6423
0.6611
0.7750
0.8388
0.1157
0.0314
0.1975

0.400415
-0.071633
0.522774
0.576331
0.227314
0.150766
0.260430
0.318757
0.009257
0.107721
-0.139484
-0.725284
-0.091117
0.036863
-0.332534
-0.475716
0.305599
0.078934
-0.073286
-0.047798
0.039581
0.291389
0.379691
-0.156551

1.645
9.793
0.629
6.822
174.252
17.236
1.801
2.643
32.137
1.034
2.451
0.578
0.071
0.526
1.148
0.051
0.081
4.718
1.929
0.745
0.652
1.321
2.916
3.945
0.141

SCHEDULE 3, LOGISTIC VERSION

Variable

DF

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

Wald
Chi-Square

Pr >
Chi-Square

Standardized
Estimate

Odds
Ratio

INTERCPT
V4APTY
V4BPIY
V4CP1Y
V4DPIY
V4EP1Y
V4FFIY
V4GPTY
V4HPTY
V5AYIY
V5BPTY
V5CPTY
V5DPTY
V5EPTY
V5FPTY
VSGPTY
V5HFTY

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.5938
2.0915
-0.2689
1.3697
3.9733
1.8494
0.6337
0.9025
3.1203
-0.6057
0.1146
-0.8114
-2.2339
-0.8029
0.3285
-2.0726
-2.5879

1.2314
0.8732
1.3504
0.6492
1.5492
1.7806
0.6010
0.7290
1.5809
0.5777
1.4710
0.6274
0.6737
1.1008
0.5916
1.7569
0.8252

0.2325
5.7373
0.0397
4.4515
6.5779
1.0788
1.1115
1.5329
3.8960
1.0992
0.0061
1.6729
10.9942
0.5320
0.3084
1.3917
9.8343

0.6297
0.0166
0.8421
-0.0349
0.0103
0.2990
0.2918
0.2157
0.0484
0.2944
0.9379
0.1959
0.0009
0.4658
0.5786
0.2381
0.0017

0.376545
-0.042642
0.368555
0.456382
0.151969
0.164024
0.240936
0.294932
-0.165078
0.013167
-0.205931
-0.615187
-0.111611
0.086914
-0.238061
-0.489924

1.811
8.097
0.764
3.934
53.160
6.356
1.884
2.466
22.654
0.546
1.121
0.444
0.107
0.448
1.389
0.126
0.075
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SCHEDULE

5,

LOGIsTIc VERSION

Variable

DF

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

Wald
Chi-Square

Pr >
Chi-Square

Standardized
Estimate

Odds
Ratio

INTERCPT
V4APTfY
V4BPTY
V4CPTY
V4DPIY
V4EPTY
V4FPTY
V4GPfY
V4HPTY
V5APTY
V5BFIY
V5CPTY
V5DPTIY
V5EPTY
V5FPTY
V5GPTfY
V5HPTY
SESF1
SESF2
SESF3
SESF4
VSESMIS
THREAT1
BLAME1
BLAME2
WHYSUFR
RPRIORI
MUTILATE
AMBUSH
WHITVIC
BLACKD
MALEDEF

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
1

-0.6259
1.9495
-0.5056
1.4104
4.6215
-0.4121
-0.3102
0.6570
4.3539
-0.1754
1.8980
-1.0972
-4.2719
0.0652
0.6529
-5.9664
-3.9609
1.4297
-0.8412
-1.3372
-0.4450
-2.6194
1.2489
1.1084
1.3687
0.3892
0.8940
2.4801
0.1466
0.5952
2.3015
-0.2059

4.3354
1.2439
1.8245
0.9199
1.8507
2.8048
0.8443
0.8724
2.0435
0.8565
1.7493
0.8662
1.1823
1.2905
0.8364
2.8021
1.3045
1.0045
1.7102
0.9113
1.7055
1.7069
1.0072
0.7840
0.5077
0.3022
0.4383
1.3666
0.7593
0.8551
0.8719
3.9183

0.0208
2.4564
0.0768
2.3509
6.2359
0.0216
0.1350
0.5671
4.5396
0.0420
1.1772
1.6044
13.0546
0.0026
0.6094
4.5339
9.2191
1.7064
0.2419
2.1531
0.0618
2.3550
1.5375
1.9985
7.2690
1.6594
4.1603
3.2936
0.0373
0.4845
6.9669
0.0028

0.8852
0.1170
0.7817
0.1252
0.0125
0.8832
0.7133
0.4514
0.0331
0.8377
0.2779
0.2053
0.0003
0.9597
0.4350
0.0332
0.0024
0.1915
0.6228
0.1423
0.7942
0.1249
0.2150
0.1575
0.0070
0.1977
0.0414
0.0695
0.8470
0.4864
0.0083
0.9581

0.342111
-0.078061
0.384000
0.516130
-0.032904
-0.079523
0.176056
0.399952
-0.047882
0.228101
-0.279496
-1.173192
0.009264
0.174306
-0.666331
-0.748320
0.281628
-0.101094
-0.333514
-0.049693
-0.372029
0.337515
0.354193
0.667405
0.267306
0.443732
0.298068
0.037082
0.162050
0.636682
-0.016436

0.535
7.025
0.603
4.098
101.642
0.662
0.733
1.929
77.783
0.839
6.672
0.334
0.014
1.067
1.921
0.003
0.010
4.177
0.431
0.263
0.641
0.073
3.486
3.030
3.930
1.476
2.445
11.943
1.158
1.813
9.989
0.814
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SCHEDULE6, PURGED LOGISTIC VERSION
LABEL
PEN. TRIALJURY FOUND 4A FACTOR
PEN. TRIAL JURY FOUND 4B FACTOR
PEN. TRIAL JURY FOUND 4C FACTOR
PEN. TRIAL JURY FOUND 4D FACTOR
PEN. TRIAL JURY FOUND 4E FACTOR
PEN. TRIAL JURY FOUND 4F FACTOR
PEN. TRIAL JURY FOUND 4G FACTOR
PEN. TRIALJURY FOUND 4_H FACTOR
MIT. CIR. 5A FOUND AT PEN. TRIAL
MIT. CIR. 5B FOUND AT PEN. TRIAL
MIT. CIR. 5C FOUND AT PEN. TRIAL
MIT. CIR. 5D FOUND AT PEN. TRIAL
MIT. CIR. 5E FOUND AT PEN. TRIAL
MIT. CIR. 5F FOUND AT PEN. TRIAL
MIT. CIR. 5G FOUND AT PEN. TRIAL
MIT. CIR. 5H FOUND AT PEN. TRIAL
THREATS FACTOR (PTDEATH MODEL)
BLAMEWORTHINESS FACT. #1 (PTDTH
MOD)
BLAMEWORTHINESS FACT. #2 (PTDTH
MOD)
SOURCE OF SUFFERING: VIC #1&#2
PERCENT PRIOR/RELEASE (PTDTH
MOD)
MUTILATION DURING KILLING
DURING/AMBUSH

NAME
CONST
V4APTY
V4BPTY
V4CPTY
V4DPTY
V4EPTY
V4FPTY
V4GPTY
V4HPTY
V5APTY
V5BPIY
V5CPTY
V5DPTY
V5EPIY
V5FPTY
V5GPTY
V5HPTY
THREAT1

BETA

STD

-0.039
1.114
0.169
1.125
3.017
0.072
-0.356
0.428
3.104
-0.233
1.311
-0.739
-2.819
0.056
0.368
-3.891
-2.716
0.815

0.964
1.365
0.921
0.652
1.295
1.650
0.737
0.592
1.631
0.597
1.031
0.706
0.562
0.773
0.570
1.406
0.686
0.519

EST

ESTP

-0.04
0.82
-0.18
1.73
2.33
0.04
-0.48
0.72
1.90
-0.39
1.27
-1.05
-5.02
0.07
0.65
-2.77
-3.96
1.57

0.9681
0.4145
0.8548
0.0845
0.0199
0.9649
0.6291
0.4591
0.0570
0.6958
0.2037
0.2951
0.0000
0.9426
0.5189
0.0056
0.0001
0.1166

BLAMEI

0.772 0.362

2.14

0.0328

BLAME2
WHYSUFR

0.934 0.396
0.246 0.261

2.36
0.94

0.0184
0.3457

1.58
2.10
0.00
0.72

0.1134
0.0359
0.9992
0.4734

RPRIORI
MUTILATE
AMBUSH
PDAWASRC

0.625
1.639
-0.001
0.098

0.395
0.782
0.663
0.137
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SCHEDULE

Variable
INTEROPT
V4APRC
V4BPRC
V4CPRC
V4DPRC
V4EPRC
V4FPRC
V4GPRC
V4HPRC
V5APRC
V5BPRC
V5CPRC
V5DPRC
V5EPRC
V5FPRC
V5GPRC
V5HPRC
WHITVIC
BLACKD
MALEDEF
SESFI
SESF2
SESF3
SESF4
VSESMIS

DF

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

Wald
Chi-Square

Pr >
Chi-Square

Standardized
Estimate

Odds
Ratio

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

-0.4808
2.2058
-0.1694
1.7526
3.2398
2.1912
0.9734
0.2340
3.0956
0.2110
-0.1904
-1.3928
-1.9742
-0.3440
-0.1202
-1.6883
-3.2342
0.6391
0.7888
-0.1881
1.1869
-0.5856
-0.2445
-0.7343
-0.1977

1.5953
0.7363
1.0000
0.5032
1.1964
1.6220
0.5219
0.5684
1.3341
0.4841
1.0791
0.5367
0.5709
1.0985
0.5095
1.6964
0.7810
0.4980
0.4969
1.2522
0.6074
1.1863
0.5159
0.9440
0.7951

0.0909
8.9751
0.0284
12.1295
7.3326
1.8251
3.4783
0.1695
5.3837
0.1901
0.0311
0.5358
11.9587
0.0980
0.0556
0.9905
17.1473
1.6468
2.5199
0.0226
3.8185
0.2437
0.2246
0.6051
0.0618

0.7631
0.0027
0.8662
0.0005
0.0068
0.1767
0.0622
0.6806
0.0203
0.6629
0.8600
0.4642
0.0005
0.7542
0.8135
0.3196
0.0001
0.1994
0.1124
0.8806
0.0507
0.6216
0.6356
0.4366
0.8036

0.313238
-0.031928
0.438126
0.303540
0.131028
0.221401
0.058127
0.185105
0.053967
-0.024835
-0.099088
-0.541365
-0.037898
-0.032480
-0.158181
-0.411887
0.176148
0.216138
-0.016741
0.218649
-0.092077
-0.063148
-0.086226
-0.035691

0.681
9.078
0.845
5.770
25.528
8.946
2.647
1.264
22.100
1.235
0.827
0.675
0.139
0.709
0.887
0.185
0.039
1.895
2.201
0.829
3.277
0.557
0.783
0.480
0.821

SCHEDULE

Variable
INTERCPT
V4APRC
V4BPRC
V4GPRC
V4DPRC
V4EPRC
V4FPRC
V4GPRC
V4HPRC
V5APRC
V5BPRC
V5CPRC
V5DPRC
V5EPRC
V5FPRC
V5GPRC
V5HPRC

VERSION

9, LOGISTIC

VERSION

DF

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

Wald
Chi-Square

Pr >
Chi-Square

Standardized
Estimate

Odds
Ratio

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.0607
1.9302
-0.4137
1.6674
3.1006
2.2821
1.0325
0.3961
3.1904
0.0851
-0.2457
-0.4544
-1.8793
-0.4941
-0.1386
-0.7693
-3.1326

0.9581
0.6525
0.9614
0.4802
1.1921
1.4399
0.4792
0.5356
1.3055
0.4541
1.0047
0.5076
0.5442
0.9839
0.4742
1.5191
0.7332

0.0040
8.7511
0.1851
12.0585
6.7648
2.5120
4.6427
0.5469
5.9719
0.0355
0.0598
0.8012
11.9253
0.2522
0.0854
0.2565
18.2565

0.9495
0.0031
0.6670
0.0005
0.0093
0.1130
0.0312
0.4596
0.0145
0.8504
0.8068
0.3707
0.0006
0.6155
0.7701
0.6126
0.0001

0.274100
-0.078414
0.416838
0.290495
0.136464
0.234852
0.098397
0.190774
0.021770
-0.032056
-0.114612
-0.515330
-0.054440
-0.037450
-0.072079
-0.398957

1.063
6.891
0.661
5.299
22.210
9.797
2.808
1.486
24.297
1.089
0.782
0.635
0.153
0.610
0.871
0.463
0.044
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ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY IN STATE V. DONALD

LopmTv, S.C. DOCKET

No. A-86,

REGARDING

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW, OCTOBER

22, 1996

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-86 September Term 1996
39,597
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

DONALD LOFTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
The Supreme Court having affirmed the conviction and death
sentence of defendant, State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295 (1996), and having
directed that a proportionality review of his sentence be undertaken
at the request of defendant;
And the Court having previously affirmed the conviction and
death sentence of Joseph Harris, State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525 (1995),
and the Administrative Office of the Courts having thereafter prepared a report for the proportionality review of the defendant Harris's
death sentence (the Report), which proportionality review was scheduled to be heard by the Court in September 1996;
And the evidence of the proportionality of the defendant Harris's
death sentence having been sharply controverted by the parties;
And the proportionality review of Joseph Harris; death sentence
no longer being before the Court because of the dismissal by the
Court of the Harris case based on the defendant's unrelated death;
And the Court having noted that the evidence and statistical data
in the Report that was prepared in the Harris case, as supplemented,
will be considered in the within matter, that Report having stated that
additional study would have to be undertaken to evaluate fully the
validity of a preliminary indication of the possibility that race is a factor in the proportionality of the death sentence in the Harris case and
in the imposition of death sentences by juries generally,
And the Court having further noted that the within matter, which
is scheduled to be heard by the Court this term, will raise a racial
discrimination claim identical to that raised in State v. Harris(A-3-96);
And the Court, based on the Report and the contentions of the
respective parties, having determined that the issues implicated by the
preliminary indication of the possibility of race as a factor in the imposition of death sentences must be addressed more completely as a part
of its consideration and adjudication of pending capital cases;
And the Court having further determined that the need for addi-
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tional study of such issues can be most appropriately addressed by the
Court through the use of supplemental proceedings with the assistance of a Special Master;
And good cause appearing;
It is ORDERED that retired Superior CourtJudge Richard S. Cohen is appointed as a Special Master for the Supreme Court to conduct a review, perform analyses, and make findings and
recommendations relating to defendants' race as a possible factor in
the decision of juries to impose the death penalty as implicated by
date in the Report; and it is further
ORDERED that such review and analyses shall encompass the following areas:
(1) The Special Master shall examine and issue findings on the
reliability of the data obtained by the Administrative Office of the
Courts as it relates to the issue of racial discrimination in the proportionality review proceedings in State v. Harris(A-3-96) and the within
matter. The Special Master shall review and evaluate the arguments
of the parties as they relate to the reliability of the data and the statistical techniques employed; shall consult with the parties, representatives of the Administrative Office of the Court, and with experts as
appropriate; shall conduct analyses as appropriate; and make recommendations as to alternative research methods as appropriate;
(2) The Special Master shall independently assess and rank by
culpability, sentence, and race of defendant all penalty-phase cases in
the Administrative Office of the Courts' proportionality review universe. The Special Master shall consider the findings regarding the
reliability of the data and statistical techniques when ranking such
cases, and, where appropriate and feasible, shall incorporate suggestions for improvement;
(3) In addition to statistical analyses relating to culpability rankings, the Special Master shall attempt independently to corroborate
the appropriateness of the culpability rankings, and in this respect,
may consider other factors including those deemed relevant by witnesses, including prosecutors, defense attorney, trial judges, and
others experienced in the trial of death penalty cases; and
(4) The Special Master shall undertake or cause to be undertaken
a precedent-seeking review of those cases falling within the mid-range
of culpability on the table(s) that the Special Master causes to be created. The precedent-seeking review shall be conducted without disclosure of the race of individual defendants and in accordance with
the general standards used by the Supreme Court when it conducts
proportionality review. The Special Master shall make detailed find-
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ings regarding whether the precedent-seeking review reveals reasons
why some of the mid-range cases received life sentences while others
received death sentences and whether race appears to have been a
factor in the sentences. As noted, the Special Master may obtain evaluations of the mid-range cases from other witnesses experienced in
death penalty cases, provided all such evaluations are made a matter
of record; and it is further
ORDERED that to assist the Special Master in the project, the
Administrative Office of the Courts shall forthwith provide the Special
Master and the parties with: (1) a list of all penalty-phase cases, broken down by the race of the defendants, the sentences, and the aggravating and mitigating factors found; (2) a brief synopsis of all penaltyphase cases; and (3) copies of the reports on all prior proportionality
review including the report in the within matter when finalized, as
well as the reports submitted to the Court by David Baldus; and it is
further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall forthwith provide the
Special Master with copies of the proportionality review briefs in State
v. Harrisand with copies of the proportionality review briefs in within
matter as they are filed; and it is further
ORDERED that the Special Master shall conduct the review directed by this Order using all available data and reports, together with
the assistance of the Administrative Office of the Courts and a consultant to be appointed by the Special Master with the approval of the
Court; and it is further
ORDERED that in respect of the relevant issues, the Special
Master may invite the participation of interested parties not otherwise
participating in the within matter; and it is further
ORDERED that the Special Master shall have the authority to
conduct hearings, to procure technical and judicial expert advice, to
call witnesses, and to direct the Administrative Office of the Courts
and the selected consultant to perform such analyses and to provide
such advice as the Special Master deems necessary and appropriate to
comply with the terms of this Order; and it is further
ORDERED that the Special Master shall promptly undertake the
review required by this Order and shall file a report consisting of the
Master's findings and recommendations, as well as the underlying evidence, data, and analyses byJanuary 17, 1997; and it is further
ORDERED that the within Order may be modified or supplemented by the Court on the application of the Special Master, on application of any party, or on the Court's own motion; and it is further
ORDERED that the report of the Special Master shall not include
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any determination concerning the appropriateness of a death sentence imposed in any case of the constitutionality of the death penalty
statute; and it is further
ORDERED that parties in the within matter shall file supplemental briefs within thirty days of the filing of the Special Master's report
with the Clerk of the Court, with responding briefs to be filed within
thirty days thereafter; and it is further
ORDERED that nothing in this Order should be construed by the
Special Master or the parties to represent a position of the Supreme
Court on any issue before it.
WITNESS, the Honorable Deborah T. Poritz, Chief Justice, at
Trenton, this 22st day of October, 1996.
Clerk of the Supreme Court
Chief Justice Poritz and Justices Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, Garibaldi, Stein, and Coleman join in the Court's Order.

